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Summary
This thesis investigates three important themes within the development economics liter-
ature that link children, women and economic development.
In the first essay we present an analysis of child labour among agricultural households
in rural Nepal. We first examine the monetary contribution of child labour to family farms.
For this purpose, within a non-separable agricultural household model we estimate a farm
production function to obtain shadow wages for both children and adults employed on the
farm. Our results reveal that the relative contribution of child labour to family income
is not negligible. We then analyse child labour supply to explore whether it is driven
by poverty or other reasons such as imperfections in the labour market. We estimate
both a reduced form model and a structural equation model. This latter includes the
estimated shadow wages and income from the previous analysis. Both models allow for
an examination of how child labour supply reacts to a change in the opportunity cost
of time and wealth. The reduced form results suggest that an increase in household’s
wealth (measured by land endowments) reduces child labour, specifically of girls. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis of poverty-induced child labour in the presence of
perfect labour markets. This decline, however, occurs for sufficiently high levels of wealth.
Imperfections in the labour market may play a role in explaining child labour of boys
and in households that are not at the top-end of the land distribution. Estimates of the
structural labour supply model, however, yield results on wage and income elasticities that
partly contradicts the theoretical predictions.
In the second essay we analyse whether and how an increase in the participation of
women in a key decision making body of local collective action institutions - the Execut-
ive Committee (EC) of Community Forest User Groups (CFUG) in Nepal - affects forest
protection, specifically household firewood collection. In many developing countries wo-
men are responsible for the collection and management of forest products essential to the
daily lives of their household. Therefore they have stronger interests than men in ensur-
ing the availability of these products. Despite this, women are often excluded from the
decision-making process that sets out the rules to access and collect forest products within
community forests. We account for the potential endogeneity of female participation and
exploit an amendment made to the guidelines for CFUG formation that sets a higher
iv
threshold for women representation in the Executive Committee to evaluate the impact
of women on firewood extraction. The results indicate that higher female participation in
the ECs of CFUGs leads to a decrease in firewood extraction. This evidence is suggest-
ive that women are prioritising conservation to ensure sustainable firewood extraction for
their daily needs.
In the third essay we analyse the short and long-term impact of violence on education in
Timor Leste. Specifically, we examine the effect of the 1999 violence on school attendance
in 2001 and its longer-term impact on primary school completion of the same cohorts of
children observed again in 2007. We compare the educational impact of the 1999 violence
with the impact of other periods of high-intensity violence during the 25 years of Indonesian
occupation. The short-term effects of the conflict are mixed. In the longer term, we find
evidence of a substantial loss of human capital among boys in Timor Leste exposed to
peaks of violence during the 25-year long conflict. The evidence suggests that this result
may be due to household trade-offs between education and economic welfare.
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1Introduction
This thesis consists of three separate essays devoted to the analysis of links between
children, women and economic development. Specifically, we investigate the relationship
between children and economic development by looking at the effects of changing economic
conditions and of conflict on child labour and education, respectively. We examine the
link between women and economic development by analysing the effect of increased female
empowerment in local level institutions on environmental degradation.
Each essay investigates themes that are closely connected and on which debates have
emerged over the years. However, little research has been devoted to the specific research
questions that are the subject of focus in this thesis. In particular, the first essay provides
an analysis of child labour in agricultural households which to date has received only
modest attention in the literature. This issue is investigated here for rural Nepal. Much of
the existing literature has failed to account for the fact that in agricultural households the
allocation of children’s time depends on both production and consumption choices and that
wages are typically unavailable for self-employed individuals. The second essay provides
an analysis of collective action institutions focused on forest protection. In particular, it
looks at the impact of an increased share of women in the decision making body of these
institutions on environmental outcomes, focusing on the quantity of firewood collected
by households in rural Nepal. Most of the existing studies do not concentrate on the
role of gender in forest and those that do so are mostly based on the use of small case
2studies. This analysis thus contributes to a very small existing literature in exploring this
extremely important topic. The third essay studies the short-term and long-term effects
of the Timor Leste conflict on the educational outcomes of girls and boys. This study
contributes to an emerging literature on the long-term effects of conflict on human capital
accumulation.
A contribution common to the three essays is the focus on gender. Girls and women
appear to react differently than boys and men to changing economic conditions, to em-
powerment and to violent events. Gender analysis is central to many topics in development
economics. The recognition of differences by gender is well established but there are still
relevant issues that merit careful investigation. We show that most of the differences by
gender in our results are related to the different roles that men and women, boys and girls
play within the household. These differences appear particularly acute in rural settings
where social norms and gender division of labour exist.
The interest in analysing the link between children’s outcomes and economic develop-
ment lies both in the inherent rights of children to fully develop and in the vital role that
children and young people play in every society. A child has his own right to survive, grow
and develop. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is founded on the premise that
the human rights of all children need to be ensured. In addition, children represent the
future of every society and their accumulation of human capital leads to economic growth
and development (Boyden and Dercon, 2012). An improvement in children’s well-being
early in their life has long-lasting effects which ultimately manifest themselves when they
are adults. Well-established literature emphasizes the impact of negative shocks during
childhood or of any other constraint which hinders a child’s development on outcomes later
in life (Akresh et al., 2012; Almond, 2006; Almond and Currie, 2011; Case and Paxson,
2008; Maccini and Yang, 2009).
In particular, children who work many hours per day, sometimes in harmful activities,
3may have their educational or health outcomes adversely affected. A clear identification
of what determines child labour may help remove the constraints that also hinder the
normal growing-up of a child and his/her human capital accumulation. Similarly, the
adverse effects of a conflict on the affected population may come to light not only in
the short-term but also in the longer term. This can lead to significant and long-lasting
detrimental effects on individual human capital accumulation. Identifying the effects of
conflicts and the appropriate interventions to mitigate them, may help improve economic
development.
The analysis of the link between women and economic development is also extremely
relevant. A growing literature investigates the relationship between the empowerment of
women and economic development. Duflo (2012) suggests a two-way relationship. Eco-
nomic development, by reducing poverty and gender inequality, may improve conditions
for women. However, at the same time, policy interventions devoted to empower women
may accelerate development. We are particularly interested in the latter relationship. A
focus on empowering women lies primarily on equity grounds. Every woman should have
the same right as men to have representation at all levels of decision-making. In addi-
tion, the participation of women at decision-making levels may have a positive impact on
many socio-economic outcomes. These potentially positive consequences of an increased
role for women at different levels are based on the observation that women have differ-
ent interests and preferences to men (Agarwal, 2010b; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).
Some empirical evidence suggests that by empowering women within the household (e.g.,
by giving them access to credit), within a community (e.g., by increasing their role in
local institutions) or on the farm (e.g., by giving them access to land), they tend to in-
vest disproportionately more on child-related outcomes. Hence, if empowering women
improves children’s outcomes (such that their human capital accumulation increases), or
any other socio-economic outcome, this would also favour economic development (Doepke
4and Tertilt, 2011; Duflo, 2012).
More specifically, to inform on the relationship between women and economic devel-
opment, we look at the effect of an increased role of women within community level insti-
tutions on environmental degradation. Environmental degradation per se may jeopardise
economic development. At the same time it has direct consequences on the populations
that rely daily on natural resources. The scarcity of such resources poses serious concerns
for them. Women can play a significant role in this context as they have primary respons-
ibilities for the collection and use of forest products that are essential to the household’s
livelihood. However, female participation in forestry has been neglected and recognition
and encouragement of the role of women may ultimately prove beneficial for economic
development.
Nepal and Timor Leste are particularly suitable countries for our analysis. The reason
for focusing on Nepal for an analysis of child labour lies in the fact that such labour
is a significant phenomenon that is mainly confined to the agricultural sector and fairly
prevalent on most family farms. Among agricultural households, 50 percent of children
aged five to 14 years old are involved in some work activity. In addition, agriculture is the
major source of income and employment of the large majority of the population.
Nepal is also appropriate for the analysis of the role of women in forestry. The forest
represents one of the most important natural resources in the country. However, over the
past decades concerns over forest degradation in Nepal have emerged. In addition, despite
the fact that women are still largely under-represented at all institutional levels in Nepal,
the presence of women in key positions in locally-based forestry protection institutions has
been increasing over recent years.
Finally, the Timor Leste conflict is also particularly interesting for the purpose of our
analysis. Timor Leste was hit by a long-lasting conflict with Indonesia. This allows an
investigation not only of the short-term effects but also the longer term effects of different
5peaks of violence and of the whole conflict on educational outcomes. Despite its very
vicious nature, this conflict has been largely ignored. Its peculiarity in terms of post-
conflict interventions increases the interest in the analysis undertaken here. In addition,
the reason to focus on educational outcomes lies in the fact that the effects of 25 years of
Indonesian occupation on education have been adverse. Almost ten years after the end of
the conflict most of the Timorese population still had little or no education.
The choice of these two countries is also motivated by practical reasons. All essays
develop arguments based on the microeconomic theory. Hence the empirical analysis
is based on the use of nationally representative household survey data. The relevant
authorities in Nepal and Timor Leste have made high quality household survey data
available which contain the information needed for our analysis. In addition, in two essays
we complement the analysis using two additional datasets, the CFUG Database, which is
a census of all Community Forest User Groups created in Nepal, and the Human Rights
Violations Database, which contains detailed data on the violence that occurred in Timor
Leste. The use of this data provides unique information which is essential for the empirical
identification strategies used in these essays.
The specific objectives of this thesis are structured as follows. In the first chapter
we examine the monetary contribution of child labour to family farms and then analyse
child labour supply to explore whether it is driven by poverty or other reasons such as
imperfections in the labour market. We first estimate a farm production function which
permits the calculation of child and adult shadow wages and shadow household income.
We then estimate child labour supply equations, in both their reduced and structural
forms. The second chapter investigates the effect of an increased participation of women
in the Executive Committees (ECs) of Nepalese Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs)
on the quantity of firewood collected at the household level. As firewood collection is one
of the main causes of forest degradation and deforestation, a reduction in its extraction
6potentially informs on the effectiveness of CFUGs in protecting the forests. Our hypothesis
is that, given the interests of women in ensuring the availability of firewood, an increase
in female participation in the ECs of CFUGs reduces the extraction of firewood. In the
third chapter, using individual level measures of violence we examine the short-term effect
of the 1999 violence on school attendance in 2001. We then exploit the temporal and
geographical variation in the incidence of the conflict to assess the longer term impact of
the 1999 violence and of early periods of violence on primary school completion in 2007.
7Chapter 1
Shadow wages and child labour
supply in agricultural households
in Nepal
1.1 Introduction
Child labour is a widespread phenomenon around the world. The ILO estimates that
around 218 million children aged between five and 14 years are employed in some kind of
economic activity (Hagemann et al., 2006). Most of the attention has been concentrated on
the widely known forms of child labour, usually located in urban areas (e.g., child labour
in the manufacturing and mining sectors, street children and child sexual exploitation).
However, little attention has been focused on child labour in the agricultural sector though
‘most of working children are found toiling in the fields and fisheries of the world, not in
factories’ (ILO, 2002, p.5). This form of child labour is usually recognised as not being
harmful for children whenever child activities are limited to helping parents for only a
few hours per day. This is not only simply part of a normal growing up in a rural area,
but it can also have a beneficial effect on the development of children’s skills and on their
8education. However, child labour in agriculture is classified by the ILO as one of the worst
forms of child labour. There is a great number of children involved in difficult agricultural
tasks harmful to their health and required to work for too many hours per day. This might
also be true for children that work on the family farm as self-employed. This is the most
prevalent form of child labour in rural settings of developing countries.
The aim of this paper is to fill an existing gap in the literature and present an analysis
of child labour in agricultural households. More specifically, we first examine the monetary
contribution of child labour to family farms and then explore why child labour is prevalent
in farm households, whether for poverty or for other reasons (i.e., imperfections in the
labour market). The poverty hypothesis simply states that parents will not put their
children into work if they ‘can afford not to’ (Basu et al., 2010, p.8).
Knowledge of the value of income generated by children is particularly relevant as it
provides information on the opportunity cost of their time (Jacoby, 1993). In particular,
the allocation of children’s time is the result of a complex household decision process,
which depends on resources available and their distribution within the household, on the
availability and quality of schools, on the substitution with adult family members or with
hired labour and on various market imperfections. For household members that work
in wage employment, market wages represents the opportunity cost to these individu-
als. However, for individuals engaged in on-farm work, typically wages are not available.
Simply imputing market wages to self-employed individuals does not provide robust es-
timates of the value of family labour, both because observations on wages are typically
too few and rural labour markets are usually imperfect. Therefore, shadow wages need to
be computed.
In addition, understanding the role of poverty as a determinant of child labour in farm
households is particularly challenging. The existing literature on child labour provided
mixed evidence on this. Only more recently the precise role of poverty has been analysed
9providing evidence that children work more in land rich households than in land poor
ones, not for poverty reasons but, under certain conditions, due to the existence of market
imperfections (Basu et al., 2010; Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007). In particular,
the recognition that land has a dual role, being both a source of wealth and also a source
of work opportunity, sheds light on the apparently perverse response of child labour to an
increase in land in agricultural households. This phenomenon has been termed the ‘wealth
paradox’ and has been attributed mostly to imperfections in the markets (Bhalotra and
Heady, 2003). More recent evidence has suggested for the existence of an inverted-U
relationship between child labour and land. Children tend to work more as land size
increases. However, at a certain level of wealth, child labour starts to decrease. This
pattern is also a consequence of imperfections in the labour markets (Basu et al., 2010).
The specific objectives of this analysis are as follows. First, we want to establish what
is the contribution of child on-farm labour to the household income and look at child
contribution as compared to adults. Within a non-separable agricultural household model
we estimate a farm production function to obtain shadow wages of child and adult labour
employed on the farm. Second, we want to know how child labour supply in agricultural
households reacts to changing economic conditions to understand whether children work
mainly because their families are poor or because of imperfections in the labour market.
In order to address this objective, we first estimate a reduced form model where land
is used as the main source of wealth. The sign on the land coefficient should inform
on the relative strength of income and substitution effects stemming from an increase
in land size. We then estimate a structural child labour supply equation. In addition
to providing useful information in its own right, the shadow wage and income variables
can be included in the structural labour supply model to investigate their effects on child
labour supply. We obtain direct child wage and household income elasticities that should
permit the calculation of pure income and substitution effects. Moreover, the inclusion
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of adult shadow wages provides information on the interaction between adult and child
labour. This analysis allows an examination of how child labour supply changes when
either the opportunity cost of her time changes or the family income changes thus testing
the poverty hypothesis noted earlier.
Our results show that the relative contribution of child labour to the family income
of farm households is not negligible and that child labour contribution is nearly half of
those of adults. In addition, the reduced form results suggest that an increase in land
size decreases child labour, particularly of girls. However, this decrease only occurs for
relatively high levels of wealth. This suggests that imperfections in the labour market
may play a role in explaining child labour of boys and of households that are not at the
top-end of the land distribution. Estimates of the structural labour supply model reveal
results on wage and income elasticities that are partly contrary to the theoretical priors.
This analysis is conducted on agricultural households in Nepal. This is a particularly
interesting country to study as child labour is quite a sizeable phenomenon and is mainly
confined to the agricultural sector. Indeed, despite the high incidence of child labour in
the worst industries and occupations, and the increasing prevalence of child labour in
non-agricultural activities, most of the children in Nepal are involved in some agricultural
activity and a great part of it is within their own household (CBS, 2004). In addition,
most of the population in Nepal lives in rural areas and the agricultural sector is the major
source of Nepalese income and employment. Agriculture accounts for 40 percent of its GDP
and nearly 80 percent of the population is involved in some agricultural activity (FAO,
2007). Hence knowing whether and how child labour contributed to Nepalese agricultural
income becomes particularly relevant.
With this analysis we attempt to contribute to a limited literature that provides es-
timates of the shadow wage of children and that in general focuses on child labour in
agricultural households. To our knowledge there are no studies that have estimated the
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economic contribution of child on-farm labour and then have used this value to estimate a
structural child labour supply equation and there is only one study that provides estimate
of child shadow wages.
The knowledge of the monetary contribution of child labour to family farms and of how
child labour reacts to an increase in wealth or of work opportunities is particularly relevant
for policy makers who wish to explore the relative benefits of different policy options (Singh
et al., 1986). In particular, if poverty is the main cause of child labour, policies which
ban child labour or impose trade sanctions on it, will only worsen the conditions of these
households. Any intervention devoted to improve schooling outcomes through a reduction
of schooling fees or an improvement of school quality may not have the desired effects
if these interventions are not accompanied by lowering the opportunity cost of schooling
(Bhalotra, 2007). So programmes which give cash or food to families for sending their
children to school would be consistent with poverty being a binding constraint. However,
if imperfections in the labour market explain partly the existence of child labour in farm
households, then interventions devoted to their removal would be more effective (Basu
et al., 2010).
The structure of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 contains a brief
literature review. In Section 1.3 we present the theoretical framework. Section 1.4 provides
the empirical strategy. Section 1.5 illustrates the context and section 1.6 describes the data
and some descriptive statistics. In Section 1.7 and 1.8 we report the empirical estimates
of the production function and those of the labour supply functions respectively. Section
1.9 discusses the results and section 1.10 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
According to the ILO’s 2002-04 Global Estimates on child labour, around 132 million
children aged five and 14 years work in agriculture (Hagemann et al., 2006). In 2007 the
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ILO and FAO together with other international and union organizations signed a declara-
tion of intent of cooperation on child labour in agriculture, directed at its elimination. In
addition, the approval of the United Nations Convention of Human Rights of the Child
in 1989, the adoption of ILO’s Convention 1381 and 1822 and the institution in 1992 of
the International Program for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), testify to an in-
creasing willingness to address the problem of child labour in developing countries. The
Government of Nepal ratified ILO conventions 138 and 182 respectively in 1997 and in
2002. In addition, the Constitution of Nepal of 1990 and four other laws3 contain specific
provisions to protect children, to prohibit the use of child labour in specific occupations
and those below a certain age. The Government of Nepal, with the help of international or-
ganisations, has been and is currently active in promoting the development of programmes
towards the elimination of child labour (e.g., Nepal’s Master Plan for the Elimination of
Child labour).
Child labour has received special attention in the last two decades and a vast theoretical
and empirical literature has emerged over time. Basu and Van (1998) in their seminal
paper on the economics of child labour identify poverty (i.e., the luxury axiom) as its
main determinant. The luxury axiom predicts that child leisure is a luxury good and
households would not make their children work unless they needed to do so for poverty
reasons. However, much of the subsequent literature contains mixed evidence on the
linkage between poverty and child labour (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 1997; Ray, 2000;
Sedlacek et al., 2005). The inclusion of a measure of household income or of household
assets to analyse the poverty hypothesis, reveals either positive, negative or even zero
elasticities. The difficulty in empirically detecting a central role for poverty is linked to the
1Adopted in 1973 and concerns the minimum age for admission to employment (see www.ilo.org).
2Adopted in 1999 and concerns the ‘prohibition and immediate action for the elimination of the worst
forms of child labour’ (see www.ilo.org).
3The Children’s Act, 1992; The Labour Act, 1992, and Labour Rules, 1993; The Child Labour (Pro-
hibition and Regulation) Act, 1999; Kamaiya Labour Probihition Act, 2001 (see www.ilo.org).
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fact that most of the past literature failed to understand that different economic conditions
can affect child labour and school participation in different ways (Edmonds, 2008). Indeed
depending on the measure used, this might reflect a mix of demand and supply factors and
of income and substitution effects (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Dumas, 2007). In addition,
shocks can affect households differently depending on their aggregate/idiosyncratic or
temporary/permanent nature (Beegle et al., 2006; Dehejia and Gatti, 2002; Duryea et al.,
2007; Guarcello et al., 2010; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Kruger, 2007). More recent
empirical studies have attempted to understand whether and to what extent poverty is
the main determinant of child labour (Edmonds, 2008). This evidence has stressed the
need to clearly identify income and substitution effects from different components of family
income (Soares et al., 2012) and to separate supply from demand factors (Kambhampati
and Rajan, 2006) in order to obtain findings consistent with the predictions of the existing
theory (i.e., that poverty is one of the causes of child labour). Soares et al. (2012), find that
an increase in family wealth reduces child labour and increases schooling, while an increase
in child labour demand (proxied by the value of coffee production and overall agricultural
production), raises a child’s opportunity cost of time, hence increasing child labour and
reducing school participation. Bhalotra (2007), which provides the first direct test of the
poverty hypothesis, looks at the own wage elasticity of child labour supply in Pakistan and
finds a negative wage elasticity for boys suggesting that the income effect prevails over the
substitution effect in support of the poverty hypothesis. The author finds, instead, a wage
elasticity for girls not statistically significant from zero and suggests that girls work even
when not necessary. However, the analysis concentrates on wage work, where typically
the incidence of child labour is quite low (though prevalent in this context). Indeed, most
of the existing studies devoted to the analysis of child labour determinants do not focus
specifically on child labour in agricultural households.
The analysis of the role of poverty as a determinant of child labour becomes par-
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ticularly difficult in agricultural households (i.e., households that own or cultivate some
land). Indeed, in these households supply factors and some of the demand factors may
come both from within the household. Singh et al. (1986) present a formal agricultural
household model showing the complexities with agricultural household behaviour given
the interrelation between consumption and production choices. A few studies have ana-
lysed the allocation of children’s time within an agricultural household (Mueller, 1984).
One of the first analyses on this is Bhalotra and Heady (2003). They emphasize the fact
that land has a dual role being on one side a source of wealth (supply factor) and on the
other, a source of employment opportunities (demand factor). They find a positive effect
of land size on child labour (i.e., wealth paradox) as greater employment opportunities
within the household become available. Imperfections in labour markets may create this
paradox (de Janvry et al., 1991). Indeed, assuming that the marginal product of child
labour on the farm is increasing in land size, an imperfect labour market (e.g., manifested
by difficulty in hiring labour) pushes the household to employ its children on the farm
until the wealth effect of land ownership does not prevail. Similarly, Mueller (1984), finds
that the more productive capital (i.e, land and education) a household owns, the more
its members work, mainly male children. Dumas (2007) also focuses on child farm labour
and develops a model to test the poverty hypothesis in rural areas of Burkina Faso.4 The
empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis suggesting instead a major role for
rural labour markets imperfections. The author finds indeed that child labour increases
as land increases in the presence of market imperfections. However, the study shows that
when labour markets are perfect, child labour is decreasing in land. In a recent paper
Basu et al. (2010), building on the above two studies, develop a theoretical model and
test empirically the poverty hypothesis, more specifically they test the inverted-U hypo-
4More specifically in testing for poverty she distinguish between the subsistence hypothesis, (i.e., chil-
dren work only if the household income is below a subsistence level) and a luxury hypothesis (i.e., child
labour is a luxury good).
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thesis. Under imperfect labour markets they show in India that as landholdings rises, this
generates employment opportunities for household family members and children will start
working. There is, however, a level of land beyond which child labour starts decreasing as
households become rich enough. If labour markets where perfect and hence, for example,
off-farm opportunities available, poor households would have sent their children to work
off-farm.
The above studies, despite concentrating on on-farm child labour, estimate reduced
form models using land as a measure of wealth and employment potential at the same
time. These studies indeed do not provide direct wage and income elasticities and also
do not provide a measure of the contribution of child on-farm labour to family income.
As wages are typically not available for self-employed in agricultural households, most
of the studies that attempted to estimate structural models, had to impute prevailing
market wages for self-employed activities (Rosenzweig, 1980). Given the importance of
clearly identifying the underlying factors that drive a household decision-making process
on the allocation of its members’ time, knowing the correct value of child and adult time is
essential. The knowledge of child wages on family farm work besides having an informative
value on its own, allows the direct estimate of wage and income elasticities. This should be
informative to establish the role of poverty as a child labour supply determinant. Skoufias
(1994) estimates the determinants of child time allocation in agricultural households and
argues the case to estimate the shadow value of child labour in non-market activities given
imperfections in the markets and the reliance on too few observations when imputing
wages.
Few studies have analysed the economic contribution of child labour to household in-
come when children are employed on the family farm. There are no studies that have
estimated the economic contribution of child on-farm labour and then use this value to
estimate a structural labour supply equation. Mueller (1984) estimates a household en-
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terprise production function in rural Botzwana to derive marginal productivities of family
labour (including children) and then estimates individual labour supplies. However, the
author uses education and land variables as proxies for productivities in the time allocation
equation, without obtaining direct wage and income elasticities. The study finds that child
labour contributes significantly to household income only in households which own cattle.
Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) attempted to measure a child’s economic contribution to
family income. Menon et al. (2005) provide the first study that estimates the shadow wage
of children in their work on the family farm in Nepal and find that children’s contribution
to household income is substantial. Other attempts to estimate shadow wages for on-farm
work concentrates only on adult labour (Barrett et al., 2008; Jacoby, 1993; Lambert and
Magnac, 1994; Skoufias, 1994). As will be shown, shadow wages are simply the value of
marginal products of labour obtained from the estimate of a production function. Jacoby
(1993) finds marginal products of male labour higher than female ones. A similar result
is obtained by Abdulai and Regmi (2000) for Nepal. Fall and Magnac (2004) estimate a
rural household model allowing for different ‘tastes’ for on-farm and off-farm work among
household members. They find that shadow wages for on-farm work is below off-farm
wages and rationalise this result as reflecting ‘a specific taste for on-farm work’ (Fall and
Magnac, 2004, p.267), that household members assign to on-farm work. Barrett et al.
(2008) estimate the shadow wages for adult family on-farm workers taking into account
also the existence of any allocative inefficiency.5 They then adjust the shadow wages for
this measure of inefficiency and estimate the adult labour supply.
Estimates of the shadow wage also provide a measure of the relative productivity of
each household member on different types of work either on or off-the-farm. It provides
knowledge on the demand for child labour in farm households. The literature on intra-
5Simply testing whether the marginal product of labour and market wage are equal gives a test for the
presence of imperfections in markets, transaction costs, and in general for allocative inefficiencies in the
use of labour inputs.
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household time allocation models (Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977; Fafchamps and Quisumb-
ing, 2003) shows how the allocation of labour within a household depends on the relative
productivity of their household members. Udry (1996) shows that plots managed by wo-
men are less productive than similar plots controlled by men within the same household,
suggesting that a reallocation of inputs might increase farm output. Child and adult
family labour are not perfect substitutes assuming that different skills and characteristics
will result in different marginal productivities. Menon et al. (2005) take into account dif-
ferences in child and adult characteristics. They find that the child labour contribution
represents nearly two-thirds of the adult contribution, suggesting that the contribution
of children’s work might be substantial for a poor household in order for it to meet its
subsistence needs.
Shadow wage estimates also inform on the relative productivity of family and hired
labour. Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987), assert an imperfect substitution between family
and hired labour on the farm given their potentially different effect on output and reject
the hypothesis of perfect substitutability. Empirical studies have shown that a failure in a
simple test of equality between the estimated marginal products and the prevailing market
wage provide evidence of imperfections in the rural labour markets (Barrett et al., 2008;
Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994).
Estimated shadow wages and income, besides providing useful information per se, are
used as regressors to estimate labour supply equations at the individual level to determine
how changes in economic conditions and in opportunity costs affect household members’
labour supply, controlling for other individual and household characteristics. Skoufias
(1994) finds a positive shadow own wage elasticity and a negative shadow income elasti-
city on the labour supply of males. Jacoby (1993) finds positive uncompensated wage
elasticities both for men and women. Breaking down the overall effect of a change in the
shadow wage into substitution and income effects, the author finds a positive and signi-
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ficant compensated own wage effect (substitution effect), implying that the labour supply
is higher as the opportunity cost of time increases and confirming that the household
maximises its utility. Abdulai and Regmi (2000) also find positive wage elasticities which
are slightly higher for men than for women. Barrett et al. (2008) report a negative wage
effect on labour supply when using the marginal product as a measure of shadow wage
suggesting a backward-bending labour supply curve. However, when using the shadow
wage adjusted for allocative inefficiency they find a positive effect on labour supply, which
is more plausible.
1.3 Theoretical framework
In our theoretical framework we follow the general agricultural household model developed
by Jacoby (1993). The existence of market imperfections in rural areas of developing coun-
tries, makes the non-separability hypothesis (i.e., the fact that farm households’ consump-
tion decisions influence production decisions) more plausible. As pointed out in Jacoby
(1993), in this general farm household model the separability hypothesis is verified only
as a special case. Therefore, there is no need to make the non-separability assumption.
A farm household6 has preferences over a composite consumption (C) good7 and leis-
ure (l) which is defined by the following utility function, U(C, li; Z), where Z is a vector
of household characteristics. Each household chooses to allocate its members’ time en-
dowment among leisure (li), on-farm work (Fi) and market work (Mi) where i=adult(a),
children (c). Each household member has a total time endowment, Ti = li +Mi + Fi.
A concave production function describes the farm household produced goods as Y =
Θ(Fi, H,S; A), where H is the amount of hired labour which the household chooses to em-
6We refer here to unitary household models in which any household’s decision is taken by the household
as a whole and the resources within the household are assumed to be pooled (Alderman, 1995). Collective
household models are out of the scope of our analysis.
7This includes market goods and home produced goods whose price is normalised to 1.
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ploy on the farm, S is a vector of variable inputs (e.g., fertilisers, seeds, farm equipments)
and A is a vector of fixed inputs (e.g., land, quality of land, land use, etc.).
The farm household faces a budget constraint defined as: C = pY −whH +wiMi + V
where wh is the wage paid to hired labour
8, wi is the wage paid to household members
on market work and V is non-labour income. We introduce a labour market failure such
that the household faces the following inequality constraint, 0 ≤ Mi ≤ Mi where M is
the maximum number of hours that a family member can work on the market (Le, 2009).
The constraint is binding if either M = 0 or M = M .
The farm household has to solve the following maximisation problem:
max U(C, li; Z) (1.1)
subject to
C = pΘ(Fi, H,S; A)− whH + wiMi + V (1.2)
Ti = li +Mi + Fi
0 ≤Mi ≤Mi (1.3)
where p is the farm output price.
The Lagrangian function can be expressed as follows:
L = U(C, li; Z) + λ [pΘ(Fi, H; S; A)− whH + wiMi + V − C] + µ1i (Mi −Mi) + µ2i (Mi)
(1.4)
The following first order conditions can be derived. Knowing that T = l +M + F and so
8We assume that wh can be different from wi for transaction costs and supervision costs.
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M = T − l − F
LC : ∂U
∂C
− λ = 0 (1.5)
Lli :
∂U
∂li
− λwi + µ1i − µ2i = 0 (1.6)
LFi : λ
[
p
∂Θ
∂Fi
− wi
]
+ µ1i − µ2i = 0 (1.7)
LH : λ
[
p
∂Θ
∂H
− wh
]
= 0 (1.8)
Lµ1i : (Mi −Mi) ≥ 0 (Mi −Mi)µ
1
i = 0 (1.9)
Lµ2i : (Mi) ≥ 0 (Mi)µ
2
i = 0 (1.10)
Rearranging we get the following conditions:
∂U/∂li
∂U/∂C
= wi − µ
1
i
λ
+
µ2i
λ
= w∗i (1.11)
p
∂Θ
∂Fi
= wi − µ
1
i
λ
+
µ2i
λ
= w∗i (1.12)
p
∂Θ
∂H
= wh (1.13)
where w∗ is the shadow wage.
These conditions, together with the complementary slackness conditions, state that if
member i of the household works on the market for some positive hours below the upper
threshold, the shadow wage rate will be equal to the market wage paid to household
members on market work: 0 ≤ Mi ≤ Mi then µ1i = 0, µ2i = 0 and wi = w∗i . In this
case the model is separable. From the first order conditions of the utility maximization
problem, family labour supplies are determined as in a standard labour supply model in
which the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the wage
paid to family labour (in real terms) which in turn equals the market wage. On the other
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side, family labour demand is determined by the standard equality of the marginal product
of labour to the wage.
Conversely, if member i does not work on the market or her work reaches the maximum
number of hours a farmer can work on the market, the shadow wage will be in general
different from the market wage. In this case, the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption is equal to the value of the marginal product of on-farm family
labour, (i.e., consumption choices affect the production choices).
∂U/∂li
∂U/∂C
= wi +
µ2i
λ
= p
∂Θ
∂Fi
= w∗i > wi if Mi = 0 (1.14)
∂U/∂li
∂U/∂C
= wi − µ
1
i
λ
= p
∂Θ
∂Fi
= w∗i < wi if Mi = Mi (1.15)
These expressions convey that, when the constraints on the labour market are binding, the
household can be in equilibrium only if the demand for on-farm labour from the production
side is equal to the on-farm supply of labour from the consumption side (Elhorst, 1994)
with the shadow wage being the price that equates the demand and supply of household
labour (i.e., the model is non-separable).
The budget constraint that a household with binding labour constraints faces is non-
linear, as its slope (i.e., the marginal product of family labour) is decreasing in family
hours worked on the farm. However, the budget constraint is evaluated at the optimum
and at this point the budget is linear. Therefore, the approach is to replace the non-linear
budget with a linear one (Hall, 1973) which leads to the same optimum. The slope of the
budget constraint at this point is the marginal product of family farm labour which, as
shown before, is equal to the shadow wage (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994).
The household maximisation problem under the linear budget constraint becomes:
max U(C, li; Z) (1.16)
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subject to
C + w∗i li = V
∗ (1.17)
where V ∗ is the shadow full income at the household optimum expressed as the shadow
maximised farm profits plus the non-labour income
V ∗ = max
H,Fi
{pΘ(Fi, H,S; A)} − whH − w∗i Fi + V + w∗i T (1.18)
The solution to this problem yields the traditional Marshallian demand functions for
leisure and hence the corresponding labour supply functions for each member of the house-
hold i:
Ti − li = hi = Fi +Mi = hi(w∗i , w∗j , V ∗; Z) (1.19)
where i = a, c and j = a, c
The labour supply of each member of the household is defined as the total number of
hours worked in various activities (on-farm, off-farm work and housework) which is a func-
tion of adult wage, child wage and income. Given the non-separable nature of this model,
(i.e., that consumption and production decisions cannot be separated) the difference from
a traditional labour supply function is that wage and income are endogenous variables.
We are interested in analysing the effect of changes in the wage of household member
i on his supply by decomposing the effect into income and substitution effects. Following
Jacoby (1993), by exploiting duality in utility theory, we can minimize equation (1.17)
with respect to C and li and obtain the expenditure function, V (w
∗
i , u). It is then possible
to equate the Hicksian and Marshallian labour supply functions as:
hi(w
∗
i , w
∗
j , u) = hi(w
∗
i , w
∗
j , V
∗(w∗i , w
∗
j , u)) (1.20)
Differentiating with respect to the shadow wages we obtain the following Slutsky equa-
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tions :
∂hi(w
∗
i , V
∗)
∂w∗j
=
∂hi(w
∗
i , u)
∂w∗j
+ hj
∂hi(w
∗
i , V
∗)
∂V ∗
(1.21)
where i = a, c and j = a, c
The first component on the right hand side is the own substitution effect which should
be positive, while the second is the income effect anticipated to be negative (Ashenfelter
and Heckman, 1974). Hence the total uncompensated own wage effect is ambiguous and
depends on the relative strengths of the above two effects.
1.4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy of this analysis consists of two different steps. First, we estimate
an agricultural production function in order to obtain the marginal product of labour
inputs on the farm. We then obtain the shadow wages and shadow income for the farm
household. Second, we estimate labour supply equations for children aged five to 14 years
old. More specifically, we estimate a reduced form labour supply equation. Then we
estimate a structural labour supply model which include the estimated shadow wages for
children and adults in place of their respective market wages, and the shadow income of
the farm household.
The agricultural production function is estimated at the household level for households
that own and operate some land and in which at least one adult family member works on
the farm. The general functional form is given by the following:
Y = f(Fa, Fc, Hh, Hx,S,A;β; ) (1.22)
where Y is the total value of all crops produced and livestock raised by a farm household,
Fa, Fc, Hh, Hx are total hours worked on the farm respectively by family adults, family
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children, hired and exchange labour9; S is a vector of other variable inputs (e.g., seeds,
fertilisers, farm equipments) and A is a vector of fixed inputs (e.g., land, quality of land)
and  is an error term. We treat land as exogenous given that the land market in Nepal
is not developed and inheritance is the main channel through which land is passed over
(CBS, 2006). This is also confirmed by the observation that trading of land is very limited
(CBS, 2004).
In the above specification we assume that labour inputs are heterogenous inputs, hence
we include them separately in the production process. However, the realisations of family
child labour and hired labour might take zero values as not all inputs are employed by
each farm. In order to include in the analysis also the observations related to zero input
use, we take the logarithmic value for the values greater than zero and retain the zeros
when the input is not used.10
The error term in the production function might contain unobserved factors (e.g.,
managerial ability) which can be correlated with other variable inputs and the output
measure. Therefore, to control for this potential endogeneity problem, the above models
should be also estimated using instrumental variable estimation procedures. We need to
find valid and relevant instruments for the variable inputs employed in the production
process. This is a quite challenging issue also because we need to instrument more than
one variable. We discuss this issue in section 1.7.1.
Our sample might not be a random draw from the population of agricultural households
as we only consider households with at least one adult member working on the farm.
However, as we will show in the next section, almost all agricultural households have at
9We keep separate hired and exchange labour as the decision of using hired or exchange labour might
differ across households. This was confirmed also by qualitative interviews during the field work of the
author in August 2009.
10Another common way, which we also tried without changing the results substantially, is to add one to
each input so that the logarithmic transformation takes up the value of zero when the input is not used.
Despite this might affect the unit of measurement of the variables, it is a standard procedure in these types
of analysis (Barrett et al., 2008; Jacoby, 1993; Le, 2009; Skoufias, 1994).
25
least one adult member working on the farm. In addition, within the sample we also
include households that may or may not have children working on the farm. The decision
to employ children or not on the farm might differ by type of household. We test the
differences in sample means of some household characteristics to determine what are the
relevant differences between these two types of households.11
The production function estimates allow for the calculation of the marginal products
(i.e., the shadow wages) of family adult and child labour inputs.12 The shadow wage
estimates, as we will explain, are also used for the calculation of the farm household
shadow income.
The second step in our empirical strategy consists of the estimation of a child labour
supply both in its reduced and structural forms.
First we estimate the following general reduced form equation:
hi = g(A,Z, Xi) (1.23)
where hi are hours worked in the past 12 months by children, i = 1, ...n, aged between
five and 14 years. A is a vector which includes land size and other variables related to
land which, as explained already, we assume to be exogenous; Z is comprised of household
characteristics; and X is a vector of child characteristics. As the hours worked by children
are censored at zero if the child does not work, we also estimate our reduced form model
using a Heckman two step procedure.
The reduced form equation we estimate follows partly the analysis of Basu et al. (2010)
and Bhalotra and Heady (2003). Land has a dual role. It is a source of wealth which can
be used to buy child leisure or schooling. It is also a source of opportunity as it can
11However, due to data limitations, we do not account in our empirical model for a potential selection
process that determines the use of a specific input on the farm.
12The specific formula for the calculation of shadow wages depends on the functional form estimated
and will be provided in Section 1.7.2.
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be used to employ family labour, and thus children on the farm. Under perfect labour
markets, as land size increases child labour has to fall. This is consistent with poverty
being the cause of child labour, whereby households put their children to work only if they
are poor. However, if labour markets are imperfect, the employment opportunities that
land generates, may create the paradox that children from land-rich households tend to
work more than those from land-poorer households. These imperfections might be due to
various reasons. For example, work opportunities outside the home may not be available
and family members may only take up work within the household farm; hiring in labour
may be difficult (e.g., wages or supervision costs too high, seasonality of work, a general
paucity of available labour) and therefore only family labour or exchange labour can be
employed on the farm. Therefore, if labour markets are imperfect, a rise in land size can
lead to an increase or decrease in child labour. The coefficient on land size sheds light on
this relationship. It incorporates both the substitution and income effects. The relative
strength of the two effects is an empirical question which we investigate below.
Second we estimate the following general functional form for the structural labour
supply equation:
hi = g(ŵ
c, ŵa, V̂ ,Z, Xi) (1.24)
where ŵc, ŵa and V̂ are, respectively, the shadow wage of children, adult and the shadow
income estimated from the farm production function; the other terms are defined as above.
As for the reduced form model, we estimate this structural equation using a Heckman two
step procedure to account for censorship in the hours worked by children.
The child shadow wage and the shadow income estimates allow us to compute substi-
tution and pure income effects for the child labour supply function, hence to quantify the
relative strength of the two effects. The adult shadow wage informs on the cross-shadow
wage effect. However, given the non-separable nature of the model, these measures are
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endogenous and instruments need to be found to get consistent estimates. Indeed shadow
wage and income are jointly determined with the labour supply. They are functions of
household preferences on both consumption and production decisions (Skoufias, 1994).
This generates a correlation between the errors in the labour supply and shadow wages
and income (Jacoby, 1993). Therefore, we estimate the labour supply equation through
OLS and IV regression models.
1.5 Context
Nepal is particularly suitable for this analysis as both the economy is largely based on
subsistence agriculture and child labour is a relevant phenomenon in the country. Despite
the fact that the Nepalese agricultural sector is becoming more commercialised over the
years, agriculture is still largely subsistence and most of the households have to rely
on agricultural production of very small parcels of lands. Crop production is mostly
dominated by cereals (i.e., paddy, maize, millet, wheat and barley), which account for 80
percent of the cultivated land but also winter potatoes and vegetables account for a good
part of the production (CBS, 2006). The geographical distribution of crop production
varies somewhat as Nepal is formed of three very different ecological zones each running
from east to west and characterised by different microclimatic conditions. The Tarai region
in the south has flat and fertile land with a subtropical climate that is very suitable for
most crop production. The Hills region in the middle where mostly rice in irrigated or
rainfed land and maize or millet in dry land are produced. The Mountains in the north
where only a small part of land is suitable for cultivation and in which people mainly raise
livestock but also fruits, cereals and potatoes are cultivated.
Nepal underwent through many changes over the last decades. Between 1996 and 2006
Nepal was affected by a conflict between Maoist and government forces. In spite of the
conflict enduring for ten years, poverty decreased over the same period. According to
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estimates for 2004, child labour increased relative to 1996 (CBS, 2004, 1996). In addition,
agricultural wages increased between 1996 and 2004 (CBS, 2006, 2005). Rural daily wages
increased from 44 to 55 rupees per day between 1996 and 2004. This substantial increase
in agricultural wages may have pushed poverty constrained households to substitute with
child labour for more expensive hired labour. This may explain the increase in child
labour in Nepal in 2004 relative to 1996. The rise in agricultural wages can be the result
of increased opportunities outside Nepal which have lowered the supply of agricultural
labour in local labour markets (CBS, 2006). As a consequence farm households may have
encountered difficulties in hiring laborers to work on their farms. Recent reports suggest
a tightening of the local rural labour market in Nepal in recent years (CBS, 2006).
1.6 Data
Our analysis is based on the Nepal Living Standards Survey of 2003/04 (2004 NLSS
Survey) conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Nepal. The survey follows
the Living Standards Survey methodology developed by the World Bank and is a nationally
representative household survey. This survey is the second of two waves which have been
conducted in 1995/1996 and in 2010/2011. The first wave (i.e., the 1996 NLSS survey)
has already been used by Menon et al. (2005) for the estimation of child shadow wages.
There are no studies to our knowledge that use the 2004 NLSS Survey to estimate children
shadow wages in agriculture and analyse their labour supply in a sample of agricultural
households. This survey was conducted between April 2003 and April 2004 (CBS, 2004).
The conflict that prevailed in various parts of the country over this year impeded fieldwork
in some of the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs). Therefore eight PSUs in the rural areas
could not be enumerated.13 As a result, the 2004 NLSS survey includes 3,912 households
13The missing PSUs are one from the Central, one from the Mid-Western and six from the Far-Western
regions. The Far-Western region was indeed one of the areas mostly affected by the conflict. The study of
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both from rural and urban areas. The dataset contains detailed information on agricultural
households. There is information on crop and livestock production, on land ownership and
land use, on seeds and fertiliser use and expenditures, on farm assets and equipment, on
the hours devoted to work on the farm by both the household members and by hired
labour. All the agricultural data are related to the past agricultural year and thus include
two completed growing seasons (dry and wet). Data on child labour for those aged five
years or more in wage employment and in self-employment, both in the agricultural and
in the non-agricultural sector, is also available. One advantage of this data is that hours
of work are also available for domestic work which is typically excluded or unavailable.
Ignoring this information would limit sensibly the analysis as it represents, together with
on-farm labour, one of the largest components of child labour especially of girls. Ignoring
this component, girls would appear to work much less than boys (Basu et al., 2010).
Finally, there is extensive information at individual and household level on children and
their families in terms of demographics (e.g., age, gender, region of residence, education,
occupation, poverty levels, migration, health etc.). One limitation of this data is that
unfortunately there is no information on who does what on the farm, hence we cannot
measure the productivity on a single activity of each type of labourer. Similarly, we cannot
measure the productivity of each type of labourer on different types of plots (i.e., under
different modes of land operation).
1.6.1 The production function: sample and variables description
We use for this analysis household level data. As the focus of this study is on agricultural
households, the sample under analysis includes only households that cultivate either their
own or someone else’s land. These represent 77 percent of all surveyed households and
we define them as farm households. Among these, most of them (69 percent) own some
the effects of the Nepalese conflict are out of the scope of the current analysis.
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hectares of land. Another 24 percent own some land but also cultivate someone else’s land.
Among these households, the prevailing mode of operation is sharecropping but there is
also a small percentage of households which rent in land. A remaining six percent does
not own any land but cultivates someone else’s land. Most of the households that own or
cultivate some land also raise livestock. There are very few households (193 observations)
that only raise livestock. We exclude them from the analysis as there is no information on
input use other than the labour inputs. Also, we do not place any threshold on the amount
of land cultivated in our sample. So any household with hectares of land cultivated greater
than zero is included in our analysis. As the average land size is nearly 0.9 hectares, we
believe that it is meaningful not to impose any threshold. As explained earlier, we include
in the sample only households with at least one adult member working as self-employed on
the farm. These represent the 95 percent of households who own or cultivate some land.
Finally, we further constrain our sample to include only households that live in rural areas
as production and consumption decisions within urban households are driven by different
factors and our focus is on the former. In addition, agricultural prices are not available for
urban households. Rural households represent 85 percent of the agricultural households
considered for this analysis. The final sample includes 2,404 households, which represent
the 61 percent of all surveyed households.14
Within our sample of farm households 38 percent have children aged 5-14 years old who
have worked positive hours on the farm in the past 12 months. As noted in section 1.4,
these may be households with different characteristics than those without working chil-
dren on the farm. Table 1.1 reports the differences in means between farm and livestock
production, input use on the farm and some other household characteristics. We note
14We have looked at the differences in characteristics between the households selected in the sample and
those not. The households in the sample are on average less educated, poorer, of lower caste, with a lower
percentage of household head’s migration and of bigger household size. These differences suggest that our
analysis would be significantly distorted by the inclusion of landless households and those from urban areas
(Bhalotra and Heady, 2003).
31
that households with working children employ, on average, adults and exchange labour for
longer hours on the farm than those without working children. These households are char-
acterised, on average, by significantly lower per capita expenditures, by a lower proportion
of household heads with secondary or higher education and by a bigger household size than
households without working children. In addition, despite the fact that the overall average
hectares of land owned or cultivated for someone else is similar between the two groups,
when we group the hectares of land into different categories we note that households with
working children are characterised by more land of medium size and less land of very small
size. Furthermore, the number of available plots seem to be higher for households with
children working on-farm. This is suggestive of a greater subdivision of land. Both these
statistics may suggest that more people are needed for the cultivation of land, hence the
greater number of hours worked by adults and exchange labour in households with work-
ing children. We also note that, among households with working children, the number of
hours worked by hired labour is lower than the hours worked by family labour or exchange
labour. Exchange labour is based on trust rather than hired labour. When extra labour
is needed and hiring labour is difficult, labour exchanges among households are frequent.
These results are suggestive of a context where tradition and cultural norms prevail and
where labour markets seem to fail (de Janvry et al., 1991; Dumas, 2007).
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of the variables included in the production
function estimation. The output measure in the production function is constructed as the
total value of all crops produced and livestock raised by a household. The aggregation
of farm production into a single measure and the use of values instead of quantities raise
some concerns as price variation might bias the estimates (Le, 2009). As we do not have
information on the use of inputs on each single output, the only way we can conduct the
analysis is to use an aggregate measure. As information on the input use on each output
is rare in this type of analysis, this approach has also been widely used in the literat-
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ure (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994). We do, however, control for regional price variation
dividing crop prices by a regional price index. More specifically, the crop production is
measured as the sum of quantity produced times the prices at which each crop is sold
on the market. As many households do not sell their products on the market we had to
impute prices for the missing information. These are the subsistence households which
represent 46 percent of the sample. We report in the Appendix the methodology employed
for the price imputation.
Livestock production is measured as the sum of total revenues from livestock products
sales (e.g., milk, eggs, meat) plus the 20 percent of the value of livestocks owned. This
should take into account the fact that some of the livestock products might not be sold
but consumed within the household. The 20 percent is an arbitrary value which has been
used in the related literature (Jacoby, 1993). Other values (10, 30, 40 percent) have been
tried as well. The estimated coefficients on the production function and the marginal
product estimates are mostly invariant to the use of these different thresholds.15 We are
not considering the value of traction animals (i.e., bullocks) as we are not able to establish
in what proportion bullocks are used for traction and not for livestock produced goods.
Livestock production so calculated is then added to the crop output. Land is included
in our production function specification as hectares owned or cultivated for someone else.
To account for different uses of land and land tenure contracts, we also include as input
measures, the share of land left fallow during the dry or wet season, the share of land
rented or sharecropped out (during the dry and wet season) and the share of land rented
or sharecropped in. To account for the quality of land we include the share of irrigated
land.16
The labour inputs are measured as total hours worked on-farm by family adults (from
15These results are not reported but are available upon request.
16We do not include the share of lowland because is highly correlated with the share of irrigated land.
Indeed lowland is termed khet and consists of alluvial flat terraces suitable for rice cultivations in the Hills.
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15 years old), family children (five to 14 years old), hired workers and exchange labour in
the past 12 months. As mentioned earlier, over one-third of the households in our sample
use their children on the farm. If we consider the actual hours worked by children, they
represent a quarter of the adults hours worked on average (i.e., 850 hours worked over the
past 12 months). We distinguish between hired and exchange labour as they might affect
the production process in different ways. The dataset gives information on total man-days
worked (number of hired persons times number of days worked) by hired and exchange
labour.17 In order to obtain an hourly measure we multiply total man-days by 8 hours.
As a robustness check we have also multiplied total man-days by 9 and 10 hours without
changing materially the production function estimates.18 Hired and exchange labour are
used by 40 and 64 percent of households respectively. The total actual hours worked on
the farm are 207 and 640 hours in the past 12 months respectively, which suggests that
exchange labour is a more relevant phenomenon than hired labour. As mentioned above,
exchange labour is quite common in Nepal, mainly during the peak season. It is part
of Nepalese custom and tradition in a context where the local labour market seems to
function imperfectly.
We also include as additional inputs the expenditures on fertilisers, on seeds, on live-
stock production, other expenses and the value of farm equipment. Though quantity meas-
ures would be more appropriate given that input price variation might affect the value
of these inputs, we do not have information on the quantity of every input. Therefore,
we decided to include the expenditure measures. Other control variables (i.e., education
level of the head of the household, regional and interview’s season dummies) are also in-
cluded in our production function specification. The education level of the household head
should partly control for unobservable inputs such as managerial ability which should raise
17We do not have information on whether hired or exchange labour involves children.
18The results are not shown but are available upon requests.
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productivity.
1.6.2 The labour supply: sample and variables description
We use for this analysis individual level data. The sample used for the estimation of the
child labour supply includes only children 5-14 years old for the same sample of households
used for the production function estimate. This is motivated by the fact that the focus
of this analysis is on farm households. Among a total number of 5,228 children aged
between 5-14 in the 2004 NLSS survey, in our sample of farm households there are 3,564
children aged between 5-14. In Table 1.3 we note that most of the children 5-14 in the
sample of farm households are attending school.19 In addition, we note that one-third of
children combine work and school activities. Girls are less able than boys to devote their
time to schooling only. Consequently a higher percentage of girls than boys is involved
in work only activities. We need to remark that work is defined here as any hour worked
in the past 12 months and includes all types of activities including household work. This
explains why girls are shown to work more as they are typically involved, more than boys,
in household chores and in other activities like firewood collection and fetching water.
Among these children, 50 percent have worked in the past 12 months in some activity
(i.e., 1774 children). Within this group, 74 percent work on the family farm, while the
remainder is involved in other types of activities (which consist mostly of household work).
Child wage employment is almost non existent in this sample and, in general, very limited
in these types of settings. Finally, we note that among working children, the total hours
worked by girls are higher than those of boys, with this difference attributable to household
activities.
We have checked descriptively, the relationship between hours worked by children and
19Schooling outcomes are out of the scope of this analysis. This is also motivated by the fact that most
of the children are attending school.
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farm size. Table 1.4 shows these descriptive statistics. We note that the hours worked
are declining in farm size. Interestingly, when we split the sample between households
who own land, those who own land and cultivate someone else’s land, and those that only
cultivate others’ land, the patterns are different. Indeed we detect a U-shape for households
who own land. We detect instead an inverted-U relationship for those who own land and
cultivate others’ land. This latter pattern, despite being descriptive, is consistent with
the inverted-U hypothesis suggested in Basu et al. (2010). It is also consistent with the
fact that land which is also sharecropped, should reflect mostly its work opportunity effect
with a corresponding weaker wealth effect (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003).
Table 1.5 reports the summary statistics of the variables included in our labour supply
estimation. The dependent variable is defined as the total number of hours worked in all
types of activities (including housework) in the past 12 months by children aged between
five and 14 years old.20 Nearly half of the children within our sample of farm households
do not work and the hours of work are censored at zero for these observations. We will
account for this in the next section.
The reduced form specification includes the hectares of land owned or cultivated for
someone else as a measure of wealth and work opportunity.21 When we group the farm
size into different categories we note that most of the children live in households of quite
small farm size. We see that farm households which own or cultivate land bigger than 2
hectares represent only the ten percent of the sample. We also include in the specification
the number of plots owned or cultivated which should capture the subdivision of land
when controlling for land size. As explained earlier households may either own land or
20We are using the hours worked in the past 12 months on all types of activities to follow the theoretical
model outlined in Section 1.3. In addition, using hours worked in the past year better allows smoothing
over seasonal fluctuations.
21We do not include household expenditures in this specification as an additional wealth measure as
land is the most important source of wealth in this context. In addition, consumption measures may also
more likely be endogenous to the outcome variable than land. We already mentioned that land markets
are almost not existent in rural Nepal. Therefore, the assumption of exogeneity of land seems reasonable.
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cultivate land for someone else. Almost one-third of the sample of farm households both
own and cultivate the land of others. We need to note that among these households who
both own and cultivate others’ land the share of hectares sharecropped is almost half of
the total hectares owned or cultivated for others, which represents a substantial portion.
Hence accounting for the difference in the mode of land operation is quite important as
these households may exhibit quite different behaviours. We include dummies to control
for these different types of households in the reduced form estimation.
The structural labour supply equation, as explained, does not include any measure
related to land size or its mode of operation. This specification includes the relevant para-
meters (i.e., the shadow wages and income estimated from the farm production function),
which allow us to measure income, substitution and cross wage effects. We use the es-
timated shadow wage of children to measure the opportunity cost of their time and the
shadow wage of adults informs on the cross wage effect. The estimated shadow income
is our measure of wealth of the household. This is calculated, following Jacoby (1993),
subtracting from the predicted output of the production function estimation the total
shadow value of family farm work (adult and children work), the value of hired labour,
all expenses on all variable inputs, and the value of the rent paid for renting in land. The
rent received from renting out land, the value of remittances received and the value of
loans are also added as measures of non labour income.
Both the structural and reduced form equations include a set of child and household
related characteristics which are usually considered in the analysis of child labour supply.
We control for the age and gender of the child. We expect hours worked to be increasing in
age and to be higher for girls. The education of the household head, while controlling for
sources of wealth, should capture preferences over child labour. Caste and ethnicity should
capture instead attitudes towards child labour. The age of the head of the household, his
health status and whether he migrated may capture the necessity of children to substitute
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for old, ill or migrated adults. However, the education and the migration status of the
household head and the caste and ethnicity of the household, may also partly reflect an
income effect if it is not fully captured by the wealth measures in the model. Child labour
besides depending on the relative strength of income and substitution effects, should also
depend on the size and the composition of the household. Once controlling for land size
(or for the estimated shadow wage and income), child hours are expected to be decreasing
in the number of children aged between five and 14.
1.7 Empirical analysis: the production function
1.7.1 Production function estimates
We first estimate a simple Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form with
OLS:
ln(Yh) = β0 + β1 ln(Ah,1) +
f∑
k=2
βkAh,k +
n∑
j=1
γj ln(Lh,j) +
m∑
s=1
δs ln(Sh,s) + h (1.25)
where Yh is the farm output of household h, Ah,1 is the land input of household h, Ah,k
are other fixed inputs k (i.e., land quality) of household h, Lh,j are the variable labour
inputs j which include family (F ) and hired (H) labour of household h. Sh,s are the other
variable inputs s (i.e., seeds, fertilisers, farm equipment, other expenditures).
As mentioned above, not all farm households use all inputs in crop and livestock
production. When the logarithmic transformation is not defined for zero input use we
retain zero for these values.
The advantage of a Cobb-Douglas production function lies in its convenience for the
interpretation of the results. Indeed, all coefficients on the inputs in logarithm represent
the estimated elasticities of the output with respect to inputs. Column 1 in Table 1.6
reports the OLS estimates from the Cobb-Douglas production function. All coefficients on
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land and on other variable inputs are positive and significant. Specifically, land contributes
the most to the production as expected. In particular, a one percent increase in land is
associated with a 0.4 percent increase in the output. This estimate is somewhat higher than
those found in the related literature (Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Barrett et al., 2008; Jacoby,
1993) with the exception of Skoufias (1994) who reports a very similar coefficient. These
differences may be attributable to the fact that we also control for the mode of operation of
land, which few of these related studies in the literature do. The coefficients on the labour
inputs are all positive. A one percent increase in adult labour contributes to the 0.28
percent increase in the production. Also hired and exchange labour contributes positively
to production but to a lower extent than family adult labour.22 This is consistent with the
hypothesis that family members have stronger incentive than hired labour to contribute to
farm production in these types of households (Skoufias, 1994). The child labour coefficient,
as expected, is smaller than those on adult labour (family and hired)23 and is positive and
significant. This estimate is consistent with others in the related literature (Abdulai and
Regmi, 2000; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994). All other variable inputs, as expected, affect
positively and significantly the production process. We have tested for constant returns
to scale which should characterise Cobb-Douglas production functions. The F-test is 29.2
with a p-value at zero which suggests a rejection of the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale. The sum of all coefficients on land and on the other variable inputs is lower than
one which suggests for decreasing returns to scale.
The other estimated coefficients on land quality variables are of some interest. In
particular, irrigated land contributes positively to farm production. The coefficient on
the land sharecropped-in is negative. Hence, once controlling for land size, an increase in
the share of land cultivated for someone else, reduces the output which is suggestive of
22Differences between coefficients are statistically significant.
23Differences between coefficients are statistically significant with the exception of child labour versus
exchange labour.
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this mode of land operation being less productive. One explanation of this result could
be that workers have less incentive to work efficiently if the cultivated land is owned by
someone else. Interestingly farm production is increasing in the education of the household
head. This is consistent with the role of human capital in agriculture which is expected to
enhance land productivity (Huffman, 1977, 1974). The education of the household head
may also partly capture the improved managerial ability of the farmer.
As the Cobb-Douglas functional form imposes separability between inputs and a unit-
ary elasticity of substitution among them, we estimate the production function with a more
flexible functional form. We allow the marginal rate of technical substitution between two
inputs (e.g., between labour inputs) to vary with the level of other inputs as well (Berndt
and Christensen, 1973; Christensen et al., 1973). We have therefore estimated a Trans-
log (i.e., transcendental logarithmic) production function using OLS.24 The purpose of
estimating a translog production function here is to verify whether the marginal product
estimates of our interest are similar across functional forms. We first estimated the trans-
log production function with all squared and interaction terms between the labour inputs
and other variable and fixed inputs. We then estimate a similar specification excluding
the squared and interaction terms on child labour. When including these terms there are
too many violations of positive and diminishing marginal products of child labour, which
is one of the drawbacks of flexible functional forms (Jacoby, 1993). Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 1.6 report the estimates of these models. For simplicity of exposition, we report
only the interaction terms that are significantly different from zero. We test the joint sig-
nificance of the squared and interaction terms. The Wald test leads us to conclude that we
reject, at a level of one percent, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly equal
to zero in both specifications, in support of the Translog functional form (the F-statistics
24The general empirical form to be estimated is the following: ln(Y ) = β0 +
∑n
k=1 βk ln(Xk) +
1
2
∑n
k=1
∑n
l=1 βkl ln(Xk) ln(Xl) + . The Cobb-Douglas function is a special case of this more flexible
form when βkl = 0.
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are equal to 10.65 and 13.2 respectively with p-values equal to zeros in both cases).25 The
results reveal that some inputs exhibit non-separability (e.g., adult labour and seeds or
fertilisers expenditures). However, we will show that the estimated marginal products of
family labour are almost invariant to the choice of the functional form.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there might be a potential endogeneity problem as there
may be unobservable characteristics correlated with both inputs and the output meas-
ures. Hence the OLS estimates could be biased. For example, managerial ability which
is unobserved (though partly captured by the education of the household head) should
be positively correlated with expenditures on seeds. More able farmers would be more
favourable in using improved seeds which may increase expenditure on them. At the same
time, higher ability may be also associated with greater production. The estimates from
OLS would then potentially be biased upward. One may also think that an improved
managerial ability of farmers may favour the mechanisation of the farm which would re-
duce the use of labour inputs. If ability and labour inputs are negatively correlated and
if we anticipate the coefficient on the omitted variable to be positive, the OLS estimates
would be downwardly biased. Therefore, in order to account for this potential endogen-
eity problem, IV estimation should be performed. We assume land, farm equipments, the
share of irrigated land and other expenses such as those for livestock production (e.g.,
value of animals used for traction) as exogenous as the time horizon we are considering
is one agricultural year during which substantial changes to these types of inputs should
be either small or non-existent. Therefore, the instrumented variables should be all the
labour inputs (i.e., adult, child, hired and exchange labour), seeds and fertilisers. How-
ever, as the data do not offer a relevant natural experiment, we acknowledge the difficulty
25A formal test of separability between inputs would imply imposing restrictions sequentially as long as
separability is not rejected to obtain a more parsimonious specification (Jacoby, 1993). However, while
acknowledging the appropriateness of this test we are not performing it as it is out of scope for the present
analysis.
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in finding valid instruments for all these potential endogenous regressors. We nonetheless
performed an IV estimation which we discuss in the Appendix and report the results in
Tables 1.A.1 and 1.A.2. We partly follow, in the choice of the instruments, the existing
literature (Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994). The results show
some differences between OLS and IV estimates which may suggest that the problematic
variables are indeed endogenous. However, this difference may come from the fact that
the instruments are not valid. For this reason IV estimates are as likely to produce biased
estimates as OLS ones. Although we do not deny a potential endogeneity problem, given
the available data and current setting, we opt for focusing our attention on OLS estimates
only.
1.7.2 Marginal product estimates
The estimated production functions allow us to calculate the marginal products of labour
inputs for each farm household. In particular we have calculated the marginal product of
labour from the Cobb-Douglas production function estimates in the following way:
ˆMRPLh,j = γˆj
Yˆh
Lh,j
(1.26)
where Lh,j are total hours worked on the farm h by each type of labour input j and γˆj are
the estimated coefficients from the Cobb-Douglas production function on ln(Lh,j); Yˆh is
the predicted output value for the farm h. Similarly, we compute the marginal products
from the Translog production function. For this calculation we also need to account for
all interaction and squared terms.26
We report the estimated marginal products at their mean from the estimated models
in Table 1.7. The estimates suggest that the average adult shadow wage ranges between
26The general formula is the following: ˆMRPLk = [βˆk +
∑n
k=1
∑n
l=1 βˆklln(Ll)]
Yˆ
Lk
, where Lk and Ll are
the labour inputs.
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3.2 and 3.5 rupees per hour. These values are quite similar when estimated using different
production technologies. The prevailing rural agricultural wage in Nepal in 2003/04 was
around 55 rupees per day (CBS, 2006, 2005). In addition, in 2003 the government of Nepal
fixed a minimum wage for agricultural workers equal to 60 Nepalese rupees per day (i.e.,
Nrs. 7.50 per hour if we assume eight hours of work per day) (Wily et al., 2008). This
suggests that the average hourly adult shadow wage is less than half the minimum wage
paid to agricultural workers. Part of the previous literature that estimated adult shadow
wages, have tested for the equality between marginal products and observed wages. They
suggest that any differences between these two measures should shed light on imperfections
in the rural labour market, on the presence of transaction costs and other frictions in the
markets (Barrett et al., 2008; Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias, 1994). We do not perform this test as
we do not have reliable data on the rural market wage.27 However, the observed difference
between the two values may indeed reflect imperfections in the labour market.
A child’s shadow wage ranges between an average of 1.6 and 1.7 rupees per hour.28
If we consider that the average total annual hours worked by a child aged between five
and 14 years in our sample of farm households is 750 hours (see table 1.3), the annual
average contribution of children appears to be 1,200 rupees. The average annual nominal
per capita expenditure of a household is 12,800 rupees. This suggests that child labour
contributes, on average, to about the nine percent of it. In addition, the estimated average
poverty line in current prices for 2003/04 is 7,695 rupees per person per year (CBS, 2005).
This suggests that children’s contribution may be, on average, the 15 percent of the annual
expenditures of households who are close to the poverty line. Therefore, these estimates
suggest a not negligible contribution of child labour to the income of their families.
Moreover, the hourly contribution of child labour is nearly half of those of adults.
27This is also one of the reason we need to estimate the shadow wage.
28As mentioned earlier we are not including the child marginal product estimated from the Translog 1
specification as there are too many violations of positive and diminishing marginal products.
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This also suggests for a quite substantial contribution of child labour to the household
income. This ratio between child and adult productivity is consistent with Menon et al.
(2005) findings. They estimate a child-adult shadow wage ratio between one-third (when
estimating shadow wages from the primal side) and two-third (when estimating shadow
wages from the dual side). The difference between child and adult shadow wages suggests
that these two types of labour, as expected, are not perfect substitutes given the hetero-
geneity in their skills. Different productivities of child and adult family labour can be also
attributed to the fact that children and adults may be involved in different tasks which
ultimately reflect into the output (Menon et al., 2005). As mentioned already, we do not
have information on which specific tasks each labourer perform on the farm. For the same
reason, we are not able to calculate the different productivity of each labourer on plots
under different mode of land operation (e.g., sharecropping).
1.8 Empirical analysis: the labour supply
We now estimate a reduced form model to see whether there is any relation between land
and child labour in the sample of farm households. This analysis also serves as a basis to
proceed with the estimation of a structural labour supply, which includes shadow wages
and shadow income estimates obtained from the production function.
1.8.1 Reduced form estimates
This analysis provides a reduced form estimate to test the poverty hypothesis. A rejec-
tion of this hypothesis may lead us to conclude that reasons other than poverty (i.e.,
imperfections in the labour market) may determine child labour in this setting.
We estimate the following reduced form child labour equation:
ln(hih) = α0 +
f∑
k=1
βkAh,k +
n∑
j=1
γjZh,j +
m∑
s=1
δsXih,s + ih (1.27)
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where hih are the total hours worked in the past 12 months by child i, aged between five and
14 years, of household h . The term Ah,k refers to land size and other variables k related to
land characteristics of household h. Specifically, we include in the specification the hectares
of land and its square to allow for non linearity in the relationship. As mentioned already,
we also include the number of plots cultivated which, when controlling for hectares of land
operated, should inform on the effects of the subdvision of land (Bhalotra and Heady,
2003). We also include a variable which accounts for the fact that some households do not
own the land they cultivate, and others both own the land and also cultivate someone else’s
land (sharecropping). As an alternative to the hectares of land variable as a continuous
measure, we also estimate a specification that includes a categorical variable for land size.
Finally, Zh,j are characteristics j of household h and Xih,s are characteristics s of child i
in household h.
Table 1.8 shows the results from the reduced form estimates. We note in Column
1 that the coefficient on the land size variable is negative and significant. Instead the
square of land size is not significant. This suggests a linear relationship between child
work and land, contrary to what found in Basu et al. (2010). In addition, these results do
not suggest the presence of a ‘wealth paradox’ as in Bhalotra and Heady (2003). On the
contrary, the negative sign seems to indicate that the wealth effect is prevailing over the
substitution effect that an increase in land size entails. It seems that children in households
which own an increasing amount of land tend to work less on average. In particular, a
one hectare increase in land size, reduces child labour by 14 percent.29 This declining
pattern is consistent with the descriptive statistics shown in the first column of Table 1.4
and with poverty being the main cause of child labour (Basu and Van, 1998). As soon
as households become richer, child labour decreases. As mentioned already, the existing
29We ran the same estimation using the logarithm of land in place of the actual value. We find that a
one percent increase in hectares of land, increases child labour by 0.06 percent, which is a quite sizeable
effect.
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literature suggests that in the presence of perfect labour markets, child labour may emerge
only if households are poor (Basu et al., 2010; Dumas, 2007).
However, part of our discussion in previous sections, suggested that the rural labour
market in Nepal may not be perfect. Therefore, despite the fact that the wealth effect
seems to dominate the substitution effect generated by an increase in land size, part of this
latter effect may still be at play. In Column 2 of Table 1.8 we report results that include, in
place of the hectares of land cultivated, a set of dummy variables which divide the hectares
of land cultivated between very small, small, medium and large farms. We note that the
dummy coefficients on farm size are negative and increasing in farm size. However, only
the coefficient on large farm is significant. Children in larger farm households work less
relative to those in very small farm households. We know from Table 1.5 that most of
the children live in households which own or cultivate relatively small areas. Only the ten
percent of children live in households with large farms. Hence, it seems that the reduction
in child labour, as land size increases, is confined to a small portion of the households in the
sample, specifically at the top-end of the land distribution. These estimates suggest that
wealth must be sufficiently high in order to see a reduction in child labour. Therefore, we
cannot exclude that imperfections in the labour markets may partly explain the existence
of child labour in farm households.
The coefficient on the number of plots is positive and significant. This is suggestive
of the fact that after controlling for farm size, an increasing number of plots cultivated
increases child work which, as mentioned above, may reflect the subdivision of land. When
more plots are available for cultivation in the same farm, more children may be needed.
This also emerged in the descriptive statistics from table 1.1. Finally, children in house-
holds which only cultivate someone else’s land relative to those that own the cultivated
land tend to work longer hours. This represents a quite small percentage in the sample.
Children of households which both own and cultivate others’ land relative to those that
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only own the land tend to work less hours. This result, controlling for farm size and for
the number of plots, may reflect attitudes of parents who can be reluctant to put their
children into work on someone else’s land.
The signs on the other coefficients in Table 1.8 are mostly in the anticipated direction.
Being male decreases on average child hours worked by 34 percent relative to being a
female. This substantial change is a reflection of the fact that the total hours worked
include housework and other household related activities (e.g., fetching water, collecting
firewood) in which girls are typically more involved than boys. As anticipated, older
children work more hours. This reflects either an increase in children’s productivity as
they get older or parents’ preferences which may do not favour child labour of very young
children (Dumas, 2007). Children of muslim or other religious minorities and of low
caste tend to work longer hours than those from higher caste groups. As expected a
higher education of the head of the household is negatively related to child hours worked.
In addition, subistence households seem to have children working less hours then non-
subsistence ones. Since subsistence households are the poorest in our sample, this result,
when controlling for farm size, is quite interesting as it may reflect characteristics other
than poverty.
In order to further explore these results, we provide in Table 1.9 reduced form es-
timates with a split of the sample between those who own land and those who own and
cultivate others’ land.30 Separate estimates for the sample of households who both own
and sharecrop land should reflect mostly a substitution effect (i.e., the opportunity of
land) rather than a wealth effect (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003). Interesting results emerge
from this analysis which are also consistent with the descriptive statistics provided in table
1.4. Indeed, the results indicate that in households which own land only, child labour is
30We do not show the estimates for children in households which only cultivate someone else’s land as
the sample is very small (100 observations). The results do not show any significant effect on the land
variables and are available upon request.
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decreasing in farm size. We note that the coefficient on the square of hectares of land is
positive and becomes significant. This result may suggest a U-shaped relationship. How-
ever, the turning point is at 5.13 hectares which corresponds to very big farms representing
only a few households (these households are at the very top end of the distribution, cor-
responding to the 99th percentile). Therefore, the relationship is still linear for most of
the land distribution. For those households that both own and cultivate others’ land the
sign on land size is now positive and its square is negative. However, despite these signs
are consistent with the descriptive statistics provided in table 1.4 and with the inverted-U
hypothesis, these coefficients are not significant.
We have estimated separate equations for boys and girls to see if there is any differential
effect between them. The results in Table 1.10 reveal that only girls’ work is significantly
reduced by an increase in land size.31 We note that the squared term of land hectares is
now significant at the 10 percent level but the turning point is still at very big farm size
levels.
In order to further shed light on these results we have also estimated the same reduced
form model excluding the housework activity (which includes household chores and other
activities such as fetching water and firewood collection).32 The results show that the
coefficient on land size is not significant. This may suggest that most of the effect we
see in Table 1.8 comes from children’s involvement in housework activity. This result is
consistent with the fact that we only find significant results on girls and not on boys in the
estimates of Table 1.10. Indeed, as girls are typically involved in these types of activities
we expected most of the effect shown above to be related to girls.
As a final step of the reduced form analysis we try to account for the fact that hours
31In order to test whether the two models are significantly different we have estimated a fully interactive
model and the results reveal significantly different effects between boys and girls. The F-statistic is 2.33
(p-value=0.0009).
32These results are not reported and are available upon request.
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are only observed for children that work. Hence we estimate a Heckman two step model
involving a participation and an hours equation. This allows correcting for selectivity
(i.e., to check whether the sample of children working some positive hours is randomly
drawn from the population). In order to test for this we need to include in the selection
equation exogenous variables which are then excluded from the hours equation. However,
it is difficult to find variables which shift the participation probability while not directly
affecting the hours worked. We select the variables among those that do not appear
to affect the hours worked while affecting participation and viceversa. Specifically, the
number of persons aged above five and the number of persons aged between 15 and 60
who work only off-farm, are assumed to affect only participation into work. These variables
are all likely to affect the work participation of children and not the intensity of their work
activity. The hectares of land cultivated and its square are assumed to affect only the
hours worked. Subsistence households are also assumed to affect the hours worked and
not participation into work. The estimates reported in Table 1.A.3 in the Appendix show
that the selection term (i.e., the mills ratio) is positive and significant, suggesting that the
correlation between the unobservables that determine the work participation equation and
the hours equation is positive. Despite the significance of the selection term, we note that
the coefficients on land size have the same signs and similar magnitudes to those of table
1.8, hence reassuring on the results obtained in the reduced form equation. Interestingly,
we note that the coefficient on whether households own and cultivate others’ land is now
positive and significant in the participation equation. This may indicate that, children
in households which do not own all the operated land are more likely to work relative to
those that own land only. However, they tend to work less hours.
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1.8.2 Structural equation estimates
We now provide estimates of the structural labour supply for children 5-14 years old for
the same sample of households used for the production function estimate. We estimate
the following equation:
ln(hih) = α0 + βaln(ŵh,a) + βcln(ŵh,c) + βhln(V̂h) +
n∑
j=1
γjZh,j +
m∑
s=1
δsXih,s + ih (1.28)
where hih are the total hours worked in the past 12 months by child i aged between five
and 14 years of household h; ŵh,a, ŵh,c and V̂h are respectively shadow wages for adult a,
child c of household h and shadow income of household h estimated from the production
function. As child shadow wage is only available for those households which employ
children on the farm, the sample of working children we consider for the structural labour
supply estimation is lower than the one used for reduced form estimation. Therefore, the
sample includes 1,496 children aged 5-14 who have worked some positive hours in the past
12 months. The terms Zh,j and Xih,s are defined as in equation (1.27).
We conduct this estimate to obtain direct child wage and income elasticities to establish
the relative strength of income and substitution effect, hence to quantify the relative role
of poverty or of imperfections in the labour market in driving child labour supply.
Table 1.11 reports the OLS estimates which use estimated shadow wages and income
from both the Cobb-Douglas and the Translog production technology of child labour
supply for those children that work.33 We note that the estimates in column 1 and 2 are
very similar, hence we restrict our comments to those in column 1. The uncompensated
wage elasticity (i.e., the coefficient on the child shadow wage) is significant and yields a
33In order to account for censorship in the hours worked, we have estimated a Heckman two step model.
Similarly to the reduced form estimates, we have used as identifying variables those that do not appear to
affect the participation equation but that influence only the hours equation and viceversa. Despite the fact
that the estimates show a positive and significant selection term, the results are invariant to a selection
bias. The results are not reported but are available upon request.
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negative sign. This may suggest the existence of a backward bending labour supply curve
where for higher wages, the income effect prevails over the substitution effect. The income
elasticity is significant and positive. We have calculated the compensated wage effect from
these two coefficients as expressed in the Slutzky equation (i.e., equation (1.21) in Section
1.3) and following Jacoby (1993). The first term on the right hand side of the equation
represents the substitution effect which we calculate from the estimated terms above. In
particular, as the variables required for this calculation are in logarithm form, we calculate
the uncompensated child wage effect multiplying the wage elasticity by the ratio between
the average hours worked by children and the sample mean of the child shadow wage.
The results indicate that the compensated wage effect is negative and the income effect
is positive. These signs are opposite to the theoretical priors and to results obtained in
the related literature which estimate adult labour supply using estimated shadow wages
and income. The negative sign on the child shadow wage is invariant to the underlying
production technology estimates we use. The sign is also consistent across different model
specifications.34 Indeed, we included the logarithm of per capita expenditures in place of
the shadow income. The sign on the expenditure coefficient remains positive and significant
and the one on the child shadow wage remains significant and negative. We estimate the
same model splitting the sample between boys and girls. The signs on the shadow wage
and income coefficients are robust to all of these alternatives.
The adult shadow wage seems to affect child labour supply positively. We would expect
though a negative sign on this coefficient. We have calculated the compensated cross-wage
effect and it is positive. However, this result may suggest that adult and child labour are
complementary rather than substitutes. Interestingly, we find that the coefficient on the
education of the household head, which was negative and significant in the reduced form
34Results not shown but available upon request.
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estimates, is statistically insignificant in these results. This may suggest that part of
the variation in this variable is captured by the shadow terms which partly reflect farm
productivity. The coefficient on the number of children aged between five and 14 is now
significant and negative. This result, while controlling for the opportunity cost of labour,
suggests that each additional child reduces the hours worked by another child.
1.9 Discussion of the results
The estimates of the child shadow wage suggest that a child’s contribution to the family
income is not negligible. In particular, on average children’s contribute to about the nine
percent of the annual average per capita household expenditure. In addition, children’s
contribution is about half of adults one. This suggests that, in some households, child
labour may be necessary to meet their subsistence needs.
The results on the estimated child labour supplies provide insights on whether poverty
or imperfections in the labour markets explain child labour in farm households. The
reduced form estimates reveal that hours worked by children are decreasing in land size.
The work opportunities stemming from land do not seem to be predominant. In particular,
girls’ work seems to decline as household’s wealth increases. However, the same reduction
does not appear on boys’ labour supply as the coefficients on land size are not significantly
different from zero. This result is opposite to what Bhalotra and Heady (2003) find. They
show that the substitution effect prevails over the wealth effect of an increase in land size
for girls but not for boys. Girls in land-rich households are found to work more than in
land poorer households. Their finding suggests that households using girls on the farm
are not compelled to do so for poverty reasons but for imperfections in land and labour
markets. One explanation for our different results is that our measure of work includes
all types of work children can do, while Bhalotra and Heady (2003) look only at on-farm
child work. We have shown indeed that the result is significant for girls and driven by
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domestic work. As girls are typically more involved in these types of activities this may
explain why the results are stronger when including domestic work. As soon as wealth
is sufficiently high, households tend to substitute their girls work with hired labour for
domestic work. These girls may be put back into school (Basu, 1999).
Therefore, our reduced form results are not suggestive of a ‘wealth paradox’. As
land increases, child labour decreases. This is consistent with perfect labour markets,
where hiring labour becomes easier or where outside work opportunities are higher (Basu
et al., 2010). However, the reduction in child labour as land increases, is mostly related
to households with sufficiently high wealth. In accordance with our results, Basu et al.
(2010) find that a smaller portion of households face the declining part of the inverted-U
relationship as the turning point is at high levels of land size. In addition, we see that
the negative effect of an increase in land size on child labour supply is related mostly to
households which own land only. On the contrary, we do not find any significant effect for
households which both own and sharecrop land although the descriptive statistics related
to these households implied an inverted-U relationship.
Therefore, we may advance the argument that imperfections in the Nepalese labour
market may partly explain the existence of child labour in farm households. Part of our de-
scriptive analysis suggested that rural labour markets in Nepal seem to be imperfect. The
prevalence of exchange labour over hired labour was an indication in this sense (Dumas,
2007). As discussed earlier, the increase in agricultural wages and the raising opportun-
ities outside Nepal may have rendered difficult hiring labour. Farm households who need
extra-labour may substitute with child or exchange labour for hired labour. However, the
labour market seems to function adequately for households at the top-end distribution of
land ownership. We may suppose that these households can more easily hire labour.
The convenience of a reduced form approach lies in the fact that it does not include
estimated values which may bias the estimates. Of course the drawback of this strategy is
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that results are more difficult to interpret given that we are not able to quantify the income
and substitution effects. The negative coefficient on the land size variable just suggests
that the income effect prevails over the substitution effect resulting from a change in land.
We estimate a structural labour supply equation for this purpose. However, as noted, the
results on the wage and income elasticities are in contrast with our theoretical priors. We
offer some potential explanations for these results. First, despite the empirical strategy
we are following should allow us to disentangle income and substitution effects from our
estimates, its complexity may instead prevent us from doing so. Hence, the negative sign
on the wage elasticity may reflect a prevailing income effect over the substitution effect
as in Bhalotra (2007). This could be reconciled with the reduced form results and would
suggest a backward bending labour supply curve. A negative coefficient on wage was
found also on the female labour supply in Skoufias (1994).35 They provide as a potential
explanation the fact that as the dependent variable (i.e., the hours worked) includes all
types of work activities (including domestic work), this negative sign can be a reflection
of the broader measure of work used. The positive income elasticity instead may imply
that child leisure is an inferior good. This result is in contrast with some of the related
literature which instead finds a negative income effect (Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Jacoby,
1993; Skoufias, 1994) with the exception of Barrett et al. (2008) which also find a positive
income effect. In addition, leisure being an inferior good in this type of setting may not
be very plausible if we think that child leisure may also include schooling, which is very
likely to increase if income increases.
Second, the negative sign on the wage elasticity may also be explained by the fact
that our shadow wage measure does not correct for imperfections in the markets and
in general for allocative inefficiencies. Barrett et al. (2008) find a similar negative wage
35Barrett et al. (2008) also find a negative wage elasticity but only in the estimates that do not correct
for allocative inefficiencies.
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elasticity in a model which do not control for allocative inefficiencies. Once correcting
for allocative inefficiency, the wage elasticity becomes positive, which is consistent with a
positively sloped labour supply.36 We already expressed our motivation for not pursuing
this correction but concede that our estimated measures may reflect this.
Third, the conflicting signs on the shadow wage and shadow income coefficients may
also be due to the fact that we are not able to address adequately the endogeneity of these
variables, hence leading to biased estimates. As explained, the estimated shadow wages
and income are endogenous measures. Indeed the estimated marginal products depend
on their actual hours of work (Skoufias, 1994). Hence we also estimate our model using
instrumental variables. It is difficult to find valid and relevant instruments for shadow
wage and income measures. We therefore provide a discussion of IV estimates and related
tables in the Appendix (tables 1.A.4 and 1.A.5). Importantly, the results obtained reveal
that the coefficient on the child shadow wage, despite of lower magnitude is still negative.
This may suggest that this effect is quite robust across different estimation methods.
Finally, this empirical strategy and the related estimates reflect the complex forces that
drive labour supply decisions within agricultural households. The fact that the shadow
wage and income are estimated measures may create some measurement error in these
variables which then reflects into the labour supply estimates (Baland et al., 2010b).
This complex structural approach may also suggest that the predictions of the underlying
neoclassical model may be violated in a context where the presence of social norms and
of informal institutions is important.
36Barrett et al. (2008) implement this correction by first testing for the equality between the estimated
marginal product and the market wage. Any deviation from this equality informs on the presence of
allocative inefficiencies. They then investigate the determinants of these estimated allocative inefficiencies
and use the imputed values to provide a shadow wage measure corrected for allocative inefficiencies.
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1.10 Concluding remarks
This chapter estimates the contribution of child labour to the family farm and test whether
poverty is the main driver of child labour in a sample of agricultural households in rural
Nepal. In particular, we analyse child labour in agricultural households where typically
consumption and production decisions are jointly determined. Child labour supply in this
type of households is the result of complex forces. We first obtain estimates of shadow
wages for family labour from the estimate of a farm production function. We then analyse
individual child labour supply, estimating both a reduced form and a structural equation
which includes the estimated shadow wages and income.
As wages are not available for adults and children who work as self-employed on the
farm, shadow wages have to be computed from production function estimates. The shadow
wage measures the opportunity cost of time of both children and adults who work on the
farm and its estimation allows us to assess the contribution of child and adult family
labour to the farm. We find that adult shadow wage is below the minimum agricultural
wage which is suggestive of the existence of frictions or imperfections in the Nepalese rural
labour market. Most importantly, we find that the estimated child shadow wage is nearly
a half of the adult shadow wage for on-farm work and that children contribute on average
to the nine percent of the average annual household expenditures. This suggests that
the relative contribution of child labour to the income of farm households in Nepal is not
negligible. Part of these households may therefore need their children’s work purely for
their subsistence.
We therefore estimate the child labour supply in farm households to see how it reacts
to changing economic conditions and in particular to explore whether child labour is
driven mostly by poverty or other reasons such as imperfections in the labour market.
We first estimate a reduced form model which includes, as a measure of wealth and work
opportunity, the amount of land a household owns or cultivates for someone else (or both).
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We find that child labour is decreasing in land size. This result is consistent with poverty-
induced child labour in the presence of well-functioning labour markets. The results also
show that this effect is mostly driven by households who own land and do not sharecrop,
and mostly related to girls. However, we also note that the decline in child labour only
occurs for quite large farm size. These results suggest that child labour in farm households
declines if wealth is sufficiently high. For these households it may be easier to substitute
their girls’ domestic work with hired labour. On the contrary, imperfections in the labour
market may explain child labour of boys and of a large portion of households which are
not at the top-end of the land distribution.
With the reduced form results we are not able to separately quantify the income and
substitution effects that an increase in land size generates. The estimates of a structural
labour supply model should have allowed us to do so. The coefficient on the child shadow
wage elasticity is negative and on the shadow income is positive. These signs are opposite
to our theoretical priors. We offered some explanations for these counter-intuitive results.
In spite of the above, the current analysis makes a number of important contributions.
First, it is one of the few studies that attempts to estimate the shadow wage of children.
We try to assess the monetary contribution of children to the family income in a setting
where wages are not available. More specifically, it is the first study which estimates
shadow wages for children in farm households of Nepal using data from the 2004 NLSS
survey (Menon et al. (2005) used 1996 NLSS survey data). Second, it is also the first
study that uses the estimated shadow wages and income in a structural child labour sup-
ply equation in order to assess the extent of income and substitution effects to understand
the role of poverty. These structural form estimation methods, despite providing theor-
etical soundness, should be estimated carefully. Given the complexities behind a farm
household’s decision making process and the specific setting under analysis, the appropri-
ateness of this empirical methodology and of the underlying predictions of the neoclassical
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model needs to be reconsidered. Finally, we provide reduced form estimates of child labour
for a sample of agricultural households that offer very interesting results. In particular,
imperfections in the labour market appear to be a potential cause of child labour in farm
households, particularly of boys and of households that also sharecrop others’ land. These
results highlight both the different roles that boys and girls play within the household and
the effects that different modes of operation of land may have on child labour.
This study offers important insights from a policy perspective. The knowledge of
the monetary contribution of child labour to the family income may help defining the
appropriate amount of cash transfers to households which need their children’s work in
order to meet their subsistence needs. In addition, the above results also suggest that
interventions devoted to the removal of imperfections in the labour markets may be helpful
in reducing child labour of boys and in households that are not at the top-end distribution
of land. Finally, programmes devoted to the reduction of child labour in agricultural
households should also target differently farm households which have different modes of
operation of land.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Household and farm characteristics in households with working and not working
children on the farm
Farm HH Farm HH Diff.
without working children with working children
Output 35808.295 36777.606 -969.311
Land (ha) 0.906 0.911 -0.004
Adult labour 3268.610 3709.946 -441.336∗∗∗
Child labour 0.000 848.122 -848.122∗∗∗
Hired labour 147.123 107.257 39.866∗
Exchange labour 109.049 170.033 -60.983∗∗∗
Seeds 295.533 214.839 80.693
Fertilisers 1327.777 1366.957 -39.179
Equipment 4471.287 3652.366 818.921
Other expenditures 1882.008 1587.058 294.951
Share of irrigated Land 0.453 0.432 0.021
Share of dry land sharecropped out 0.039 0.027 0.011
Share of wet land sharecropped out 0.043 0.031 0.012
Share of dry land left fallow 0.155 0.138 0.016
Share of wet land left fallow 0.019 0.018 0.001
Share of land sharecropped in 0.166 0.189 -0.023
West Mountains/Hills 0.296 0.280 0.016
East Tarai 0.155 0.142 0.013
West Tarai 0.267 0.231 0.036
HH head has primary education 0.170 0.197 -0.027
HH head has secondary/higher education 0.218 0.144 0.074∗∗∗
Spring 0.140 0.150 -0.010
Summer 0.360 0.387 -0.026
Autumn 0.140 0.170 -0.030∗
Very small farms (below 0.2 ha) 0.167 0.102 0.064∗∗∗
Small farms (between 0.2 and 1 ha) 0.546 0.571 -0.025
Medium farms (between 1 and 2 ha) 0.194 0.238 -0.044∗
Large farms (above 2 ha) 0.093 0.089 0.004
Number of plots 3.388 3.868 -0.480∗∗∗
Household size 4.975 6.307 -1.332∗∗∗
Nominal PC consumption 14166.320 10744.821 3421.499∗∗∗
Subsistence households 0.464 0.454 0.010
Observations 1483 921
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of variables in production function
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Output 36179.65 45068.31 76 958034
Land (ha) 0.91 1.13 0 20
Adult labour 3437.69 2439.00 12 20790
Child labour 324.93 686.49 0 6480
Hired labour 131.85 422.49 0 14728
Exchange labour 132.41 220.45 0 4000
Seeds 264.62 1186.26 0 44800
Fertilisers 1342.79 2718.54 0 48000
Equipment 4157.55 28564.50 0 630100
Other expenditures 1769.01 5121.29 0 149200
Share of irrigated Land 0.44 0.40 0 1
Share of dry land sharecropped out 0.03 0.15 0 1
Share of wet land sharecropped out 0.04 0.16 0 1
Share of dry land left fallow 0.15 0.28 0 1
Share of wet land left fallow 0.02 0.09 0 1
Share of land sharecropped in 0.18 0.31 0 1
West Mountains/Hills 0.29 0.45 0 1
East Mountains/Hills 0.31 0.46 0 1
East Tarai 0.15 0.36 0 1
West Tarai 0.25 0.44 0 1
Head has no education 0.63 0.48 0 1
Head has primary education 0.18 0.38 0 1
Head has secondary/higher education 0.19 0.39 0 1
Spring 0.14 0.35 0 1
Summer 0.37 0.48 0 1
Autumn 0.15 0.36 0 1
Winter 0.33 0.47 0 1
Observations 2404
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics on the sample of children 5-14 year old
All Boys Girls
Panel A: Participation rates
Never attended school 0.21 0.16 0.26
Attended school 0.03 0.04 0.03
Attending school 0.76 0.81 0.70
Idle 0.10 0.10 0.11
Work and school 0.31 0.29 0.33
Work only 0.14 0.09 0.19
School only 0.45 0.52 0.38
Do not work 0.50 0.56 0.44
Work in farm self-employment 0.37 0.37 0.36
Work in other activities 0.13 0.07 0.20
Obs. 3564 1811 1753
Panel B: Working children 5-14
Total hours worked in
past 12 months 754.65 618.61 865.12
Obs. 1774 795 979
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey.
Table 1.4: Children total hours worked in the past 12 months and farm size
All Own land Own and Cultivate Cultivate
others’ land other’s land
Farm size
Very small 841.411 893.306 460.346 936.375
Small 769.352 786.816 672.79 984.073
Medium 707.125 701.185 702.548 811.5
Large 682.407 738.176 567.27 1174.571
Total 754.648 779.401 655.455 953.292
Obs. 1774 1165 503 106
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Sample includes children
5-14 years old from farm households which work some positive hours in past 12
months.
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Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics of variables in child labour supply
Mean St.Dev
Total hours worked by children 5-14 in past 12 months 754.65 755.69
Land hectares 0.93 1.01
Land hectares squared 1.89 7.82
Number of plots 3.87 2.86
Very small farms (below 0.2 ha) 0.11 0.31
Small farms (between 0.2 and 1 ha) 0.56 0.50
Medium farms (between 1 and 2 ha) 0.23 0.42
Large farms (above 2 ha) 0.10 0.30
Own land 0.66 0.47
Cultivate others land 0.06 0.24
Own and cultivate others land 0.28 0.45
Child is male 0.45 0.50
Child age 10.91 2.31
West Mountains/Hills 0.27 0.44
East Mountains/Hills 0.36 0.48
West Tarai 0.14 0.35
East Tarai 0.23 0.42
Upper caste 0.45 0.50
Low caste 0.50 0.50
Muslim and other minorities 0.05 0.21
Head has no education 0.64 0.48
Head has primary education 0.20 0.40
Head has secondary education 0.16 0.36
Head age 43.83 11.25
Head is chronic ill 0.11 0.31
Head migrated 0.36 0.48
Number of children 0 to 4 0.75 0.87
Number of children 5 to 14 2.69 1.23
Number of adults older than 60 0.32 0.58
Number of adults older than 14 working off-farm 5.13 2.41
Subsistence households 0.46 0.50
Observations 1774
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Sample includes children 5-14
years old in farm households which work some positive hours in past 12 months.
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Table 1.6: Production function estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Cobb-Douglas Translog 1 Translog 2
Log Land (ha) 0.402*** 0.547*** 0.557***
(0.019) (0.143) (0.144)
Log Adult labour 0.279*** -0.109 -0.106
(0.021) (0.174) (0.171)
Log Child labour 0.011*** -0.030 0.012***
(0.004) (0.054) (0.004)
Log Hired labour 0.044*** 0.146** 0.153**
(0.006) (0.065) (0.065)
Log Exchange labour 0.015*** 0.110 0.098
(0.006) (0.068) (0.067)
Log Seeds 0.025*** 0.076* 0.075*
(0.004) (0.045) (0.045)
Log Fertilisers 0.012*** 0.040 0.041
(0.004) (0.043) (0.043)
Log Equipment 0.076*** 0.076 0.077
(0.011) (0.072) (0.072)
Log Other expenditures 0.041*** -0.004 0.002
(0.005) (0.046) (0.046)
Share of irrigated Land 0.262*** 0.233*** 0.235***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Share of dry land sharecropped out 0.003 0.087 0.070
(0.208) (0.205) (0.203)
Share of wet land sharecropped out -0.809*** -0.806*** -0.798***
(0.206) (0.207) (0.205)
Share of dry land left fallow -0.214*** -0.181*** -0.193***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Share of wet land left fallow -0.438*** -0.418*** -0.416***
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146)
Share of land sharecropped in -0.134*** -0.095** -0.092**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
West Mountains/Hills 0.141*** 0.182*** 0.187***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
East Tarai -0.025 -0.007 -0.008
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
West Tarai 0.050 0.061* 0.066*
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Head has primary education 0.069** 0.053* 0.051*
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Head has secondary/higher education 0.132*** 0.080*** 0.080***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Spring 0.021 -0.028 -0.034
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Summer -0.014 -0.016 -0.017
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Autumn 0.062* 0.062* 0.068*
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Log Land squared 0.050** 0.050**
(0.021) (0.021)
Log Adult labour squared 0.079*** 0.078***
(0.024) (0.023)
Log Hired labour squared 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.008) (0.008)
Log Exchange labour squared 0.002 0.003
(0.008) (0.007)
Log Seeds squared 0.013** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005)
Log Fertilisers squared 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.004)
Log Equipment squared 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004)
Log Other expenditures squared 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003)
Log Adult x Log Seeds -0.012** -0.012**
(0.006) (0.006)
Log Adult x Log Fertilisers -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.006) (0.006)
Log Child x Log Equipment 0.005*
(0.003)
Log Child x Log Other expenditures -0.003**
(0.001)
Log Hired x Log Equipment -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 6.958*** 7.704*** 7.671***
(0.184) (0.744) (0.746)
Obs. 2404 2404 2404
R-squared 0.702 0.739 0.737
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
East Mountains/Hills is the reference category for the regional variables, head has no educa-
tion for household’s head education variables and Winter for the season dummies. Estimates
in column 2 and 3 include all interaction terms between the inputs but we only report the
significant ones for simplicity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.7: Marginal product estimates
Obs. Cobb-Douglas Translog 1 Translog 2
Adult 2404 3.24 3.39 3.47
(3.46) (7.48) (7.68)
Children 921 1.58 1.66
(3.57) (3.81)
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Column two
reports marginal products estimated from the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. Columns three and four refer to marginal products
estimated from Translog production functions.
64
Table 1.8: Child labour supply reduced form estimates
(1) (2)
Land hectares -0.128**
(0.060)
Land hectares squared 0.012
(0.007)
Small farms (between 0.2 and 1 ha) -0.074
(0.093)
Medium farms (between 1 and 2 ha) -0.133
(0.109)
Large farms (above 2 ha) -0.291**
(0.134)
Number of plots 0.026** 0.026**
(0.011) (0.011)
Cultivate others land 0.249** 0.247**
(0.119) (0.118)
Own and cultivate others land -0.184*** -0.187***
(0.064) (0.065)
Child is male -0.408*** -0.410***
(0.053) (0.054)
Child age 0.115*** 0.115***
(0.012) (0.012)
East Mountains/Hills 0.006 0.005
(0.071) (0.072)
West Tarai -0.272*** -0.276***
(0.093) (0.093)
East Tarai 0.092 0.096
(0.092) (0.093)
Low caste 0.203*** 0.202***
(0.056) (0.056)
Muslim and other minorities 0.481*** 0.481***
(0.138) (0.137)
Head has primary education -0.174** -0.177***
(0.068) (0.068)
Head has secondary education -0.354*** -0.356***
(0.078) (0.078)
Head age -0.006** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Head is chronic ill -0.139 -0.140*
(0.085) (0.085)
Head migrated -0.069 -0.071
(0.057) (0.057)
Number of children 0 to 4 0.088*** 0.087***
(0.033) (0.033)
Number of children 5 to 14 0.025 0.026
(0.022) (0.022)
Number of adults older than 60 0.011 0.010
(0.049) (0.049)
Number of adults older than 14 working off-farm -0.014 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012)
Subsistence households -0.106* -0.104*
(0.060) (0.060)
Constant 5.319*** 5.337***
(0.212) (0.227)
Obs. 1774 1774
R-squared 0.123 0.123
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Sample includes children 5-14 years old from farm households which work
some positive hours in past 12 months. Reference categories: very small farms, west
mountains/hills, high caste, head has no completed education. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Table 1.9: Child labour supply reduced form estimates - Households which sharecrop and
do not sharecrop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own land Own land and Own land Own land and
cultivate others’ land cultivate others’ land
Land hectares -0.195** 0.041
(0.079) (0.360)
Land hectares squared 0.019*** -0.015
(0.007) (0.107)
Small farms (between 0.2 and 1 ha) -0.147 0.472
(0.119) (0.364)
Medium farms (between 1 and 2 ha) -0.257* 0.480
(0.151) (0.412)
Large farms (above 2 ha) -0.360* 0.254
(0.187) (0.447)
Number of plots 0.012 0.051** 0.011 0.050**
(0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024)
Child is male -0.414*** -0.389*** -0.417*** -0.383***
(0.072) (0.105) (0.072) (0.104)
Child age 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.112***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.015) (0.026)
East Mountains/Hills -0.036 0.226 -0.034 0.243
(0.124) (0.266) (0.126) (0.266)
West Tarai -0.497*** 0.125 -0.503*** 0.169
(0.141) (0.301) (0.137) (0.313)
East Tarai -0.123 0.590** -0.125 0.614**
(0.160) (0.298) (0.160) (0.294)
Low caste 0.206** 0.223* 0.202** 0.221*
(0.091) (0.133) (0.091) (0.131)
Muslim and other minorities 0.680*** 0.405 0.682*** 0.383
(0.205) (0.315) (0.202) (0.313)
Head has primary education -0.096 -0.317* -0.103 -0.275
(0.090) (0.188) (0.091) (0.171)
Head has secondary education -0.400*** -0.271 -0.395*** -0.275
(0.111) (0.199) (0.115) (0.195)
Head age -0.006 -0.012* -0.007* -0.012*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Head is chronic ill -0.097 -0.056 -0.106 -0.053
(0.124) (0.188) (0.129) (0.197)
Head migrated 0.009 -0.230 0.007 -0.246*
(0.096) (0.146) (0.096) (0.143)
Number of children 0 to 4 0.050 0.116 0.047 0.103
(0.048) (0.077) (0.047) (0.077)
Number of children 5 to 14 0.032 -0.008 0.029 -0.005
(0.036) (0.044) (0.036) (0.046)
Number of adults older than 60 0.052 -0.011 0.046 0.001
(0.067) (0.129) (0.068) (0.134)
Number of adults older than 14 working off-farm -0.018 -0.008 -0.016 -0.007
(0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026)
Subsistence households -0.093 -0.098 -0.085 -0.090
(0.080) (0.161) (0.081) (0.162)
Constant 5.409*** 4.926*** 5.482*** 4.550***
(0.252) (0.469) (0.264) (0.536)
Obs. 1165 503 1165 503
R-squared 0.132 0.138 0.130 0.148
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample includes children 5-14 years old from
farm households which work some positive hours in past 12 months. Reference categories: very small farms, west mountains/hills, high caste,
head has no completed education. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.10: Child labour supply reduced form estimates - Boys vs girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls Boys Girls
Land hectares -0.073 -0.160**
(0.097) (0.075)
Land hectares squared 0.005 0.015*
(0.010) (0.009)
Small farms (between 0.2 and 1 ha) -0.137 -0.034
(0.172) (0.108)
Medium farms (between 1 and 2 ha) -0.135 -0.166
(0.191) (0.134)
Large farms (above 2 ha) -0.368 -0.221
(0.234) (0.162)
Number of plots 0.038** 0.015 0.039** 0.014
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015)
Cultivate others land 0.175 0.317** 0.168 0.314**
(0.203) (0.149) (0.203) (0.149)
Own and cultivate others land -0.201** -0.174** -0.199** -0.182**
(0.101) (0.084) (0.100) (0.084)
Child age 0.094*** 0.128*** 0.096*** 0.128***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)
East Mountains/Hills -0.068 0.054 -0.064 0.057
(0.113) (0.093) (0.113) (0.094)
West Tarai -0.186 -0.357*** -0.183 -0.357***
(0.140) (0.127) (0.139) (0.127)
East Tarai 0.192 0.012 0.192 0.022
(0.147) (0.120) (0.146) (0.122)
Low caste 0.222*** 0.198*** 0.221*** 0.194**
(0.085) (0.076) (0.085) (0.076)
Muslim and other minorities 0.607*** 0.412** 0.611*** 0.408**
(0.229) (0.174) (0.229) (0.174)
Head has primary education -0.138 -0.205** -0.132 -0.215**
(0.113) (0.086) (0.112) (0.085)
Head has secondary education -0.368*** -0.355*** -0.369*** -0.356***
(0.121) (0.104) (0.121) (0.105)
Head age -0.005 -0.007** -0.005 -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Head is chronic ill -0.099 -0.187* -0.101 -0.194*
(0.134) (0.109) (0.134) (0.110)
Head migrated -0.216** 0.054 -0.217** 0.053
(0.090) (0.074) (0.090) (0.074)
Number of children 0 to 4 0.102* 0.066 0.102* 0.063
(0.055) (0.041) (0.054) (0.041)
Number of children 5 to 14 0.017 0.030 0.022 0.027
(0.035) (0.029) (0.035) (0.029)
Number of adults older than 60 -0.027 0.051 -0.031 0.047
(0.074) (0.065) (0.074) (0.066)
Number of adults older than 14 working off-farm -0.035* 0.005 -0.034* 0.006
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Subsistence households -0.060 -0.143* -0.071 -0.134*
(0.092) (0.080) (0.092) (0.081)
Constant 5.131*** 5.188*** 5.180*** 5.176***
(0.337) (0.269) (0.374) (0.284)
Obs. 795 979 795 979
R-squared 0.091 0.120 0.094 0.118
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample includes
children 5-14 years old from farm households which work some positive hours in past 12 months. Reference
categories: very small farms, west mountains/hills, high caste, head has no completed education. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.11: Child labour supply structural form estimates
(1) (2)
OLS from Cobb-Douglas OLS from Translog
Log Children shadow wage -0.627*** -0.632***
(0.021) (0.021)
Log Adult shadow wage 0.120*** 0.124***
(0.043) (0.042)
Log Shadow income 0.173*** 0.186***
(0.026) (0.027)
Child is male -0.468*** -0.470***
(0.042) (0.042)
Child age 0.118*** 0.119***
(0.010) (0.010)
East Mountains/Hills -0.044 -0.056
(0.054) (0.054)
West Tarai -0.110 -0.117
(0.076) (0.076)
East Tarai -0.006 -0.030
(0.065) (0.064)
Low caste 0.069 0.071
(0.045) (0.044)
Muslim and other minorities 0.226* 0.250**
(0.116) (0.119)
Head has primary education 0.009 0.007
(0.056) (0.055)
Head has secondary education -0.008 -0.019
(0.066) (0.067)
Head age -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Head is chronic ill -0.144* -0.149*
(0.078) (0.078)
Head migrated -0.060 -0.083*
(0.044) (0.044)
Number of children 5 to 14 -0.118*** -0.119***
(0.019) (0.019)
Number of adults older than 14 working off-farm 0.019** 0.021**
(0.010) (0.010)
Number of children 0 to 4 0.077*** 0.073***
(0.026) (0.026)
Number of adults older than 60 0.062 0.058
(0.040) (0.040)
Subsistence households -0.226*** -0.225***
(0.047) (0.046)
Constant 3.099*** 3.016***
(0.295) (0.307)
Obs. 1496 1496
R-squared 0.523 0.523
Mean dependent variable 791.37 791.37
(776.42) (776.42)
Mean adult shadow wage 2.99 2.94
(2.17) (2.38)
Mean child shadow wage 1.29 1.34
(3.04) (3.16)
Mean shadow income 48453.04 49011.84
(63021.50) (63014.39)
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample includes
children 5-14 years old from farm households which work some positive hours in past 12 months. Column 1
and column 2 include shadow wages and income measures estimated from Cobb-Douglas and Translog production
function estimates respectively. Reference categories: west mountains/hills, high caste, head has no completed
education.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Imputation of missing crop prices
Within our sample there are missing prices for crops which are not sold on the market. Out
of 26,893 observations corresponding to quantities of crops harvested by each household
there are only 3,416 observations on prices at the household level. Therefore we proceed
with imputation of missing prices.
We firstly convert prices and quantities harvested in the same unit of measure using
the conversion factors provided in the companion documents of the 2004 NLSS Survey
(CBS, 2004). In this way we are able to multiply quantities of crops produced by prices
expressed in the same unit of measure to obtain the value of farm production.
The procedure we follow for price imputation is the following. The available prices
are either at the household level (i.e., reported by the household who sells its products
on the market) or at the ward/community level. We first use household level crop prices
when available. When prices are not available for some households, we take the ward level
average of prices reported by other households for the same crop in the same ward (these
are therefore still prices reported by households). The remaining missing information
is then imputed with community level market prices for the same crops. After these
imputations we are able to cover the 42 percent of observations for prices. These prices
are then used in order to impute the remaining missing observations. We exploit the
Hotdeck imputation method procedure whereby missing data are imputed stochastically
rather than deterministically (Rubin, 2004; Rubin and Schenker, 1987). For this reason
we run the procedure one hundred times. We take the row average over the one hundred
prices generated for each crop produced by every household. There will still be some crops
for which there are no available prices as no prices have been reported for them. These
crops are Sweet Lime, Bamboo and Other Trees. These three crops represent respectively
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the 0.1, 0.7 and 0.9 percent of the overall household production. Therefore we believe we
are ignoring only a marginal portion of farm production. As a final step we adjust this
price measure for regional price differences dividing the prices by its regional price index
as reported in the 2004 NLSS Survey data. Finally, we multiply the quantity produced on
each crop by its relative price. This is the value of farm production used for our analysis.
As a robustness check we have imputed prices in another way. First, as above we use
prices reported at the household level. We then replace the missing observation with the
ward level average of prices reported at the household level on the same crops. We replace
the missing information with the average prices at the district level, then at the region
level and finally at the country level. The output measure we obtain is largely similar to
the one obtained above. Hence we use the first measure as output variable.
1.A.2 Instrumental variable estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production
function
In the related literature common used instruments for hours worked on the farm by family
members are the number of adults and children in the household in different age groups.
The rationale behind this is that an additional adult or child in a farm household should
increase its number of hours worked on the farm while affecting the farm output only
indirectly. Hired and exchange labour are instrumented with variables at the village level.
More precisely we use a dummy that says whether there is temporary migration of people
in the village that look for work as an instrument for hired labour. We then use the
number of landless households in the village that provide labour on other farms and the
daily market wage at village level for adults as an instrument for exchange labour.37 These
variables should be all relevant and valid instruments for hired and exchange labour as they
37As market wages are only available for some villages, we impute the missing observations with the
median wage at the district level, hence reducing substantially their variability.
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should capture the supply of these type of labour at the village level while not affecting
directly the farm and livestock production. These instruments are a bit less intuitively
valid for exchange labour. Indeed this input is driven by forces (e.g. traditions and norms)
that cannot be easily captured by the available data. Unfortunately, we do not have data
to capture the seasonality in the use of hired and exchange labour. Our conjecture is that
this is an important omission for our analysis. Finally, we use available market prices of
seeds (i.e., rice seeds) and fertilisers (i.e., urea) at village level and the distance from the
closest market for agricultural inputs purchases as instruments for seeds and fertilisers
expenditures.
Table 1.A.1 shows the first stage results from regressing each endogenous variable on
its set of instruments. We see that the coefficients on the instruments are all significant
and show the expected signs. The sign on the coefficient for the number of households
in the village without land but that provide labour, is negatively correlated with the
exchange labour input. A positive sign would have been more intuitive. The usual F-test
that provides information on whether instruments are relevant cannot be applied here as
there are multiple endogenous variables. We report the estimates from the two stage least
squares model in Table 1.A.2. We note that the coefficient on the land input becomes lower
than in OLS estimates and below the coefficient on adult labour which is now substantially
increased. This result is less consistent with the literature as land seems to contribute the
most to the production. Also the results suggest that the coefficients on child, hired and
exchange labour are not significant anymore. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test shows that
we strongly reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrumented variables, hence
suggesting for the need of applying an IV model. However, the Hansen’s J statistic which
under the null hypothesis tests that all instruments are valid (i.e., test the independence of
the selected instruments from the errors in the structural equation) indicate that we reject
the overidentifying restriction test for orthogonality of the instruments, hence leading us
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to conclude that our instruments are not valid. The difference between OLS and IV
estimates may suggest that the problematic variables are indeed endogenous. However,
this difference may come from the fact that the instruments are not valid. For this reason
IV estimates are as likely to produce biased estimates as OLS ones.
1.A.3 Instrumental variable estimates of the structural child labour sup-
ply equation
We use as instrument for the child shadow wage the children market wage at the village
level.38 We also exploit the number of public schools present in the village. The instrument
for adult shadow wage is the adult market wage at the village level. Finally, instruments
for the shadow income are whether the household has electricity, water and whether the
household has a loan. The orthogonality of some of these instruments is questionable as
well as the relevance. Table 1.A.4 in the Appendix shows the results from the first stage
estimates which regress each endogenous variable on its set of instruments. All coefficients
are significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient on the instrument for adult
wages is significant at the 10 percent. The usual F-statistics which should inform on the
relevance of the instruments does not apply in this setting given that there are multiple
endogenous variables. We proceed with the IV estimation and report the estimates in
Table 1.A.5 in the Appendix. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrumented variables. This would suggest that the above
variables may not need instrumentation. However, a failure to reject this test may also
come from the fact that this model is weakly identified. The Hansen’s J statistic which
tests for overidentifying restrictions shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis, hence
suggesting that our instrument set is valid. However, the outcome of this test can be
38There are missing values for the market wage, so we impute these values with the median level of wage
at the district level, hence loosing variability.
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fairly misleading if the instruments are not relevant. Notwithstanding these limitations
it is interesting to compare this IV results with the OLS results. We note that results in
Table 1.A.5 still show a negative coefficient on the shadow wage elasticity. Despite that,
its magnitude is lower than in OLS estimates. In addition the coefficients on adult shadow
wage and shadow income are not statistically significant. These IV estimates may be as
biased as the OLS ones. However, the fact that the coefficient on the child shadow wage,
despite of lower magnitude is still negative may suggest that this effect is quite robust
across different estimation methods.
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Appendix tables
Table 1.A.1: Cobb-Douglas production function IV estimates - First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adult labour Child labour Hired labour Exchange labour Seeds Fertilisers
Number children 15 to 17 0.123***
(0.031)
Number adults 18 to 60 0.120***
(0.010)
Number children 5 to 10 0.768***
(0.052)
Number children 11 to 14 1.498***
(0.063)
Temporary migration in village 0.412***
(0.099)
Number HH with landless labourers in village -0.014***
(0.003)
Log daily rural adult wage 0.230**
(0.110)
Log village price input seeds (rice) -0.304***
(0.067)
Log village price input fertilisers (urea) -1.642***
(0.261)
Distance from market for agricultural inputs -0.010***
(0.004)
Obs. 2404 2404 2404 2404 2404 2404
R-squared 0.427 0.312 0.411 0.322 0.238 0.391
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Each model includes also all other explanatory variables included in the second stage. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.A.2: Production function IV estimates
(1)
Cobb-Douglas-IV
Log Land (ha) 0.242***
(0.084)
Log Adult labour 0.573***
(0.108)
Log Child labour 0.011
(0.010)
Log Hired labour 0.076
(0.072)
Log Exchange labour 0.040
(0.058)
Log Seeds 0.138**
(0.055)
Log Fertilisers 0.016
(0.023)
Log Equipment 0.027
(0.020)
Log Other expenditures 0.003
(0.023)
Share of irrigated Land 0.181**
(0.091)
Share of dry land sharecropped out 0.274
(0.242)
Share of wet land sharecropped out -0.560*
(0.286)
Share of dry land left fallow -0.169***
(0.059)
Share of wet land left fallow -0.339*
(0.186)
Share of land sharecropped in -0.101
(0.065)
West Mountains/Hills 0.221***
(0.073)
East Tarai -0.009
(0.181)
West Tarai 0.070
(0.133)
HH head has primary education 0.014
(0.050)
HH head has secondary/higher education 0.034
(0.095)
Spring 0.028
(0.057)
Summer -0.015
(0.047)
Autumn 0.079*
(0.044)
Constant 4.669***
(0.902)
Obs. 2404
R-squared 0.571
Hansen’s J statistic 14.237
p-value Hansen’s J (0.007)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-squared 43.749
p-value DWH (0.000)
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust stand-
ard errors in parenthesis. Instruments: Number of children 15 to 17,
number adults 18 to 60, number children 5 to 10, number children 11
to 14, temporary migration in village, number HH with landless labour-
ers in village, log daily rural adult wage, log village price input seeds,
log village price input fertilisers, distance from market for agricultural
inputs. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.A.3: Child labour supply reduced form estimates - Heckman two step estimator
(1) (2)
Hours eq. Participation eq. Hours eq. Participation eq.
Land hectares -0.139**
(0.055)
Land hectares squared 0.012*
(0.006)
Small farms (between 0.2 and 1 ha) -0.078
(0.088)
Medium farms (between 1 and 2 ha) -0.145
(0.104)
Large farms (above 2 ha) -0.310**
(0.129)
Number of plots 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Cultivate others land 0.280** 0.242** 0.276** 0.242**
(0.124) (0.114) (0.124) (0.114)
Own and cultivate others land -0.164*** 0.115* -0.167*** 0.115*
(0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.059)
Child is male -0.489*** -0.456*** -0.487*** -0.456***
(0.066) (0.050) (0.066) (0.050)
Child age 0.172*** 0.360*** 0.169*** 0.360***
(0.033) (0.012) (0.033) (0.012)
East Mountains/Hills 0.054 0.334*** 0.051 0.334***
(0.076) (0.068) (0.076) (0.068)
West Tarai -0.311*** -0.175** -0.314*** -0.175**
(0.097) (0.082) (0.097) (0.082)
East Tarai 0.069 -0.126* 0.072 -0.126*
(0.088) (0.075) (0.088) (0.075)
Low caste 0.213*** 0.112** 0.211*** 0.112**
(0.058) (0.054) (0.058) (0.054)
Muslim and other minorities 0.459*** -0.118 0.461*** -0.118
(0.140) (0.115) (0.139) (0.115)
Head has primary education -0.190*** -0.073 -0.193*** -0.073
(0.070) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066)
Head has secondary education -0.434*** -0.425*** -0.433*** -0.425***
(0.091) (0.071) (0.091) (0.071)
Head age -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head is chronic ill -0.124 0.038 -0.126 0.038
(0.088) (0.085) (0.088) (0.085)
Head migrated -0.053 0.052 -0.056 0.052
(0.057) (0.054) (0.057) (0.054)
Number of children 0 to 4 0.093*** 0.063** 0.091*** 0.063**
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
Subsistence households -0.100* -0.098*
(0.058) (0.058)
Number of children 5 to 10 0.039 0.039
(0.026) (0.026)
Number of children 11 to 15 -0.217*** -0.217***
(0.031) (0.031)
Number of adults 16 to 17 0.001 0.001
(0.054) (0.054)
Number of adults 18 to 60 -0.095*** -0.095***
(0.022) (0.022)
Number of adults older than 60 -0.114** -0.114**
(0.045) (0.045)
Number of adults older than 14 working off-farm 0.047*** 0.047***
(0.014) (0.014)
Constant 4.662*** -2.574*** 4.716*** -2.574***
(0.418) (0.177) (0.420) (0.177)
Mills ratio (lambda) 0.358* 0.342*
(0.195) (0.193)
Obs. 1774 3564 1774 3564
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Sample includes children 5-14 years old from farm households which work
some positive hours in past 12 months. Reference categories: very small farms, household owns land, west mountains/hills, high
caste, head has no completed education. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.A.4: Child labour supply IV estimates - First stage
(1) (2) (3)
Child shadow wage Adult shadow wage Shadow income
Log rural child market wage 0.413***
(0.104)
Number of public schools 0.031***
(0.010)
Log rural adult market wage 0.066*
(0.037)
HH has piped source of water 8601.598**
(3692.503)
HH uses electricity as light source 18764.025***
(4022.879)
HH has a loan 27894.689***
(3835.408)
Obs. 1496 1496 1496
R-squared 0.271 0.290 0.180
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Each model includes also all other explanatory variables
included in the second stage. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.A.5: Child labour supply IV estimates
(1)
IV
Log Children shadow wage -0.470***
(0.151)
Log Adult shadow wage -0.219
(0.368)
Log Shadow income 0.021
(0.084)
Child is male -0.462***
(0.044)
Child age 0.124***
(0.011)
East Mountains/Hills -0.110
(0.073)
West Tarai -0.147
(0.100)
East Tarai 0.127
(0.157)
Low caste 0.058
(0.053)
Muslim and other minorities 0.291**
(0.138)
Head has primary education 0.011
(0.068)
Head has secondary education 0.054
(0.098)
Head age -0.004
(0.003)
Head is chronic ill -0.107
(0.081)
Head migrated -0.026
(0.048)
Number of children 5 to 15 -0.068
(0.044)
Number of adults older than 15 working off-farm 0.005
(0.017)
Number of children 0 to 4 0.069**
(0.029)
Number of adults older than 60 0.093**
(0.047)
Subsistence households -0.306***
(0.085)
Constant 5.043***
(1.115)
Obs. 1496
R-squared 0.474
Hansen’s J statistic 3.214
p-value Hansen’s J (0.360)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-squared 4.906
p-value DWH (0.179)
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey. Robust stand-
ard errors in parenthesis. Shadow wages and income measures are estim-
ated from Cobb-Douglas production function estimates. Instruments:
child village wage, number of public schools in the village, adult village
wage, household has electricity, household has water, household has a
loan. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 2
Women as decision makers in
Community Forest management in
Nepal
2.1 Introduction
The management and protection of common property resources such as forests, water
or fishing grounds have been central issues in development economic policies in recent
years. Increased scarcity of these resources poses serious concerns not only in terms
of environmental sustainability but also for rural populations reliant on environmental
resources for their livelihoods. Over the few decades local level collective action institutions
emerged as ways to protect the resources as well as sustain local development. Over
the years these institutions were deemed to be successful for environmental resources
protection, though more recent concerns started to emerge on their correct functioning.
The existence of socio-economic heterogeneity and gender inequality within community
institutions may indeed lead to a failure of collective action mechanisms (Adhikari and
Lovett, 2006; Baland et al., 2007).
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The purpose of this essay is to analyse whether and how an increased participation of
women in the decision-making body of local collective action institutions - the Executive
Committee (EC) of Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) in Nepal - affects forest
protection, specifically the quantity of firewood collected by the households. Firewood
extraction is considered as one of the main causes of deforestation. Therefore, a reduction
in the quantity of firewood collected would imply better forest conditions. Our hypo-
thesis is that a higher female representation in ECs of CFUGs contributes to better forest
management and hence to forest protection.
Nepal is a particularly suitable country for this analysis. In 1993 the government
of Nepal promulgated a Forest Act which established the transfer of national forests to
local communities. Since then Community Forest User Groups (FUGs from now on)
have been formed for the management and protection of these forests. These groups can
autonomously manage the forests and decide on the distribution of benefits deriving from
the forest resources. On the basis of 2010 estimates on the Nepalese forest cover, nearly the
44 percent of forest area in Nepal is now covered by FUGs (FAO, 2010b). The Executive
Committee of each FUG plays a critical role in defining the forest products extraction
rules and its composition is therefore crucial for the functioning and effectiveness of these
institutions. We use two national representative household surveys, the NLSS 2004 and
2011, and combine them with a census of all FUGs formed in the country. This is a unique
feature of our analysis.
This study is motivated by the fact that minimal research has been devoted to exploring
gender differences within community-based institutions established for natural resources
management. However, women are largely responsible for the collection and use of firewood
and other forest products within a household. Despite being important stakeholders in
forest management, they are often neglected in the decision-making process that sets
out the rules to access and collect forest products within a Community Forest (CF). The
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recognition of the essential role that women play within community level forest institutions
can make a difference in terms of forest conservation and equity in the distribution of
benefits.1
Why should an increased presence of women in the ECs of FUGs make such a differ-
ence? We expect female participation to affect the outcome for one main reason. Women
have different and complementary interests relative to men within a FUG which stem from
the differences in concerns and nature of dependence on forest that women have relative to
men (Agarwal, 2000, 2010b). They are the main users of forests, at least of those products
which are essential to household daily life. Women have better knowledge than men of cer-
tain forest products, on how these products should be extracted and which species should
be planted. Given the specific interests of women in certain forest products and particu-
larly in firewood, they thus have the incentive to ensure the availability of these products
and ultimately to protect the forests. Women may also have different preferences than
men (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). This links to the growing literature on women
in leadership positions. They tend to favour redistribution and to support child-related
expenditures and outcomes. Women would then have a stronger preference than men to
ensure that household’s firewood needs are satisfied both in the short and long run.
Therefore, a higher representation of women may increase the effectiveness of FUGs
in terms of forest management and protection. However, women face a trade-off as they
need to balance sustainable forest protection with their immediate household needs. For
the above reasons we argue that, for given forest conditions, women sitting on the ECs
may favour decisions that prioritise a sustainable extraction of firewood. We would expect
a negative sign on the effect of an increased female participation on firewood collection.
We first look at the determinants of female participation in Executive Committees
1We concentrate in the present study only on the analysis of the effects of a higher female participation
in the ECs of FUGs on the protection of forests (i.e., on the quantity of firewood collected at the household
level).
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and then analyse the relationship between such participation and firewood collection. As
a further step we also try to account for the potential endogeneity of female participation.
Hence we propose one way to address this issue using a difference-in-difference estima-
tion strategy to exogenously identify the effect of an increase in female participation on
firewood collection. In 2009 an amendment to the Community Forest programme’s op-
erational guidelines sets at 50 percent the minimum threshold for female representation
in the ECs of FUGs. This new provision actually increased female participation within
these local institutions. We exploit this exogenous variation in the percentage of women in
the Executive Committees of groups formed after 2009 and compare the outcome before
and after this change, as an identification strategy. The results show that higher female
participation in the ECs of FUGs leads to a decrease in firewood extraction. This evid-
ence is suggestive that women are prioritising conservation to ensure sustainable firewood
extraction for the satisfaction of their daily needs.
There is a very limited number of economic studies which assess the role of women
within collective action institutions for the management and protection of natural re-
sources. One reason lies in the paucity of good quality data that allows for a rigorous
analysis of collective action institutions. Agarwal (2009a) is one of the few studies that
analyse how the gender composition of community based groups affects forest conservation
and management rules. The results reveal that groups with a higher presence of women
in the ECs exhibit improvements in forest conditions. However, this existing research
focused on relatively narrow geographical areas of Nepal and India using data related to
small case studies.
Therefore, the main contributions we want to make with the present analysis are the
following. The first novel contribution is the use of the census of all FUGs created in Nepal
which is maintained by the Department of Forest of Nepal. This allows concentrating on a
wider area of Nepal. In addition, we are able to combine national representative household
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surveys data with the census data. This gives unique information for the analysis. Finally,
we try to account for potential non-random female participation in the ECs, which most
of the existing literature ignored. To the author’s knowledge there are no studies that
rigorously investigate and address this relevant question. This analysis is extremely im-
portant mainly in countries where strong gender division roles exist and where the natural
resources are essential to the daily lives of people.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a literature review and the
analytical framework. Section 2.3 provides a background both on the Nepalese context
and on the country’s forestry policy. Section 2.4 describes the data, the sample used for
the analysis and provides some descriptive statistics of the relevant variables. Section
2.5 presents the empirical strategy and Section 2.6 reports the results and provides some
robustness checks. Section 2.7 discusses the results and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Literature review and analytical framework
Forests cover about 4 billion hectares, nearly 31 percent of the earth’s land surface. The
rate of deforestation has slowed down in recent years. Between 2000 and 2010 the estimated
net change in forest area was about -5.2 million hectares per year while between 1990 and
2000 it was -8.3 million hectares. This reduction in forest depletion is attributed to large-
scale planting of trees and forest protection programmes (FAO, 2010a). However, forest
degradation is still very high in many countries. Indeed, the management and protection
of common property resources and of forests in particular has been and remains a global
challenge. Over the past decades the widespread concerns on deforestation and forest
degradation, specifically of the Himalayan forest, have raised questions on the best ways
to limit and counteract this trend and to understand its causes (Baland et al., 2010b,
2013).
Few studies analyse the determinants of firewood collection which is assumed to be one
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of the causes of deforestation and forest degradation (Baland et al., 2013, 2010b; Edmonds,
2002; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003). Poverty has been advanced as one of the hypothesis
for environmental degradation. However, some of these studies do not find evidence that
poverty is a determinant of deforestation. Poorer households collect less than richer ones,
but at the top income level firewood collection starts to decrease. In addition, despite
consumption growth appearing to accelerate deforestation, an increase in education, non-
agricultural occupations and access to other sources of fuelwood may reduce this pressure
on forests, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between sources of growth when
looking at the effects of poverty on environmental degradation (Baland et al., 2013).
Understanding the causes of deforestation becomes particularly relevant for determin-
ing the ways forests can be protected. The protection of forests and, in general, of common
property resources from an overexploitation and hence from depletion as population grows
is crucial for defining any developing policy (Wade, 1987). The question is then to un-
derstand how best these resources can be protected and managed (Baland and Platteau,
1996).
Common property resources are essential to the livelihoods of a large part of the
population mostly in developing countries. Indeed the depletion of these resources, besides
posing concerns for the sustainability of the entire world population, becomes particularly
worrying for those populations which rely on these resources for their daily lives (i.e.,
the rural poor in developing countries). Water, grazing land, agricultural land, forests,
fisheries are all common property resources. The rights to exploit these resources are
held in common with many individuals and these rights can take various forms from
an unlimited use to an almost total ban in the access to the resources (Wade, 1987).
Essentially common property resources represent a subset of public goods. They are non-
excludable but rival in consumption. Unlike public goods, common property resources
face problems of congestion, depletion and degradation (Runge, 1986), because their joint
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use implies subtractability.
Past literature concentrated on highlighting the failure of common property arrange-
ments which generate a mismanagement of these resources and ultimately cause even more
rapid degradation. The basic theoretical argument is that individual incentives inevitably
lead to the mismanagament of common property resources. This is indeed well described
in three of the most popular theories of collective action summarised by Wade (1987). Spe-
cifically, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma model, rational individuals do not have the incentive
to cooperate. The Tragedy of the Commons theory (Hardin, 1968), which extends the
argument to common property resources, predicts that the private benefit of an overex-
ploitation of a common resource exceeds the private costs of protecting the resource from
excessive use because this can be shifted to the whole group. A tragedy of the commons
emerges because of the existence of common property rights over a scarce resource. In the
Logic of Collective Action (Olson, 1965), Mancur Olson argues that a rational individual,
unless forced by coercitive mechanisms, will always have the incentive to ignore the social
costs of an overexploitation of the resource and act for his own interests. He also adds that
only small groups will have the incentive to voluntary cooperate and successfully protect
the collective good while large populations will never have this incentive (Olson, 1965).
As a result of these theories, the tendency therefore was to give a relatively small role to
local collective action institutions for environmental protection and economic development.
However, since the mid-1980s the discussions on which type of institutional arrangement is
best for common property resource management changed and a vast literature on common
property arrangements emerged (Agrawal, 2001). This more recent literature claimed for
the success of collective action2 as an effective alternative to private resource management
or state regulation of a common resource (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1987). The
2Collective action is ‘action by more than one person directed towards the achievement of a common
goal or the satisfaction of a common interest’ (Wade, 1987, p.97).
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claim was based on the recognition that the above theories hold under the assumption
that individuals cannot communicate, which is implausible in many situations (Wade,
1987). As a result voluntary collective action institutions can emerge and be successful
in protecting the common interest if effective rules and related sanctions are established
within the group.
Since then the belief that local communities through the formation of collective action
institutions could successfully manage common property resources and hence contribute to
environmental protection and local development became relevant (Baland and Platteau,
1996; Bardhan, 1993). ‘Participatory development’ and ‘community driven development’
became common themes across countries with natural resources to protect (Hobley and
Shakya, 2012).
However, Baland et al. (2007), while proclaiming the potential of small rural com-
munities in achieving the goals of environmental protection and economic development,
emphasise that group heterogeneity may lead to a failure of these institutions. Often a fail-
ure of collective action institutions in protecting common property resources (e.g., forests)
results from inequalities within the groups which prevent them from successfully cooper-
ating. The authors stress the relevance of various dimensions of inequality. In particular,
income and asset inequality matters as well as ethnic and social heterogeneity which may
influence the well functioning of collective action institutions. Group participation may
be lower in localities that are more unequal in terms of income and ethnicity (Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2000). Most importantly for the current analysis, gender inequality within
groups may affect the level of cooperation. Women are largely excluded from any decision
making within community groups. In addition, gender norms and divisions of roles within
the household have tended to exclude women at many levels within society. This under-
representation together with pre-existing gender inequalities within the household and the
society as a whole, poses serious concerns for women who have the primary responsibility
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for the collection of forest products within the household (Agarwal, 2007). This suggests
that the nature of dependence on forest is different between women and men. Women
have a higher interest then men in ensuring the availability of firewood and other forest
products essential for their daily life. This is also related to the burden associated with a
deterioration in forest conditions (Acharya and Gentle, 2006). Environmental degradation
and natural resource scarcity affects women and children’s time directly, given they have
to walk longer distances for the collection of firewood (Cooke, 1998). Similarly, women
and children’s health may be adversely affected by fuelwood scarcity. Indeed, the use of
firewood in an enclosed environment (i.e., a house) is also potentially unhealthy.
Besides having different interests than men, women in general may have different pref-
erences. Income generated within the FUG could be more equally distributed if more
women had power at the decision-making level. Women would also be more prone to
favour investments related to their needs and to those of their children (Agarwal, 2010b).
This strand of research on women in collective action institutions links to another literat-
ure which analyses female representation in public decision-making. Women and men have
different policy priorities. This literature demonstrates that women in key political posi-
tions tend to favour public goods that emphasise investing more on child-related expenses
(Clots-Figueras, 2012). Female political representation also tends to attenuate the gender
bias in voter attitudes towards women (Beaman et al., 2009). Chattopadhyay and Duflo
(2004) report how the gender of those in key political position affects the type of public
good provided and show that women tend to favour public goods which are more linked
to their concerns. Therefore, any surplus income generated within a FUG is likely to be
spent disproportionately on goods and outcomes such as health and children’s education.
Much of the research which looks at the effects of collective action institutions and
of the role of women within local forest groups, concentrate on India and Nepal. The
reason for this lies in the recent reforms enacted by the governments to address issues of
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environmental degradation.3 Edmonds (2002) is one of the few studies on Nepal which
attempts to rigourously evaluate the impact of collective action institutions established for
the management of forests on environmental degradation. The results seem to suggest that
FUGs in Nepal have been successful in reducing firewood extraction and hence forest de-
gradation. This study focuses on the short term effects of these institutions as it evaluates
the effect of the 1993 reform in 1996. Two other recent studies do not find any significant
correlation between firewood collection and the presence of FUGs in communities in Nepal
(Baland et al., 2010b, 2013).4 The remaining empirical analysis mostly concentrates on
relatively small case studies which acknowledge the success of FUGs activities in Nepal
in halting deforestation (Kumar, 2002; Hobley and Shakya, 2012). However, these latter
studies ignore the potential endogeneity of community group formation on relevant out-
comes. Baland et al. (2010a) demonstrate that ignoring this potential endogeneity bias
may lead to an under-estimation of the benefits of community forest management.
However, the success of community forestry in Nepal has been challenged in a more
recent literature which stresses how most of the benefits accrued to local elites (Thoms,
2008; Malla et al., 2003). Participation in FUGs is found to be higher for more economically
advantaged groups (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). Adhikari et al. (2004) show that richer
households benefit more in terms of forest access and distribution of benefits than poorer
ones, highlighting the importance of making these groups more inclusive. The exclusion
of some sub-groups within these local community institutions may indeed cause failure
in terms of both equity and efficiency of these groups (Agarwal, 2001). The success or
failure of collective action institutions depends also on their design and characteristics
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Edmonds, 2003; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1987).
For example, many local community groups in Nepal are created with the assistance
3We will discuss Nepal forestry policy in the next section.
4However the authors claim they are not able to assess any causal effect given the non randomness of
group formation.
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of donors. Differences between donors in terms of funding or objectives may reflect the
attributes of the groups which as a result will have different characteristics (e.g., number of
members, area covered). This heterogeneity eventually affects the success or failure of some
of these groups and, more generally, of programmes which devolve to local communities
the management of natural resources (Edmonds, 2003).
Some recent research focused on explaining why gender matters in environmental col-
lective action and what type of differences women can make to the management of forests
(Mai et al., 2011; Agarwal, 2000, 2010b). A higher presence of women may indeed generate
different outcomes in terms of forest conditions. Agarwal (2009a) analyse how the gender
composition of community based groups affect forest conservation and management rules.
The results on Nepal and India reveal that groups with a higher presence of women in the
ECs of FUGs show improvements in forest conditions. Sun et al. (2011) look at correl-
ations between the gender composition of a sample of FUGs in Kenya, Uganda, Bolivia
and Mexico and property rights and forestry management. They find that groups with
a balanced presence of women and men tend to participate more in decision-making pro-
cesses within the group, but do not find any effect on firewood collection. On the contrary
groups where women are the majority (i.e., more than two thirds) tend to collect more
firewood, though participating less in decision-making. This result may be attributable to
the particular conditions under which groups with a large majority of women are formed
as will be discussed later.
Agarwal (2009a) illustrates that one mechanism through which a higher female pres-
ence in the groups improves forest conditions is through a better quality of forest protec-
tion. Women who take up some responsibilities within the group have the incentive to
follow the rules (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2007) and to bring their concerns into the
group’s discussions. Female involvement in the decision-making process would also help to
spread awareness of the rules among village women, generating an informational flow. The
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gender composition of the ECs of FUGs may affect differently the type of rules on forest
access, resource extraction and the distribution of benefits defined within the groups given
different female priorities in terms of resource extraction. Agarwal (2009b) finds in Nepal
and India that groups with more women tend to favour stricter rules which in turn favour
forest regeneration. The author stresses also that rules which are too strict are difficult
to enforce and may favour violations and conflicts. Hence a well balanced strictness of
rules may facilitate forest protection giving incentive to FUG members to cooperate. The
results show that more women in ECs appear to favour stricter rules which would allow
forests to regenerate.
This reviewed literature suggests that the need for greater gender equality is still urgent
and is reflected in the fact that one of the most recent World Development Report’s focus
was on gender (WB, 2011). Another recent World Bank report on women in agriculture
also highlights the importance of women in forestry and in general in natural resource
management devoting two chapters to these issues (WB/FAO/IFAD, 2009).
2.3 Nepal context and forest policy background
2.3.1 General context
Nepal is an apposite country to analyse as the forest is one of the most important natural
resource in the country. In addition, the large majority of the population in the rural
areas depends on forest resources for subsistence (CBS, 2004, 2011). Recently, commercial
interests over the forest sector started to emerge. These new patterns are increasing the
awareness that this shift could potentially lift the population relying on forests out of
subsistence (Pokharel et al., 2008). Forestry now represents a productive sector of the
economy and is estimated to comprise around 10 percent of Nepal’s GDP (Hobley and
Shakya, 2012).
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Concerns over forest degradation have emerged in Nepal since the 1980s. According
to FAO, in 2010 Nepal forest coverage was estimated at about 3.6 million hectares, which
represents nearly 25.4 percent of the total land area of Nepal. Despite the decreasing rate
of forest degradation in the last number of years, recent estimates suggest that between
1990-2010 Nepal lost a quarter of its forest cover (FAO, 2010b).
Nepal is divided into 75 administrative districts. These are grouped into three diverse
ecological belts running from north to south - the Mountains which lie in the north at
altitudes above 4,000 meters, the Hills in the middle which comprise fertile valleys, river
basins and steep terrain, and the Tarai in the south which includes fertile lands and
most of Nepal’s dense forest. This variety of topography and elevation renders Nepal a
very heterogenous country given its climate. Each ecological belt is further divided into
five development regions - eastern, central, western, mid-western and far-western regions.
Nepal is also very heterogeneous in terms of income, caste and ethnicity (Ojha et al.,
2008). Social norms prevail and there is a fairly sharp gender division of labour (Hobley
and Shakya, 2012).
As discussed already the female role in forests is essential (Mai et al., 2011). Despite
the fact that women are still largely under-represented at all institutional levels in Nepal,
forestry is now the sector where the presence of women in key positions is highest (Pokharel
et al., 2008). The attention toward female social inclusion and empowerment in Nepal
increased substantially in recent years at different levels within society and in particular
in the forestry sector as testified by the recent Gender Equality and Social Inclusion
strategy (Pradhan, 2010) and by the Forest Sector Gender and Social Inclusion strategy
(MFSC, 2012).
Nepal in the past two decades witnessed significant political, social and economic
changes. In 1996 a Maoist insurgency initiated a conflict in the country between the
Communist Party of Nepal (the Maoist) and government forces. This was triggered by
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the most marginalised groups (ethnic and low-caste groups) living in rural areas. It started
in the western regions but soon extended throughout the country. In 2001 the conflict
intensity escalated and ended in 2006 with the signing of a peace agreement. Despite this
relatively intense decade of conflict, the Nepalese economy experienced a significant growth
over this period. Between 1996 and 2004 poverty rates reduced from 42 to 31 percent,
and between 2004 and 2011 the poverty rate further reduced to 25 percent (Hobley and
Shakya, 2012).
2.3.2 Forestry background
In this section we first provide a historical background to forestry in Nepal. We then
specifically focus on Community Forestry and provide a summary of the main phases and
changes it went through. Finally we give an overview of FUGs definition, formation and
characteristics.
History of forestry policies and legislation
The Nepalese forestry sector legislation has gone through many changes since the early
20th century. Three main phases can be distinguished (Hobley and Shakya, 2012; Ojha
et al., 2008; Chhetri, 2006; Acharya, 2002).
Privatisation (pre-1950s): Nepal before unification (in 1769) was divided into several
small kingdoms, characterised by low population and an abundance of resources. Since
then, the monarchy that ruled the country along with other state nobilities, encouraged
the conversion of forests into agricultural land and the clearing of forests to extract timber
for trade. This pattern continued also during the regime of the Rana family, one of the
state nobilities, who ruled the country between 1846-1951. Forests during this period were
a source of income for the elites (Chhetri, 2006).
Nationalisation (1957-mid-1970s): Severe deforestation in these years led the govern-
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ment to nationalise forests in 1957 to undermine local tenure rights, and culminated in the
Private Forest Nationalisation Act of 1957. Despite the purpose of the Act was to protect
forests, its open access arrangements made the situation worse as a lot of forestland had
been cleared during these years, mostly in the Tarai. The pressure on forests in Tarai was
even higher due to large migration inflows toward this area after the 1960s (Hobley and
Shakya, 2012; Ojha et al., 2008).5
Community orientation (late 1970s): The failure of centralised arrangements for the
protection of forests together with the rising international concerns over Himalayan de-
gradation, influenced the emergence of participatory development to oversee forest man-
agement. The recognition of a role for local communities started with the National Forestry
Plan in 1976 and with the 25-year Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) approved
by the government in 1989 (Ojha et al., 2008; Gautam et al., 2004). However, the new
forestry legislation which legally established the transfer of forests to local communities
was promulgated in 1993 with the Forest Act (HMGN, 1993a). The Act categorised part
of the national forests as Community Forests (CF).6 These are forests collectively man-
aged by local communities who have formed a Community Forest User Group subsequent
to approval of a local district forest office (Gautam et al., 2004). Once the CF is handed
over to the FUG, this can independently manage, conserve and use the forest according to
an operational plan while the land ownership remains with the state (Ojha et al., 2007).
The Forest Regulation of 1995 (HMGN, 1993b) represented the first operational tool for
the implementation of the Forest Act.
5Until the 1950s malaria was prevalent in the Tarai belt which was finally eradicated in the 1960s and
induced large migration inflows into the area (Gautam et al., 2004).
6Community Forest is only one of six different institutional arrangements of the wider programme in
Nepal on Community Based Forest Management (CBFM). See Acharya (2002), Gautam et al. (2004),
Kanel (2004) and Ojha et al. (2008) for a review of all modalities.
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Evolution of Community Forestry and main policy changes
Most of the FUGs started to form in the middle Hills and very few formed initially in
the Tarai despite half of the population residing there and with the region including a big
proportion of forest land. Still today Tarai is the region with the lowest number of FUGs.
One explanation for this lies in the fact that forests in Tarai were more valuable and the
government was reluctant to hand over its management to local communities, making also
any donor interventions difficult. This area is characterised by higher ethnic heterogeneity
than other regions, is more accessible and had significant migration inflows in the 1960s.
Multiple interests emerged in this area which hindered the formation of FUGs and pushed
the government to implement a different forest policy for Tarai7 (Hobley and Shakya,
2012; Ojha et al., 2008). Given the very different context and policy framework of the
Tarai belt and given that the bulk of FUGs was formed in the Hills and the Mountains,
we exclude Tarai from our current analysis.
During the 1990s, CF expanded rapidly throughout the country. The objective of CF
in Nepal was the protection and management of forests with the clear aim of halting forest
degradation in Nepal. A strong focus on learning and exchange between groups was put in
place (Hobley and Shakya, 2012). The process of handing forests over to local communities
required the assistance and support of both officers from the Department of Forests (DoF)
(i.e., District Forest Office (DFO) officers) and international donors. Initially the DFO
staff was essential for facilitating and supporting FUG formation (Edmonds, 2002). FUGs
formation have also been largely supported by donor-funded projects (Edmonds, 2003).
During the 2000s the expansion of FUGs slowed down. This occurred at the same
time as the escalating violence due to the conflict in these years and to a change in atti-
tudes and objectives of CF. While success up to this period in terms of forest conservation
7Terai Forest Policy in 2000 (Ojha et al., 2008).
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was acknowledged, the effects on marginalised and more vulnerable groups were unclear.
Problems of elite capture started to emerge. Issues of poverty, equity, inclusiveness and
in general of the rebalancing of power were recognised not to have been adequately ad-
dressed and hence incorporated within CF objectives. The operational guidelines for FUG
formation were revised in 2001 incorporating only part of these new objectives (MFSC,
2001). Not only did the scope of FUGs widen and evolve over these years but the role
of government (through the DFOs) and the role of donors also changed. Other actors
within the civil society (NGOs, FECOFUN8) acquired a more relevant role in facilitating
communities to form groups. The decrease in the role of government officials in these years
was also coincident with the escalation of the conflict which impeded the free movement of
officials around the country (Pokharel et al., 2008). The emergence of a civil society voice
also testified to the need for a more democratic push and less intervention of the state
through its forest officials. In addition, as a result of the conflict, many donors withdrew
their financial support. Of the six major donors that supported FUGs in most of Nepal’s
districts only three remained in the country. Despite this, most FUGs continued to func-
tion and to rely on their self-generated income for their financial sustainability (Pokharel
et al., 2008).
After the end of the conflict in 2006 an increasing emphasis was placed on extreme
poverty and inclusiveness of the most marginalised groups. CF evolved from just being
a government-supported programme into an extensive system which continues in most of
Nepal indipendently of external support. FUGs are now conceived as vehicles for local
development, representing in some places the most democratic institutions in the country
and acting as a source of cash income, physical infrastructures and other rural development
activities. CF have now a strong influence on local democracy and inclusive self-governance
8FECOFUN is the Federation of Community Forest Users in Nepal which represents FUGs rights and
interests in Nepal and was established in 1996.
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(Pokharel et al., 2008).
In 2009, the operational guidelines for FUG formation have been revised for the second
time (MFSC, 2009). These new guidelines put a greater emphasis on poor and excluded
groups (Dalit, women, indigenous people and ethnic minority groups), including mandat-
ory provisions for representation of all categories of users and equitable distribution of
benefits among them. It is also specified that FUGs have to spend 25 percent of their
income on forest development activities, an additional 35 percent should be used for pro-
grams that target the poor and excluded groups and the remaining amount should be
spent on other community development activities (e.g., drinking water supply, schooling
infrastructures) (MFSC, 2009; Pokharel et al., 2008). Therefore, surplus income generated
within the groups could be spent on initiatives other than protecting the forests.
A specific new provision was introduced for female representation that in particular
indicates that there should be at least 50 percent of women representatives in the Executive
Committee (EC), the main decison making body of FUGs. Previous guidelines of 2001
only specified that ‘The Committee should represent men, women and interest groups
from each tole9 proportionately’ (MFSC, 2001, p.14). We exploit the amendment made to
the 2009 revised guidelines in terms of female representation in the ECs as identification
strategy in the subsequent empirical work.
Definition, features and process of formation of FUGs
The 1993 Forest Act established that all government forest land should be devolved to local
communities for forest management and protection. As explained above, FUGs are legal
and autonomous bodies which have full power and authority over forests whose ownership
remains in the hands of the state. Each FUG has the right and responsibility to manage,
protect and use forests. All benefits from CF go to the FUG. All management decisions are
9A tole has a size of a hamlet.
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taken by FUGs and each member should have in principle equal rights over the resources.
Each household is recognised as a unit for membership and anyone who is not member of
the FUG is excluded from access to the CF. Another important feature of FUGs is that
they have no political-administrative boundaries but traditional use rights. This implies
that one FUG may cover more than one community and vice versa.
Each FUG has two main bodies in its organisational structure: a General Assembly
with members drawn from the whole community and an Executive Committee (EC). The
EC is the key decision making body which, in conjunction with the General Assembly
(and in varying degrees with the forest department) defines the rules for forest use and
benefit sharing, the penalties for rule violation, methods of protection and so forth. Forest
use rules may restrict access to the forest and these restrictions can range from almost
a total ban on extraction of forest products to varying degrees of permitted extraction
on firewood, fodder and other forest products (Agarwal, 2010a,b). The benefits derived
from FUGs activities should be equally distributed among members, though in practice,
as already acknowledged, this has not always happened (Acharya, 2002).
The composition of the committee is thus a critical issue in terms of decisions about
the use of a community forest. In principle the Executive Committee should have repres-
entation from all members, and thus its decisions will reflect the needs and desires of all
members (Yadav et al., 2008). In practice many groups have been excluded from any de-
cision making process and most of the benefits have been reaped by local elites. The new
provisions included in the revised guidelines in 2009 aimed at mitigating these patterns.
The process of FUG formation is a long process which goes through different steps that
eventually end up with the transfer of the forest area to the FUG and to the approval of an
Operational Plan by the DFO (MFSC, 2009). The process starts with the identification
of users and forest area.10 After discussions among potential users, a group is formed. As
10Generally users are households that are ‘traditional users of the forest, close to the forest, interested to
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discussed above the process is often facilitated by DFOs, donor-funded projects or NGOs.
The members compose a framework constitution which has to be approved by the General
Assembly. The Executive Committee is formed. FUG members send an application for
registration of the FUG to the DFO. Once the FUG is registered the members write the
Operational Plan (OP) of the FUG and send an application for its approval to the DFO.11
The main features that the OP has to include are the details of the forest (e.g., boundary,
area, type, condition etc.), management objectives, demand and supply of forest products,
rules for forest products extraction and monitoring and provisions for fines and punishment
in case of rule violations (MFSC, 2009). Finally, the DFO issues a certificate of approval
of the Operational Plan and the Community Forest is handed over to the FUG.
2.4 Data, sample and descriptive statistics
2.4.1 Data
This study uses two main sources of data. As a first source we use two national represent-
ative random cross-section surveys collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Nepal
(CBS) in collaboration with the World Bank. This data is linked at the village level to
a second source of data which is a census of all CFUGs in Nepal. This additional data
contains FUG related characteristics necessary for our empirical analysis.12 Our sample
will include only villages which have formed at least one FUG at some point in time.
Specifically we use the 2003/2004 and the 2010/2011 Nepal Living Standards Surveys
(2004 NLSS Survey and 2011 NLSS Survey hereafter). They are both nationally represent-
get involved in the user group, depend on the forest for forest products, can contribute to the protection
and management of forest, distant users of the forest which have no other alternatives for forest products
but can contribute to forest management’(MFSC, 2009, p.3).
11Informal discussions with practitioners informed us that in practice the OP and the FUG constitution
are usually submitted to the DFO together.
12The NLSS surveys also contain FUG related information in the rural community questionnaires. How-
ever, not all the data we need for our analysis is available. For example there is no information on the
gender composition of the EC. Therefore we are not using this information for our analysis.
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ative surveys and their construction follows the standard methodology used by the World
Bank in all its Living Standard Measurement Surveys. The first survey was conducted
between April 2003 and April 2004 (CBS, 2004). The second was conducted between
February 2010 and February 2011 (CBS, 2011). These surveys are respectively the second
and third round of the 1995/1996 NLSS Survey conducted to update living standards and
social indicators of Nepalese population.13 Both surveys provide information on a wide
range of village, households and individual characteristics. We use for this analysis only
village and household level information. In the 2004 NLSS cross-section survey the sample
includes 4,008 households and 334 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).14 The conflict that
prevailed in various parts of the country over this year impeded fieldwork in some of the
PSUs. Therefore, eight PSUs in the rural areas could not be enumerated.15 As a result
the actual sample of the 2004 NLSS surveys includes 3,912 households in 326 PSUs. In
the 2011 NLSS survey, 5,988 households from 499 primary sampling units (PSUs) have
been enumerated for the cross section sample. Despite the sample frame considered all
districts of Nepal, six districts out of 75 were not selected in the 2004 and 2011 NLSS
cross-section surveys due to their low population or for conflict related reasons (CBS,
1996, 2004, 2011).16 For some robustness checks and descriptive statistics we also make
use of the 1995/1996 NLSS survey.
As mentioned above, our second source of data is the FUG Database, a census of all
Community Forest User Groups created in Nepal through July 2011 (MFSC, 2011). The
13In order to look at changes over time in these indicators, some households have been tracked over these
three points in time. Therefore panel survey data is also available. However the 2010/2011 NLSS survey
panel data was not made available to us yet.
14Primary Sampling Units are either individual wards or sub-wards or groups of contiguous wards in the
same Village Development Committee (i.e. a village). A ward is the smallest administrative unit according
to the Population Census.
15The missing PSUs are one from the Central, one from the Mid-Western and 6 from the Far-Western
regions. The Far-Western region was indeed one of the areas mostly affected by the conflict.
16Specifically, the Dolpa, Humla, Manang, Mustang districts were not included in the 2011 NLSS survey
and the Accham, Dolpa, Mustang and Rasuwa were not selected in the 2004 NLSS survey. Mustang was
an independent kingdom within Nepal until 2008.
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FUG Database is maintained by the Department of Forest (DoF) of Nepal. It contains
data on every forest user group formed in Nepal up to July 2011. This is the date by which
the data has been made available to us. This census contains information on the date of
formation,17 the district and village (i.e., Village Development Committee, VDC) covered,
the number of members in the Executive Committee, the number of females in the EC, the
area of forest handed over to the FUG and the number of households who participate in
the group. All the FUGs related characteristics refer to the time of formation. Therefore,
there is no data on changes that may have occurred in the FUGs characteristics over time.
We believe however that this does not substantially limit our analysis. Indeed once formed,
the ECs of FUGs normally do not change for many years (Agarwal, 2009a). In addition,
even though the composition of the ECs could have changed over time this change should
occur in a systematic way across all groups in order to affect materially our results.
In order to use both sources of data we need to merge them. The FUG Database is at
the FUG level. Unfortunately, we do not have information on whether a specific household
surveyed in the NLSS is a member of a particular FUG or another. Therefore, we are able
to merge the two datasets only at the village level. The NLSS Surveys are at the ward
level (community/PSU level) which, as acknowledged earlier, is a smaller geographical
unit than the village (i.e., the VDC). This match may generate a potential bias. However,
villages in Nepal are small and quite homogeneous units. In addition, our sample includes
only villages which formed at least on FUG and in both NLSS surveys usually one ward
per village was sampled. Therefore, any potential bias emerging from this imprecise match
should be very small.
17This date is referred formally to the Operational Plan approval date.
100
2.4.2 CFUGs in Nepal: some patterns
According to the FUG database, by July 2011, 17,685 FUGs were formed all over Nepal,
covering a total of 1.6 millions hectares of forest land and including 2.2 millions households
(MFSC, 2011). By the end of the 2004 NLSS Survey in April 2004 and also by July 2011 all
districts of Nepal except one18 had formed at least one FUG. This reflects the importance
of FUGs formation in Nepal. A rough calculation on the basis of 2010 estimates on the
Nepalese forest cover (FAO, 2010b) suggests that the 44 percent of forest area in Nepal is
now covered by FUGs.
Table 2.1 reports some characteristics of FUGs according to the census. Consistent
with the fact that the area where most FUGs formed over these years is the Hill belt,
by 2011, 74 percent of FUGs were formed in this area. Another 14 percent were formed
in the Mountains and 12 percent in Tarai. On average, the percentage of women in the
Executive Committee of FUGs is 33 percent. The number of observations in Table 2.1
reveal that some information on these variables is missing. The percentage of missing
observations on the proportion of women is nearly nine percent. We have looked at
the average characteristics of the FUGs for these observations to see if they are largely
comparable to those in Table 2.1. Summary statistics in Table 2.A.1 of the Appendix
show that some differences emerge.19 However, as the percentage of missing observations
is quite limited, it is unlikely that the results will be substantially affected by this. In
addition, as we will explain in subsequent sections, in part of our empirical strategy we
18The missing district is Mustang. As already remarked this was an independent Kingdom within Nepal
until 2008.
19Table 2.A.1 of the Appendix shows that there is a higher proportion of FUGs for which there is missing
information on the percentage of women in the Far Western region. This region is one of the least accessible
and this may also explain why some information is not available. Also these groups are characterised, on
average, by a lower area of land. We have checked whether this missing information is mostly related to
FUGs created early on or to more recent ones and we find it is related to early FUGs. As will be shown
below, FUGs created earliest had a lower percentage of women in the ECs of FUGs. We may therefore
advance the hypothesis that the FUGs for which the information on the number of women is not available
are those with a lower proportion of them. Hence, if we think that the missing observations reflect a lower
percentage of women we expect the average in the percentage of women to be higher.
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are not using the variable related to the percentage of women. Hence, the related estimate
should not contain any bias related to this missing information.
We plot some FUG characteristics against time of formation in order to determine
whether FUG created earlier on are different in terms of their characteristics to those
formed in more recent years.20 First, we plot the years of formation of FUGs against the
average percentage of women in the ECs and we notice an increasing trend with a peak
from 2010 (Figure 2.1). This pattern is consistent with the fact that in 2009 the operational
guidelines for FUG formation were changed (see Section 2.3 above) and incorporated a
new provision for female representation in the ECs of FUGs. The figure shows that FUGs
created after 2009 exhibit a higher percentage of women in their ECs. We test whether
the increase in female participation in FUGs formed after 2009 is significant. We regress
the percentage of women in the ECs of FUGs on a trend and on a dummy which indicates
whether a FUG was created after 2009 (i.e., in 2010 or 2011). The results in Table 2.A.2
in the Appendix show that there is a positive and increasing trend in female participation
over time. The results also reveal that FUGs created after 2009 have a significantly
higher percentage of women above the trend by 3.5 percentage points. We also regress the
percentage of women in ECs of FUGs on a set of dummies on the year of FUGs formation.
Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix reports that across all model specifications in which we use
the 2009, 2008, 2007 and 2006 year of formation respectively as reference category, groups
formed in 2010 and 2011 have a significantly higher percentage of women relative to those
formed in earlier years. In order to further assess whether FUGs formed after 2009 have
a higher percentage of women relative to those formed before we show in Table 2.2 a
breakdown of the percentage of women by different dates of formation of FUGs. The first
column shows that most of the groups have a proportion of women in the ECs below the
20To note that we exclude from the following descriptive statistics all FUGs created in the Tarai as it is
not part of this analysis as outlined above.
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50 percent. There is a 7.8 percent of groups with a percentage of women in the ECs above
50 percent and a 5.6 percent with all women in the ECs. It is visible from the table that
as we move towards the latest years of formation the proportion of groups with a higher
percentage of women is larger. For example, the 45 percent of groups formed in 2011 have
women between the 33 and the 50 percent threshold in the ECs relative to a 41 percent
of those formed between 2007 and 2009. Similarly, another 21 percent of groups formed
in 2010 and 2011 has a proportion of women in ECs above the 50 percent compared to
seven percent for those formed between 2007 and 2009. These patterns will be used in
subsequent sections as a basis for our identification strategy.
We looked also at the progression of FUGs formation over time in Nepal. Figure 2.2
reveals that there is an immediate increase in the number of FUGs formed right after the
reform in 1993. The bulk of FUGs have been formed between 1994 and 2000. The rate
of FUGs formation then slowed down possibly, as mentioned in Section 2.3, due to the
intensification of the conflict after 2000 and up to its end in 2006. After this year, as
the figure shows, the number of new FUGs created starts to increase again. The decline
corresponding to new FUGs formed in 2011 is attributable to the fact that the information
we have only refers to half of that year. We expect, therefore, that the number of FUGs
for 2011 is somewhat higher. In addition, given that the trend in the percentage of women
in ECs is increasing, we expect that the FUGs formed in the second half of 2011 have a
percentage of women in the ECs as high as the one of the FUGs formed in the first half
of 2011. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 exhibit patterns very similar to those noted above. Indeed,
there is a big increase in both the area of forest transferred over and in the number of
household members of FUGs in the years immediately following the 1993 reform. The
1994-2000 years are those during which larger areas of forest have been handed over to
FUGs and in which many households became members of the groups. Table 2.A.4 in
the Appendix summarises these patterns. At the regional level FUGs started to form
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in the eastern, central and western region and progressively expanded toward the mid-
western one. However, despite the eastern, central and western regions having a consistent
proportion of FUGs formed also during the years in which the conflict was most intense
(2001-2006), the mid-western region has a higher proportion of FUGs formed after the end
of the conflict and in the more recent years. In the far-western region a smaller proportion
of FUGs have been formed as compared to other regions with this proportion considerably
declining starting from 2001. This is again consistent with the fact that the conflict was
most intense in the Western regions.
We note also that there is a negative relationship between the area of forest handed over
and the percentage of women in the ECs as groups start to have larger numbers of women
(Figure 2.5). Interestingly groups where the ECs are composed by the one hundred percent
of women, manage much smaller areas of forests. This pattern is consistent with the
literature on female-dominated FUGs in Nepal (Ray-Paudyal and Buchy, 2004; Agarwal,
2010b). Indeed, in many districts women-only FUGs have been established as a result of a
pressure to include women in the decision-making process of these institutions. However,
these groups were usually allocated more degraded forests and smaller areas which made
them even more marginalised. A similar relationship is visible between the number of
households and the percentage of women. So groups with a higher proportion of women
in the ECs on average seem to be characterised by a smaller area transferred and a lower
number of households in the group. We have checked further this relationship and noticed
that the average area of forest handed over to women-only groups is much lower for groups
formed before or in 2009 than for those formed after 2009. This may suggest for a shift
in attitudes towards the role of women after 2009.
To conclude, these patterns show a different evolution of FUGs over time both in
terms of their characteristics and at the regional level. Edmonds (2002) looks at the
effects of FUGs on firewood collection accounting for the fact that FUGs formation did
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not occur randomly around Nepal. The process of forest transfer and group formation
occurred gradually over time. Areas that formed groups earlier on could have different
characteristics than those that formed groups in later years. Edmonds (2002) finds that
areas more accessible, located close to markets, to forestry offices, with a higher presence
of user groups other than forestry ones, with presence of agricultural technical assistance,
were more likely to form groups earlier on. Our sample includes only villages that have
formed FUGs at some point in time. In all our specifications we control for the year of
formation of FUGs and for district fixed effects to account for differences between villages
that formed groups earlier or later.
2.4.3 Sample
In order to merge the FUG census to the NLSS surveys to obtain the sample used for our
analysis, we select from the FUG Census only villages that have been sampled in the NLSS
surveys. The FUG Database covers all villages in which FUGs have been formed, while
the NLSS data are nationally representative surveys in which only a sample of villages and
households have been randomly selected. Therefore, from the 17,685 FUGs in the census
we end up with a sample of villages which include 2,047 FUGs. To note that the NLSS
surveys despite being representative of villages and households have not been designed
to be representative of FUGs. We have checked that the characteristics and patterns are
similar between all the FUGs in the census and this selected sample of villages. Table 2.A.5
in the Appendix shows that most of the characteristics are similar to those shown in Table
2.1.21 We have also plotted some FUGs characteristics against the FUG time of formation.
Figure 2.A.1 in the Appendix shows a pattern mostly similar to Figure 2.1 above. There
is, however, a bigger variation where peaks and troughs are more accentuated due to the
21To note that the sample of villages we are considering does not include the Tarai belt. Therefore some
regional differences between this table and table 2.1 may be due to this.
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smaller sample size. As a result the pattern is less smooth. Table 2.A.6 in the Appendix
shows, similarly to Table 2.2, that there is a higher proportion of groups formed in 2010
and 2011 which have a percentage of women between the 33 and 50 percent and above
the 50 percent relative to those formed in earlier years. Figures 2.A.2, 2.A.3 and 2.A.4 in
the Appendix suggest a very similar pattern to those shown in the same respective plots
based on the whole census (figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4).
We construct FUGs related variables at the village level as there can be more than
one FUG in a village. Specifically, we create a variable for the number of FUGs in a
village and we calculate the village average of other FUG characteristics (i.e., percentage
of women in the ECs, area of forest handed over and number of households in the FUGs)
over all FUGs formed in each village up to the end of each survey period (i.e., April 2004
and February 2011).
We can then merge at the village level, the FUG Database to the NLSS surveys from
which we exclude urban and Tarai villages. Out of the 127 and the 183 villages surveyed
in the 2004 and 2011 NLSS rural surveys, five and nine villages respectively did not form
any FUG according to the FUG census. As a result the 95 percent of the surveyed villages
in the Hills and Mountains formed at least one FUG by July 2011. As our sample has to
include only villages which have formed at least a FUG, we exclude from our sample these
14 villages that did not form any FUG by July 2011. We nonetheless check whether the
characteristics of villages and households in these villages are different relative to those
that we select for our sample. Table 2.A.7 in the Appendix reports these descriptive
statistics. The results are consistent with the non existence of FUGs in these villages.22
22Indeed, a lower percentage of households report having used firewood in the past 12 months and use
firewood as a cooking fuel. Consistently a higher percentage of households use gas, oil or kerosene as a
primary source of cooking fuel, which are superior type of fuels. Also there is a lower percentage of these
households which collect firewood from the community forest and a higher proportion that collect from
government forests. There is a higher proportion of these households which use electricity as light source
and that have higher per capita nominal expenditures. Also these households appear to own or cultivate
a lower number of hectares of land and own a lower number of livestock. These statistics may suggest
that these households are possibly richer on average than those we consider and less dependent on forest
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We also exclude from our sample two villages (one from the 2004 and one from the
2011 NLSS surveys, corresponding to 24 households in total) which according to the FUG
Database did form some FUGs, but only after 2009. These may be quite different villages
as the process of FUG formation started in 1993. We did however a robustness check
including these two villages and the results are not altered.23
The number of households surveyed in the two NLSS surveys in the Hills and Mountains
belts are respectively 1,524 and 2,196. After excluding the villages with no FUGs according
to the census and with no FUGs formed before 2010, we are left with 1,452 and 2,076
households in the sample respectively for the 2004 and 2011 NLSS surveys. We need to
further reduce our sample to those households that use and collect firewood in the past
12 months. These households represent the 97 and 96 percent of households respectively
for the 2004 and 2011 surveys and confirms a high dependency on this resource.
There are 16 observations for which the quantity of firewood is not available for the 2011
NLSS survey and these are excluded from the analysis. Finally we do not include in our
analysis the four observations in the 2011 NLSS survey which have a value above 1000 for
firewood collection. Looking at the distribution of the quantity of firewood collected, these
values appear to be outliers. We have estimated our model including these observations
and the results are not materially affected (Table 2.A.8 in the Appendix). Our final sample
includes 3,252 households (1,361 correspondent to the 2004 NLSS and 1,891 correspondent
to the 2011 NLSS in 121 and 172 villages respectively).
2.4.4 Descriptive statistics
We report in Table 2.3 summary statistics on household and community level character-
istics for the 2004 and 2011 NLSS survey samples as defined above. The average annual
products and agriculture for their subsistence.
23Results not shown and available upon request.
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amount of firewood collected by the households decreased by eight percent between 2004
and 2011 which may suggest for a reduction in forest depletion.24 Firewood is measured
in bhari which is defined as roughly a bundle (a headload) of wood whose size/weight
depends on the person carrying it.
We note that in both samples most of the households use firewood as main cooking fuel,
which implies a high forest dependency. On the contrary, the proportion of households
which use gas, oil or kerosene as a primary source of cooking fuel is just the 2.4 and 3.1
percent for the 2004 and 2011 surveys respectively. This implies that the use of fuels
of higher quality is quite rare in this sample of rural households. The survey provides
information on the place where households collect firewood and in particular whether
they collect it in their own land, in community forests or in government forests. We note
that the percentage of households that collect firewood in community forests is quite high
and in 2011 is higher than the percentage of those that collect it in government forests.
We also looked at the same descriptive statistics using the 1996 NLSS survey and we could
notice that the majority of the households were collecting firewood in government forests
(60 percent) and a minority in community forest (14 percent). This is a reflection of the
gradual implementation of the Forestry Act in 1993. Although informative, this variable
provides only imperfect information on whether households in our sample are members of
FUGs.
The surveys provide some information on forest conditions and in particular survey
respondents have to say whether the area under forest decreased in the past five years
and whether the time taken to collect firewood increased over the same period.25 These
24We are not able to distinguish between the collection of fallen twigs (which may not imply forest
degradation) and the cutting of drywood from the trees (which may generate actual forest depletion).
However we use firewood collection as a measure of forest degradation consistently with the existing
literature (Baland et al., 2013, 2010b; Edmonds, 2002; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003). In addition, the
advantage of looking at firewood collection as a measure of forest degradation is that it is directly related
to women as they are the primary collectors of this resource.
25As these are subjective measures, they might not measure precisely forest conditions. For example,
current and historical satellite data would be more informative about forest conditions. However, we have
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variables seem to indicate that forest conditions have deteriorated between the two surveys
as a higher proportion of villages seems to show a decrease in the area of forest and an
increase in the time to collect firewood. We also note that the average time to collect
firewood at the household level, increased by 14 percent between 2004 and 2011. However,
the distance of the ward to the forest appears to have decreased. This may be interpreted
as an improvement of the forest conditions in 2011 relative to 2004 as it may mean that
forests partly regenerated and are now closer. In addition, the increase in collection times
may also be consistent with the presence of FUGs in the villages which has imposed
restrictions in access to the forests. Finally, there is a higher proportion of wards where
trees have been planted by the community relative to those planted by the government or
privately in both surveys. This also testifies to the role of FUGs in these villages. A lower
proportion of households seem to have trees planted by the community or privately in
2011 relative to 2004. This may either indicate that the forests are in better condition and
hence there is less need to replant trees or it can indicate that less efforts are put toward
forest regeneration. Both interpretations are equally valid. Recent forest estimates of
Nepal appear to show that despite forest conditions deteriorating in the past two decades,
between 2005 and 2010 the total forest cover remained constant (FAO, 2010b). This is
an indication that, if anything, at least the forest conditions did not deteriorate over this
period.
2.5 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is divided into three parts. We first look at the determinants of
female participation in Executive Committees. We then look at the relationship between
such participation and firewood collection which is the objective of our analysis. Finally,
not been able to obtain these data for the current analysis and have to rely on the available data to account
for forest conditions.
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in order to account for the potential endogeneity of the proportion of women in the ECs
of FUGs, we use a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to identify the effect of an
increase in the participation of women on firewood collection.
2.5.1 Determinants of female participation in Executive Committees
We first look at which variables determine female representation in ECs of FUGs as we
want to understand what drives their participation. We regress the village average per-
centage of women in ECs of FUGs on a set of household and village characteristics and
on a set of FUG related characteristics. We estimate the following specification using an
OLS model:
Womenjdt = α+X
′
hjdtβ + F
′
jdtγ + distrd + distrd ∗ nlss2011t + yformjt + ujdt (2.1)
The term on the left hand side, Womenjdt is the average percentage of women in ECs of
FUGs formed in village j of district d up to year t. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 and
is calculated as the village average percentage of women in ECs of FUGs formed in all
years up to 2004 or 2011 depending on whether the village had been sampled in one or
the other year.26
The term Xhjdt represents a set of household characteristics for household h living
in village j of district d surveyed in year t. Fjdt are village characteristics and village
level FUGs related characteristics. Specifically, we include some variables which account
for forest conditions. As we might expect that female participation also depends on the
economic condition of the village we also include the percentage of high caste households
in the community. However, this variable may also control for social norms whereby low
26As already explained in the data section there is some missing information on the percentage of women
variable and this explains the different number of observations used in this analysis and in the one reported
for the following section.
110
caste groups are less subject to norms that hinder female participation at various levels
within a society (Agarwal, 2001). We include dummies for whether there are user groups
other than FUGs in the ward and whether there are development projects. We would
expect these variables to be positively correlated with the presence of women on the ECs
of FUGs if these projects are devoted to women empowerment issues. Finally, we include
the average number of FUGs in the village, the village average area of forest handed over
to FUGs and the village average number of household members of FUGs.
We also include district fixed effects, distrd and distrd ∗ nlss2011t, to account for any
difference across districts and a set of village level dummies which control for the year
of FUGs formation, yformjt. We assume the error term ujdt to be independent between
villages. As we expect observations within each village to be correlated, we cluster the
standard errors at the village level. We also estimate robust standard errors to account
for heteroscedasticity of the error terms.
We need to note that there can be unobservable characteristics which may affect both
female participation and village, household or FUG characteristics. For example, the
degree of awareness on issues related to female empowerment at the local level is typically
unobserved. This can be positively correlated both with the presence of development
projects or other user groups with a specific focus on women issues and the percentage
of women in the ECs of FUGs. The resulting estimates are potentially upward biased.
Therefore, this analysis should provide information on the correlations between female
participation and some village, household and FUG characteristics. We do not interpret
these estimates as causal effects of any particular characteristic on female participation.
However, this analysis provides a useful basis and organising framework for the subsequent
analysis and discussion.
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2.5.2 Female participation in Executive Committees and firewood col-
lection
The objective of our analysis is to examine the effect of an increase in female participation
in the ECs of FUGs on firewood collection at the household level. Therefore, we are
interested in estimating the following specification:
Yhjdt = α+βWomenjdt+X
′
hjdtδ+F
′
jdtγ+distrd+distrd∗nlss2011t+yformjt+ehjdt (2.2)
where Yhjdt is the outcome of interest (i.e., quantity of firewood at the household level) for
household h living in village j of district d and surveyed in year t. Womenjdt is defined as
in the above section and β is the estimated coefficient of interest. We include household and
village characteristics, FUG related charactericts, district fixed effects and dummies which
control for the FUG’s years of formation which are defined as in equation (2.1). As with the
estimation of equation (2.1) we assume the error term ehjdt to be independent between
villages but not necessarily within villages. As we anticipate observations within each
village to be correlated and potentially not robust to heteroscedasticity, we estimate robust
standard errors and cluster them at the village level. The above equation is estimated using
an OLS model.
The percentage of women on the ECs of FUGs may not be exogenous to the outcome.
Indeed there may be unobserved characteristics which could predict both female parti-
cipation in ECs of FUGs and firewood collection. This may lead to biased estimates of
equation (2.2). A higher participation of women in ECs of FUGs may reflect systematic
characteristics of villages where the FUGs have been formed which may also have affected
firewood collection. Estimates from equation (2.1) above should give us some insights
on what characterises village level female representation in ECs of FUGs. However, we
are only able to inform on observed characteristics. Other unobservables could have also
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jointly determined female participation and firewood collection. One example of a po-
tentially unobserved characteristic is the level of social capital within the village which
may imply a general positive gender attitude accompanied by a higher awareness toward
forest conservation (Agarwal, 2009a). We expect this to be positively correlated with the
presence of women in the ECs of FUGs but negatively correlated with firewood collection
if higher social capital changes also the attitudes toward forest protection and ultimately
toward firewood collection in a way that people collect less. OLS estimates may therefore
be downwardly biased if this unobservable is ignored. In order to address the potential
endogeneity of female participation in ECs, we need a source of exogenous variation in
the percentage of women in ECs of FUGs. The next section is devoted to addressing this
issue.
2.5.3 Difference-in-difference empirical strategy
In this section we propose one way to address the potential endogeneity of the female
participation variable. In order to identify the causal effect of an increased representation
of women in the Executive Committees of FUGs on firewood collection, we exploit the
introduction in 2009 of the new guidelines and the fact that we can observe the outcomes
before and after this change (i.e., in 2004 and in 2011).
Our identification strategy is based on the observation that the 2009 FUGs new opera-
tional guidelines, by including a new specific provision for female representation in the ECs
(i.e., at least 50 percent of women should be part of the ECs),27 increased substantially
the proportion of women in groups formed after 2009 (see Figure 2.1). As a remark, we
are not claiming here that groups formed after 2009 have 50 percent of women in the ECs
of FUGs. We are only stating that as a result of the introduction of the new guidelines in
2009, which put more emphasis on female representation in these institutions, the percent-
27See section 2.3.
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age of women actually increased in groups formed after this date. Tables 2.2 and 2.A.6
are also consistent with this pattern.
We exploit this source of variation for our identification strategy. The estimation frame-
work that we propose follows a difference-in-difference (DD) identification strategy.28 More
specifically, we compare the change in outcomes between 2004 and 2011 for households
living in villages where some FUGs formed after the introduction of the new guidelines
in 2009 (treated villages) to the change in outcomes over the same period for households
living in villages where FUGs formed only before 2009 or in 2009 (control villages). As
both treated and control villages include at least one FUG formed since the start of the
programme in 1993, these villages should be comparable in many of their relevant char-
acteristics. Therefore, the first difference compares treated to control villages. Villages in
the control group are those that have formed FUGs in 2009 or in the years preceding the
introduction of the new guidelines but none after 2009. While villages in the treatment
group have formed FUGs after 2009 but could have also formed FUGs before. Thus,
all villages in the sample may have formed FUGs in various years since the start of the
programme in 1993. What distinguishes the treated villages is the fact that these vil-
lages may have also formed FUGs after 2009 and this is what allows us to define them as
treated villages. According to our sample the percentage of treated villages is 16 percent,
corresponding to 532 households out of 3,252 and to 47 villages out of 293. The second
difference comes from comparing the outcome before (i.e.,2004) and after (i.e.,2011) the
policy change. This allows us to control for systematic differences between treatment and
control groups.
The baseline difference-in-difference specification, that we estimate using an OLS
28We are aware that other methodologies could have been employed to address a potential endogen-
eity problem of the variable of interest (e.g., Instrumental variables, Regression Discontinuity Design
or Propensity Score Matching). However, given the available information and data, we believe that a
difference-in-difference estimation strategy would suit better the purposes of this analysis.
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model, is of the following form:
Yhjdt = α+ βafter2009j + γnlss2011t + δ(after2009 ∗ nlss2011)jt + hjdt (2.3)
Where Yhjdt is the outcome of interest (i.e., quantity of firewood collected) for household
h living in village j of district d and surveyed in year t. The variable after2009j is a
dummy which equals 1 if in the village FUGs were formed also after 2009 (so in 2010 and
2011) and 0 if FUGs were formed only before 2009 or in 2009. The nlss2011t variable
is a dummy equal to 1 for 2011 NLSS observations and 0 otherwise. hjdt defines the
error term. The parameter δ is the reduced-form estimate of the effect of an increase in
female participation on firewood collection (i.e., the DD coefficient). Our hypothesis is
that firewood demand would decrease as a result of an increased representation of women
in the ECs. We test if this is present in the data.
The underlying assumption of the identification strategy is that trends in firewood
collection would have been the same in both treatment and control groups in the absence
of the treatment (i.e., the treatment induces a deviation from the common trend). Indeed
the existence of omitted factors correlated to both whether villages formed groups after
2009 and firewood collection, would represent a threat for our strategy. In order to account
for time-invariant differences in firewood collection levels across districts we include district
fixed effects. We also include district fixed effects interacted with the NLSS 2011 dummy
to allow for any difference between districts for 2011 and 2004 observations. These should
account for much of the time-variant unobserved heterogeneity at the district level. The
inclusion of district fixed effects accounts among other things for differences in conflict
intensity across Nepal over the years. Unfortunately, we do not have information on conflict
exposure at a lower level than the district. However, in our sample there are, on average,
three villages per district and villages are well spread across districts. Therefore, we are
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confident that by including district fixed effects we are accounting for most of the conflict
exposure. District fixed effects should also account for donor presence. Traditionally,
donors have focused their interventions at the district level (Edmonds, 2003).
However, pre-existing differential trends in firewood collection could still explain part
of the results. In order to account for differences between districts over time, we should
include district level trends. However, as we had to collapse the FUG census data at
the village level, we do not have any variable that permits us to specify a trend. As
an alternative to the inclusion of district specific trends to account for the possibility of
time varying confounders, we have conducted a series of placebo experiments which we
will discuss in a later section. The results from these experiments are reassuring for the
validity of our identification strategy.
As discussed in previous sections, villages which formed groups in earlier years just
after the reform of 1993 may be quite different from those that formed groups in more
recent ones. To account for these differences, we control for whether a village formed
at least one FUG in a particular year from 1993 up to 2011. We include therefore one
dummy for each year of formation. We also control for the total number of FUGs formed
in each village, for the village average area of forest handed over to FUGs and for the
village average number of households members of FUGs.
Finally, we also estimate a specification that includes a set of other village and house-
hold controls as in equation (2.2). The inclusion of these terms besides increasing precision
in our estimates should also account for as much observed heterogeneity of households and
villages as possible.
The richest specification we estimate is therefore defined as follows:
Yhjdt = α+ βafter2009j + γnlss2011t + δ(after2009 ∗ nlss2011)jt + (2.4)
distrd + distrd ∗ nlss2011t + yformjt +X ′hjdtθ + F
′
jdtγ + hjdt
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Where all terms are defined as in previous equations. Specifically, distrd are district
fixed effects, distrd ∗ nlss2011t are district-specific effects for each survey year, yformjt
are a set of village dummies that equal one if in village j surveyed in year t at least
one FUG was created in a particular year between 1993 and 2011. Finally, Xhjdt are
household characteristics. Fjdt are village characteristics and FUGs characteristics at the
village level. We assume the error term hjdt to be independent between villages but not
necessarily within villages. As we expect observations within each village to be correlated
and not necessarily robust to heteroscedasticity, we estimate robust standard errors and
cluster them at the village level.
2.6 Results
The next three sections report the results from the estimates of the specifications outlined
above.
2.6.1 Estimates of determinants of female participation in ECs of FUGs
We present in Table 2.4 results from the analysis of the determinants of female particip-
ation. The dependent variable measures the village average percentage of women in ECs
of FUGs.29 The results provide some interesting information on what correlates with the
village average female participation in ECs of FUGs. The household size is positively cor-
related with the village level participation in ECs. We have decomposed the household size
variable30 into number of children, male and female adults in the household. Although the
signs are all positive, only the coefficients on female adults remain statistically significant.
This is suggestive that the presence of more women in the household allows some of them
29As the variable is bounded between zero and one, we check from our estimates that the predictions
of this variable do not fall below zero or above one. We find that none of the observations is outside this
range.
30Results not shown but available upon request.
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to take up household work freeing others who are then able to participate in the FUGs. To
note that none of the variables related to the household head (i.e., gender, age, migration
and education of the household head) seem to be correlated with village average female
participation. Agarwal (2001) argues instead that household attributes and endowments
play an important role in determining the participation of women in groups. We note
that both the number of livestock and the hectares of land owned or cultivated are neg-
atively correlated with female representation in the ECs of FUGs. Also a lower distance
of households from the paved road relative to a higher distance is associated with a lower
percentage of women in ECs of FUGs. The coefficient on firewood collection in community
forest areas is not significant. Instead the village average participation of women in ECs is
lower for households who collect in government forest relative to their own land. This may
suggest that, while controlling for household size, collecting firewood in government forest
may require more time than in private land. As a result on average less women in the vil-
lage would be available to take up roles within the ECs of FUGs. The greater the distance
of the community to the forest the higher the average female representation in ECs. This
variable should reflect both the forest condition and the opportunity cost of collection of
forest products. In both cases, poorer forest conditions and a higher opportunity cost of
collecting forest products, may push women to more actively participate to the protection
of the forests, if their concerns are at risk. These estimates appear to suggest that female
participation is higher in villages which are on average less advantaged than others. Also,
the higher the proportion of existing user groups other than forestry ones in the village,
the lower the percentage of women in ECs. As the presence of user groups of various types
is usually more prevalent in better-off and more accessible villages (Edmonds, 2002), this
result is an additional indication that female participation seems to be higher in worse-off
villages.
These results are somehow surprising as we would have expected that female particip-
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ation in ECs of FUGs would be higher in groups formed in villages that are on average
richer and more accessible and where the presence of alternative user groups other than
forestry would have potentially increased awareness among women that would in turn
be more prone to participate in groups. Additional insights come from the observation
that female participation is negatively associated with the village average area of forest
handed over to FUGs and to the village average number of households in FUGs. This is
consistent with our finding in Section 2.4 where we showed that the percentage of women
in the ECs of FUGs is decreasing in the area of forest handed over and in the number of
household members of the FUG. We also noted that the area of forest is substantially lower
for groups which have one hundred percent of women in the EC. The existing literature
suggests that typically women-only groups receive more degraded forest and smaller areas
of forest than mixed groups (Ray-Paudyal and Buchy, 2004; Agarwal, 2010b). However,
the effectiveness in terms of forest management and protection of women-only groups or
groups where a female presence is dominant relative to men is mixed. Recent studies re-
veal that all-women groups, despite receiving more degraded forests and smaller areas, are
found to have better outcomes in terms of forest conservation (Agarwal, 2009a). However,
recent research has also reported that groups where women are dominant are less effective
than other groups in forest management practices (Mwangi et al., 2011). In order to shed
more light on this and other aspects that characterise female participation in the ECs of
FUGs, we should have FUGs related characteristics at the household level. For example,
knowing not only the gender but also the caste, the education level and the age of the EC
members at the household level (Agarwal, 2009a), would inform better on heterogeneities
within CFUGs.
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2.6.2 Female participation in ECs of FUGs and firewood collection es-
timates
We present the results on the estimation of equation (2.2) above in Table 2.5. The results
do not show any significant correlation between female participation in ECs of FUGs and
firewood collection. Indeed, despite exhibiting a negative sign, none of the specifications
yield coefficients on the village average percentage of women in ECs significantly different
from zero. Therefore, these estimates seem to indicate that a higher female participation
in ECs of FUGs is not related to household firewood collection. The lack of any correlation
between the participation of women and firewood collection may be due to the fact that a
higher percentage of women in the ECs of FUGs does not necessarily imply that they have
a higher decision making power and consequently that they are able to affect outcomes
(Agarwal, 2010a). A recent study does not find any persistent effect of increasing female
representation on their participation in local decision making (Casey et al., 2012). A
possible explanation lies in the fact that communities may be pushed toward more inclusion
without actually challenging the elites who hold power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
However, we should consider this result with caution for now because, as explained, we are
ignoring here the potential endogeneity problems of female participation in FUGs. The
reported estimates might indeed be biased.
The coefficients on the other variables included in the specification provide some in-
sights on what correlates to household firewood collection. Our results are mostly con-
sistent with Baland et al. (2013) and Baland et al. (2010b) who analyse the determinants
of firewood collection and specifically the effects of increasing living standards on forest
degradation. They suggest that an increase in consumption raises firewood collection.
However, they also specify that the sources of growth matter. In particular, the wealth
and substitution effects have to be distinguished to clearly establish in which direction an
improvement of the economic conditions affects firewood collection and thus environmental
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degradation. Column 5 of Table 2.5 reports results which include a set of controls that
try to account for the economic conditions of the households and their remoteness.31 We
also include some village level characteristics which should control for forest conditions in
the year of the surveys, whether the village had natural disasters, the proportion of high
caste in the village, the presence of other user groups and of development projects. These
two latter variables should control for the accessibility of the village to donors and NGOs.
Finally we include some FUGs characteristics.
Household size is positively associated with firewood collection. This suggests that
as household size increases, the demand for firewood is higher as there is an increasing
need within the household for firewood. This may also suggest that an increasing number
of persons in the household, lowers the opportunity cost of firewood collection as more
individuals in the household are available for this task. We have decomposed the household
size variable between number of children, male and female adults (results not shown). The
coefficients on these terms all remain positive and significant with the biggest size of the
coefficients reserved for female adults. This is consistent with the fact that women are
those mostly responsible for firewood collection within the household.
Also a higher level of education of the household head relative to having no educa-
tion decreases firewood collection. This may be consistent with the idea that, controlling
for other sources of wealth, more educated households should be more concerned about
forest degradation and hence collect less. On the other hand, households which own more
livestock and more hectares of land collect a higher quantity of firewood. Baland et al.
(2013) also show that an increase in livestock is associated with an increase in the quantity
of firewood collected. The positive sign on the livestock coefficient reflects both the fact
that livestock is a source of wealth (positive income effect) and the fact that livestock
31We are not including household consumption as a measure of wealth of the household not only for its
potential endogeneity but also because its inclusion does not allow to assess the effects of different sources
of wealth and opportunity.
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is also a productive asset, which is thus complementary to firewood collection (grazing).
These two effects unambiguously generate an increase in firewood collection. The positive
effect on land may suggest a prevailing wealth effect. Households which use electricity as
a light source collect more firewood. The availability of electricity should partly reduce
the dependency on firewood. Hence these households may have less concerns over forest
protection and demand more firewood. Alternatively it captures an income effect whereby
as households become richer they consume more firewood.32 A higher distance of the
village to the forest is negatively correlated with the quantity of firewood collected at the
household level. This is consistent with the fact that if forests are more distant, people
would collect less as the opportunity cost of collecting is higher. Alternatively, larger
distance to the forest may simply reflect more depleted forests which still would decrease
firewood collection. A higher percentage of high caste households in the community de-
creases firewood collection. This is partly consistent with Agarwal (2001) who finds that
a higher percentage of high caste (i.e., Brahmins) members in the ECs improves forest
conditions. Finally, a higher number of FUGs in the village and a higher average area
of forest transferred to the FUGs is associated with more firewood collection. This may
suggest that the presence of more FUGs and larger areas of forest distributed may have
rendered firewood more available. Hence, households can thus extract more firewood.
These results offer some interesting insights on the determinants of firewood collection
which are mostly consistent with other findings in the literature (Baland et al., 2013). We
exploit part of this evidence in the final part of this analysis. These estimates do not show
a significant relationship between the participation of women in the ECs and firewood
collection. As mentioned above, this result may also be driven by the fact that in the
empirical strategy we have ignored the potential endogeneity of female participation. The
32These explanations, consistently with the findings of Baland et al. (2013), would be in contrast to the
Poverty Environment Hypothesis which predicts that an increase in wealth should be associated with a
decrease in deforestation.
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next section shows results from a difference-in-difference estimation strategy that tries to
address this issue.
2.6.3 Difference-in-differences estimates
Before presenting the results from the estimation of equations (2.3) and (2.4), we look
at household, village and FUG characteristics for both control and treament groups in
the pre-treatment year (the 2004) and test the differences in means (Table 2.6). This
allows us to check whether the characteristics of these groups were broadly similar before
the policy change. As explained earlier we include in our treatment group villages which
formed FUGs in any year from 1993 up to 2011. Villages in the control group include
villages which formed FUGs from 1993 up to 2009 only. The results in table 2.6 show
that some characteristics are significantly different between treatment and control groups.
These results can be a concern for our identification strategy as we would have expected
the average characteristics to be similar between treated and control groups in the year
preceding the policy change. However, although a large degree of similarity between
treatment and control villages in the pre-treament year would have been more reassuring
for the validity of our identification strategy, we need to note that those shown in Table
2.6 are differences in the levels of the characteristics of treated and control villages in
the pre-treatment year. In order for our identification strategy to be valid we need the
differences in trends to be zero. We will show in the next section results from placebo
experiments which suggest that this is indeed the case.
We report the results from our difference-in-difference estimates in table 2.7. The
coefficient on the DD term (δ) is negative and significant across all specifications. Despite
altering across specifications, the magnitude remains broadly invariant to the addition of
more controls. These results tell us that between 2004 and 2011, the firewood collection of
households living in villages which formed FUGs also after 2009, decreased on average by
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21.4 bharis per year, as compared to those living in villages which formed FUGs only before
or in 2009. As one bhari is a headload of firewood, the results suggest that this effect is
quite large. If we think that one headload can be one round trip, this corresponds to a bit
more than 20 round trips. In order to give an interpretation of the results in percentage
terms, we divide the DD coefficient of column 5 by the average firewood collection in
the control villages in the pre-treatment year (i.e., in 2004) which is 90 bhari per year.
The decline in household firewood collection is on average 24 percent, which represents
a substantial reduction. These results therefore indicate that in villages where FUGs
have a higher percentage of women in the ECs, household firewood collection decreases
sharply. We recall from Table 2.5 that the coefficients on the participation of women are
not statistically significant from zero. Therefore, ignoring the possibility that there could
be unobservables which may correlate with both the percentage of women in ECs of FUGs
and firewood collection, would lead to downwardly biased estimates as argued in Section
2.5.2.
It is interesting to note that all other explanatory variables in column 5 of Table 2.7 are
very similar in signs, significance and magnitude to those in Table 2.5. Indeed, coefficients
on household size, electric light source, hectares of land owned or cultivated and number
of livestocks owned are all positive and significant. While those related to the household
head’s education, the distance of the community to the forest, the percentage of high caste
in the ward are all negative and significant. Finally, also the signs on the FUGs related
characteristics are the same as in Table 2.5. This, as mentioned, may suggest that the
presence of more FUGs and larger areas under their management enable households to
collect more firewood.
In summary, these results seem to indicate that an increase in female participation
in the ECs of FUGs decreases household’s firewood collection, which is consistent with
our hypothesis. Hence a higher percentage of women in decision-making position seem to
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prioritise sustainable extraction and thus forest conservation to satisfy their daily needs.
We discuss further these results in section 2.7.
2.6.4 Robustness and validity checks: placebo tests
Our identification strategy is valid only if trends in firewood collection were parallel before
2009. We have tested the validity of our identification strategy through a set of placebo
tests.
In a first set of placebo experiments we estimate the same DD specification as out-
lined in equations (2.3) and (2.4), defining treated villages as those that are not part of
our original treatment villages (i.e., villages in which no FUGs were formed in 2010 and
2011). Hence we still compare the change in outcomes between 2004 and 2011 between
households living in villages where FUGs were formed only before the introduction of the
new guidelines in 2009. Some of these villages are defined as placebo treatment villages
and some as control. None of them should have experienced any policy change in terms of
female representation in the ECs. If we find that the coefficients on the placebo DD terms
are not significantly different from zero, we may conclude that there was no pre-treatment
trend in firewood collection systematically correlated with subsequent female participa-
tion in ECs of FUGs. This would therefore reassure on the validity of our identification
strategy.
Specifically, we have constructed four different placebo treatment groups by progress-
ively excluding villages that formed groups in more recent years. The first placebo treat-
ment group includes villages which have formed FUGs in 2008 and 2009. The control
group includes villages which have formed groups only before 2008. Villages which have
formed FUGs in 2010 and 2011 (our actual treatment group) are excluded from the sample.
The second placebo group includes villages which have formed groups in 2007 and 2008
and the control includes those formed only before 2007. The third placebo group includes
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villages that formed FUGs in 2006 and 2007 and the control group includes villages which
have formed groups only before 2006. Villages which have formed FUGs in 2008 or in
later years are excluded from the sample. Finally, the fourth placebo treatment group
includes villages which formed FUGs also in 2005 and 2006 and the control is comprised
of those formed only before 2005. All other villages which formed groups in later years
are excluded from the sample.
We have estimated the same specifications as in equations (2.3) and (2.4) for all regres-
sions. The results are shown in Table 2.8. We do not report the coefficients on other control
variables as in the main regression results, as the signs and significance are very similar
and do not provide any additional information. One remark is the decreasing number of
observations as we gradually exclude villages from the sample. The results show that none
of the coefficients on the placebo terms (in the specification that includes all controls) is
statistically significant with the exception of column 5 of Panel B where the coefficient
on the DD term is significant at the 10 percent. These results are quite reassuring for
our identification strategy. They suggest that by looking at the same change in firewood
collection between 2004 and 2011 but comparing villages that did not actually experience
any treatment (i.e, did not form any FUG after 2009), no pre-treatment differentials in
trends in firewood collection were dectected.
In order to further test the validity of our strategy we implement an alternative placebo
test. For this purpose we make use of the 1996 NLSS survey and drop the 2011 NLSS
from this analysis. Basically we compare the change in outcomes between 1996 and 2004
for households living in villages where some FUGs formed after 2009 to the change in
outcomes over the same period for households living in villages where FUGs formed only
before 2009. So here we look at the change across two years during which there has not
been any policy change in terms of female participation in FUGs while mantaining the
original treatment and control groups. Indeed, the treated and control villages remain the
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same as in our specifications of equations (2.3) and (2.4). The results in Table 2.9 show
that the point estimate for the placebo interaction term is positive but not significantly
different from zero.
2.7 Discussion of the results
Our estimates from the difference-in-difference model, indicate that an increase in female
participation in the ECs of FUGs, identified by villages where groups formed also after
2009, decreases household’s firewood collection. A higher presence of women affects the
decision making process within the ECs of FUGs in a way that limits firewood extraction
and ultimately improves forest conservation and regeneration. Women sitting on the ECs
seem to prioritise forest conservation to ensure the satisfaction of their daily need for
firewood. The mechanisms through which a higher presence of women in the ECs may
affect the quantity of firewood collected at the household level are various. The presence
of more women may condition the choice of stricter or more lenient rules which define
the access to forests and the extraction of firewood (Agarwal, 2009a). The quality of
protection may improve, hence limiting rule violations. A higher female participation
may also facilitate the spread of information around the community and hence render
women more cooperative and empowered and ultimately more concerned about forest
conservation. Unfortunately, our data do not allow an exploration as to which of these
mechanisms plays a bigger role.
We discuss here reasons that support our explanation of these results. First, for a
given effect that the presence of FUGs may have already had on the forests, the effect
we are identifying should only relate to the change in female participation in the ECs of
FUGs. As our sample includes only villages which have formed at least one FUG at some
point in time, we are able to control for any effect that these institutions may have had at
the local level. The extent of these effects is accounted for by the inclusion of the year of
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formation of all FUGs created in the villages in our sample. Second, our results also hold
when controlling for both the quantity of forest under the FUG managament (i.e., the
area of forest transferred) and the quality of the forest (i.e., forest conditions). The area
of forest that FUGs manage informs on the amount of land which users can dispose of and
hence partly control for the supply of forest products. Holding the number of households
members of FUGs constant, the bigger the area the higher the products available. Indeed,
we obtain a positive sign on the coefficient that controls for area of forest transferred. In
addition, we control for forest conditions including the variables that inform on whether the
forest decreased in the past five years and whether the time to collect firewood increased
in the past five years. We already acknowledged that these variables may capture forest
conditions in an imprecise way, but believe that they partly control for the quality of the
forests. In addition, the distance of the community to the forest captures not only the
opportunity cost of collecting firewood but also forest conditions. The more degraded the
forest, the lower the amount of firewood that can be collected.
However, there is still the possibility that forest conditions and the area of forest under
FUG management are not adequately controlled for. There could be an unobserved portion
of these characteristics which is correlated with both female participation and firewood
collection. The resulting estimates would be biased and would not reflect a causal effect of
an increase in the representation of women in the ECs of FUGs on firewood collection. In
Section 2.4 we acknowledged a negative correlation between the area of forest and female
participation in ECs of FUGs and showed also that the average area of forest transferred is
substantially lower for groups which have one hundred percent of women in the ECs. The
existing literature suggested that these groups have been traditionally allocated smaller
areas of forest which were also more degraded. Therefore, a higher presence of women in
the ECs of FUGs may simply reflect smaller and more degraded forests. As a result of
this, firewood collection would decrease simply because the supply of forest products is
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lower. Hence, if the percentage of women is negatively correlated with the area of forest
handed over and the expected sign on the area coefficient is positive (i.e., an increase in the
area positively correlated with firewood collection), our estimate can be downward biased
if part of this variation is left unexplained. Therefore our estimates, if biased, represent a
lower bound of the true effect. Similarly, we expect also a downward bias in our estimates if
we are not controlling properly for forest conditions (i.e., the quality of the forest). Indeed,
we expect a negative correlation between forest condition and female participation and
a positive coefficient of forest condition on firewood collection as better forest condition
would lead to a higher demand for firewood. Nonetheless, as the percentage of groups
with a dominant presence of women is small, we argue that the potential bias should be
small in this case.
Finally, the results from the analysis of the determinants of female participation in the
ECs of FUGs seemed to suggest that women were more represented in the ECs of FUGs
of villages where households were on average worse-off. Hence our results may simply
reflect these worse conditions. However, and in support of our explanation, by including
various household and village characteristics we should control for their economic status
which would reflect in the demand for firewood. Our results are invariant to the inclusion
of these types of variable.
2.8 Concluding remarks
This essay looks at the effects of an increase in female participation in the ECs of FUGs
on household firewood collection in Nepal. The study is motivated by the observation
that women are often neglected in the decision-making process within community level
institutions devoted to the management of natural resources. However, women have a
fundamental role in the management of environmental resources and forestry in particular.
We address the potential endogeneity of female participation exploiting the 2009 new
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provision for female representation in the EC of FUGs. This change in the guidelines in-
creased the share of women in the ECs of groups formed after 2009. The results from our
difference-in-difference model show that an increase in the average village level participa-
tion of women in ECs of FUGs, identified by villages where groups formed also after 2009,
decreases the collection of firewood at the household level. This result is suggestive that
women are prioritising conservation and hence once in a decision-making position they fa-
vour decisions which tend to ensure a sustainable extraction of firewood. This important
finding suggests that a greater focus should be put on the role of women in forestry and
in general in collective action institutions.
We believe that with the available data we have done our best to rigorously answer
our research question. However, more detailed data would offer further insights for the
analysis. We do not know whether a specific household is a member of a certain FUG or
not. Therefore, we are not able to account for heterogeneity between households who are
members of FUGs or not. In addition, as FUGs related data are collapsed at the village
level and as this is the level at which we can merge the information on the household survey,
we loose variation in the FUGs data which could serve to exploit groups heterogeneity.
The availability of data on FUGs membership at the household level would be a step
forward allowing us to provide more insights on the effects of female participation in ECs
on firewood collection. Furthermore, our focus is on household firewood collection which is
one possible cause of forest degradation. Data on alternative measures of forest conditions
would be useful to explore and enable us to offer a comprehensive answer to our research
question. Finally, we do not have data that could enable us to explore the mechanisms
through which a higher female participation in the ECs affects the decisions. Additional
information on these aspects would be insightful for this analysis.
Notwithstanding the above remarks, the current analysis makes important contribu-
tions to this largely ignored, though extremely relevant, topic. The recognition of a role for
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women within local collective action institutions may improve the outcomes of community
groups in terms of their effectiveness for the protection and management of the resource.
We try to account for the potential endogeneity of female representation within CFUGs
which no other analysis to our knowledge has tried to address. This is also the first study
that examine the role of gender within collective action institutions looking at a vast area
of Nepal, using nationally representative household surveys and linking these to a unique
census of FUGs.
We deem this topic and our research question extremely important not only for the
specific setting of Nepal but for any developing country which has some natural resources to
manage and protect and which are essential to the daily lives of people. Our results indicate
indeed that in countries with common property resources, the effectiveness of collective
action institutions depends also on which provisions are made for the functioning of these
groups, specifically in terms of the gender composition of the decision-making bodies.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Percentage of women in ECs of FUGs by year of FUGs formation
Figure 2.2: Number of new FUGs by year of FUGs formation
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Figure 2.3: Total new area of forest handed over by year of FUGs formation
Figure 2.4: Total new number of households in FUGs by year of FUGs formation
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Figure 2.5: Percentage of women in ECs of FUGs and area of forest handed over
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Tables
Table 2.1: FUGs characteristics - Census data
Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Eastern region 17685 0.175 0.380 0 1
Central region 17685 0.223 0.416 0 1
Western region 17685 0.261 0.439 0 1
Mid Western region 17685 0.216 0.412 0 1
Far Western region 17685 0.125 0.331 0 1
Mountains 17685 0.142 0.349 0 1
Hills 17685 0.743 0.437 0 1
Tarai 17685 0.116 0.320 0 1
Forest handed over (Ha) 17675 92.144 164.542 0 5698
Number of households in the group 17660 123.322 148.858 0 4690
Number of EC members 17181 11.584 2.747 0 39
Percentage of women in EC 16108 0.333 0.226 0 1
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database.
Table 2.2: Average percentage of women in ECs of FUGs - Census data
All 1993-2000 2001-2006 2007-2009 2010-2011
% women in ECs=0 0.018 0.023 0.009 0.009 0.008
% women in ECs between 0-25% 0.396 0.474 0.310 0.230 0.117
% women in ECs between 25-33% 0.182 0.177 0.188 0.225 0.141
% women in ECs between 33-50% 0.271 0.213 0.332 0.410 0.454
% women in ECs between 50-99% 0.078 0.066 0.081 0.071 0.212
% women in ECs =100% 0.056 0.046 0.080 0.056 0.068
Observations 13814 8747 2922 1420 725
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database; Exclude Tarai belt.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics for rural household and village characteristics
2004 2011
Mean St.Dev. Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
Quantity firewood collected (Bhari/year) 91.007 52.424 12 360 83.555 60.599 0 600
Time to collect firewood (Hours/bhari) 3.471 1.669 0 12 3.910 1.876 1 10
Use firewood past 12 months 1.000 0.000 1 1 1.000 0.000 1 1
Collect firewood past 12 months 1.000 0.000 1 1 1.000 0.000 1 1
Collect firewood in own land 0.270 0.444 0 1 0.257 0.437 0 1
Collect firewood in community forest 0.345 0.476 0 1 0.468 0.499 0 1
Collect firewood in government forest 0.342 0.475 0 1 0.234 0.424 0 1
Collect firewood in other forest 0.043 0.203 0 1 0.041 0.198 0 1
Electric light source 0.216 0.412 0 1 0.481 0.500 0 1
Gas,Oil,Kerosene light source 0.681 0.466 0 1 0.309 0.462 0 1
Use firewood as cooking fuel 0.971 0.167 0 1 0.964 0.186 0 1
Use dung/leaves as cooking fuel 0.005 0.071 0 1 0.005 0.068 0 1
Gas,Oil,Kerosene as cooking fuel 0.024 0.152 0 1 0.031 0.174 0 1
HH size 5.109 2.219 1 17 4.823 2.144 1 15
HH head female 0.227 0.419 0 1 0.283 0.451 0 1
HH head married 0.835 0.371 0 1 0.860 0.347 0 1
HH head age 46.336 14.650 14 91 47.070 14.461 14 95
HH head migrated 0.317 0.466 0 1 0.259 0.438 0 1
HH head any compl edu 0.656 0.475 0 1 0.558 0.497 0 1
HH head completed primary education 0.167 0.373 0 1 0.239 0.426 0 1
HH head completed secondary/higher education 0.177 0.382 0 1 0.204 0.403 0 1
Own any land 0.956 0.205 0 1 0.971 0.167 0 1
Hectares land owned/cultivated 0.768 0.741 0 10 0.709 0.793 0 17
Land size very small (0-0.2 ha) 0.120 0.325 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1
Land size small (0.2-1 ha) 0.611 0.488 0 1 0.651 0.477 0 1
Land size medium (1-2 ha) 0.191 0.393 0 1 0.175 0.380 0 1
Land size large (>2 ha) 0.059 0.236 0 1 0.035 0.184 0 1
Own any livestock 0.956 0.205 0 1 0.966 0.183 0 1
Number of livestocks owned 12.145 10.132 0 83 12.377 9.833 0 89
Number of big livestocks owned 7.046 5.691 0 42 6.905 5.662 0 52
Hindu 0.800 0.400 0 1 0.808 0.394 0 1
Buddhist 0.141 0.348 0 1 0.113 0.317 0 1
Paved Road less than 1 hour away from HH 0.132 0.339 0 1 0.190 0.392 0 1
Paved Road 1-2 hours away from HH 0.111 0.314 0 1 0.163 0.369 0 1
Paved Road 2-4 hours away from HH 0.160 0.367 0 1 0.246 0.431 0 1
Paved Road 4-12 hours away from HH 0.259 0.438 0 1 0.194 0.395 0 1
Paved Road more than 12 hours away from HH 0.338 0.473 0 1 0.208 0.406 0 1
% of high caste hh in ward above 50% 0.505 0.500 0 1 0.460 0.499 0 1
Distance of ward to forest(hours) 1.347 1.139 0 5 1.168 1.179 0 10
Area Under Forest Decreased past 5 years 0.265 0.442 0 1 0.358 0.480 0 1
Time Taken to collect avg Bhari increased past 5 years 0.380 0.486 0 1 0.504 0.500 0 1
Trees planted privately past 5 years 0.234 0.424 0 1 0.092 0.289 0 1
Trees planted by community past 5 years 0.498 0.500 0 1 0.253 0.435 0 1
Trees planted by government past 5 years 0.063 0.243 0 1 0.036 0.187 0 1
Any user group in ward 0.669 0.471 0 1 1.000 0.000 1 1
Any development project in ward 0.720 0.449 0 1 0.955 0.207 0 1
Any natural disaster past 5 years 0.513 0.500 0 1 0.348 0.476 0 1
Ward population 789.278 746.009 104 4817 786.256 595.535 0 5000
Observations 1361 1891
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 and 2011 NLSS surveys; the sample excludes Tarai belt and includes only villages with at least one
FUG that have been sampled in the NLSS surveys; it includes only households which use and collect firewood.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of village average female participation in ECs of FUGs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nlss 2011 0.008 -0.056*** -0.040 -0.043
(0.010) (0.006) (0.032) (0.033)
HH head female -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
HH head age 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
HH size 0.002 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
HH head migrated 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
HH head completed primary education 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
HH head completed secondary/higher education -0.007* -0.005
(0.004) (0.003)
Electric light source -0.003 -0.003
(0.013) (0.011)
Number of livestocks owned -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Hectares land owned/cultivated -0.004 -0.005**
(0.003) (0.003)
Collect firewood in community forest -0.003 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
Collect firewood in government forest -0.016*** -0.016**
(0.006) (0.006)
Paved Road less than 1 hour away from HH -0.019 -0.025
(0.023) (0.022)
Paved Road 1-2 hours away from HH -0.032 -0.041**
(0.023) (0.020)
Paved Road 2-4 hours away from HH -0.026 -0.030
(0.020) (0.019)
Paved Road 4-12 hours away from HH -0.004 -0.003
(0.016) (0.015)
Distance of ward to forest(hours) 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.005)
Area Under Forest Decreased past 5 years 0.005 -0.009
(0.013) (0.013)
Time Taken to collect avg Bhari increased past 5 years -0.019 -0.007
(0.012) (0.013)
% of high caste hh in ward above 50% 0.006 0.009
(0.015) (0.016)
Any user group in ward -0.023 -0.035*
(0.021) (0.019)
Any development project in ward 0.009 0.013
(0.018) (0.019)
Any natural disaster past 5 years 0.008 0.008
(0.013) (0.013)
Number of FUGs in village 0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Village average FUGs area -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Village average FUGs number of households -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes
Obs. 3205 3205 3205 3205
R-squared 0.404 0.490 0.550 0.616
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004, 2011 NLSS surveys and FUG Database. Dependent variable: village
average percentage of women in ECs. All columns show estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the village level. Reference categories: HH head with no education; paved road more than 12 hours away from HH;
collect firewood in own land.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of quantity of firewood collected and female participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Village average % of women in ECs of FUGs -16.523 -28.189 -16.489 -19.454 -8.870
(15.648) (18.940) (17.349) (17.112) (16.367)
Nlss 2011 -5.616 -74.274*** -73.993*** -82.099***
(3.622) (6.077) (5.866) (9.871)
HH size 5.798***
(0.493)
HH head migrated -2.297
(2.261)
HH head completed primary education -4.594*
(2.394)
HH head completed secondary/higher education -1.974
(2.391)
Electric light source 10.602***
(3.417)
Number of livestocks owned 0.632***
(0.133)
Hectares land owned/cultivated 2.638*
(1.389)
Paved Road less than 1 hour away from HH -1.511
(6.720)
Paved Road 1-2 hours away from HH 1.504
(6.468)
Paved Road 2-4 hours away from HH 2.966
(5.698)
Paved Road 4-12 hours away from HH 2.051
(4.649)
Distance of ward to forest(hours) -3.687***
(1.420)
Area Under Forest Decreased past 5 years 4.197
(4.179)
Time Taken to collect avg Bhari increased past 5 years -4.474
(4.094)
% of high caste hh in ward above 50% -9.780***
(3.166)
Any user group in ward -2.664
(5.926)
Any development project in ward -4.231
(5.911)
Any natural disaster past 5 years -3.272
(3.071)
Number of FUGs in village 0.821*
(0.425)
Village average FUGs area 0.034***
(0.012)
Village average FUGs number of households -0.008
(0.019)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 3205 3205 3205 3205 3205
R-squared 0.001 0.090 0.166 0.184 0.274
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004, 2011 NLSS surveys and FUG Database. Dependent variable: quantity of firewood (bhari/year).
All columns show estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the village level. Reference categories: HH head with
no education; paved road more than 12 hours away from HH. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics for village and household characteristics in pre-treament
year for control and treatment groups
Control Treatment Difference
HH size 5.119 5.243 -0.124
HH head migrated 0.313 0.289 0.024
HH head any completed education 0.640 0.769 -0.129***
HH head completed primary education 0.173 0.139 0.034
HH head completed secondary/higher education 0.188 0.092 0.095***
Electric light source 0.215 0.156 0.059**
Hectares land owned/cultivated 0.774 0.831 -0.058
Number of livestocks owned 11.603 17.029 -5.426***
Paved Road less than 1 hour away from HH 0.133 0.058 0.075***
Paved Road 1-2 hours away from HH 0.112 0.081 0.031
Paved Road 2-4 hours away from HH 0.155 0.214 -0.059*
Paved Road 4-12 hours away from HH 0.209 0.439 -0.231***
Paved Road more than 12 hours away from HH 0.391 0.208 0.183***
Distance of ward to forest(hours) 1.332 1.450 -0.118
Area Under Forest Decreased past 5 years 0.281 0.347 -0.066*
Time Taken to collect avg Bhari increased past 5 years 0.427 0.208 0.219***
% of high caste hh in ward above 50% 0.536 0.341 0.195***
Any user group in ward 0.661 0.653 0.008
Any development project in ward 0.741 0.520 0.221***
Any natural disaster past 5 years 0.510 0.653 -0.143***
Number of FUGs in village 7.690 8.775 -1.084***
Village average FUGs area 96.425 97.939 -1.515
Village average FUGs number of households 131.222 104.636 26.586***
Observations 1188 173
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004 NLSS survey and FUG Database. The pre-treatment year is
2004. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.7: Determinants of quantity of firewood collected and female participation:
difference-in-difference estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2009*Nlss 2011 -20.965* -17.843* -25.282* -25.692** -21.354**
(12.689) (10.660) (13.723) (12.044) (10.790)
Nlss 2011 -2.532 -3.536 -73.348*** -74.173*** -83.653***
(4.007) (3.778) (6.098) (5.478) (9.970)
After 2009 6.368 13.763 23.087* 16.796 12.212
(11.253) (11.132) (12.156) (14.108) (12.915)
HH size 5.855***
(0.485)
HH head migrated -2.365
(2.195)
HH head completed primary education -4.237*
(2.382)
HH head completed secondary/higher education -1.490
(2.424)
Electric light source 10.265***
(3.420)
Hectares land owned/cultivated 2.490*
(1.399)
Number of livestocks owned 0.620***
(0.132)
Paved Road less than 1 hour away from HH -0.154
(6.580)
Paved Road 1-2 hours away from HH 2.205
(6.263)
Paved Road 2-4 hours away from HH 3.272
(5.551)
Paved Road 4-12 hours away from HH 1.148
(4.672)
Distance of ward to forest(hours) -3.765***
(1.335)
Area Under Forest Decreased past 5 years 4.659
(4.142)
Time Taken to collect avg Bhari increased past 5 years -3.803
(4.040)
% of high caste hh in ward above 50% -9.995***
(3.184)
Any user group in ward -1.771
(5.468)
Any development project in ward -4.425
(5.308)
Any natural disaster past 5 years -4.356
(2.951)
Number of FUGs in village 0.872**
(0.422)
Village average FUGs area 0.037***
(0.011)
Village average FUGs number of households -0.013
(0.017)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252
R-squared 0.009 0.091 0.169 0.185 0.275
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004, 2011 NLSS surveys and FUG Database. Dependent variable: quantity of firewood (bhari/year).
All columns show estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the village level. Reference categories: HH head with
no education; paved road more than 12 hours away from HH. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.8: Placebo regressions for determinants of quantity of firewood collected (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
After 2007*Nlss 2011 4.595 2.604 2.028 0.415 8.405
(9.013) (9.233) (9.286) (9.175) (10.452)
Nlss 2011 -3.537 -3.905 -73.348*** -71.464*** -81.471***
(4.580) (4.234) (6.115) (6.255) (9.259)
After 2007 -5.873 -0.768 0.230 -20.689 -17.278
(5.862) (7.790) (6.852) (13.785) (16.916)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Obs. 2720 2720 2720 2720 2720
R-squared 0.001 0.080 0.165 0.177 0.274
Panel B
After 2006*Nlss 2011 -5.153 -3.517 10.674 11.615 17.533*
(9.384) (9.982) (9.335) (9.637) (9.558)
Nlss 2011 -2.974 -3.886 -73.348*** -71.357*** -82.413***
(4.830) (4.491) (6.121) (6.870) (9.807)
After 2006 -0.320 -2.560 -7.915 -19.908 -21.008
(6.037) (8.459) (5.925) (12.238) (14.550)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Obs. 2511 2511 2511 2511 2511
R-squared 0.002 0.086 0.173 0.186 0.284
Panel C
After 2005*Nlss 2011 5.162 15.977 16.080 17.163 7.409
(11.356) (13.423) (10.494) (11.087) (10.000)
Nlss 2011 -3.938 -5.804 -73.348*** -67.361*** -70.965***
(4.988) (4.554) (6.133) (7.909) (10.265)
After 2005 -8.914 -11.373 -7.008 -11.495 3.917
(7.385) (10.161) (5.985) (14.415) (14.563)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Obs. 2263 2263 2263 2263 2263
R-squared 0.002 0.101 0.180 0.198 0.300
Panel D
After 2004*Nlss 2011 20.439 28.251 23.289 32.469* 21.563
(15.166) (19.292) (14.210) (16.740) (15.679)
Nlss 2011 -5.165 -7.365 -73.348*** -69.360*** -74.127***
(4.994) (4.520) (6.143) (7.710) (9.646)
After 2004 -10.779 -14.058 -5.621 -35.776 58.139
(7.436) (12.198) (5.922) (22.162) (37.479)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Obs. 2076 2076 2076 2076 2076
R-squared 0.004 0.119 0.198 0.214 0.316
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004, 2011 NLSS surveys and FUG Database. Dependent
variable: quantity of firewood (bhari/year). Results are obtained using difference-in-difference
estimation strategy. All columns show estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the village level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.9: Placebo regressions for determinants of quantity of firewood collected (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2009*Nlss 2004 6.488 6.057 5.879 13.283 17.549
(16.813) (15.111) (15.247) (16.561) (14.002)
Nlss 2004 -15.511*** -17.480*** -16.940 -17.682 -22.549
(5.041) (3.902) (20.302) (20.804) (17.982)
After 2009 -0.120 11.223 17.208* 12.108 -8.178
(12.486) (11.465) (9.135) (12.408) (10.485)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2004 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Obs. 2643 2643 2643 2643 2580
R-squared 0.016 0.202 0.305 0.319 0.432
Notes: Author’s computations using 1996, 2004 NLSS surveys and FUG Database. Dependent
variable: quantity of firewood (bhari/year). Results are obtained using difference-in-difference
estimation strategy. All columns show estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis
clustered at the village level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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2.A Appendix
Figure 2.A.1: Percentage of women in ECs of FUGs by year of FUGs formation
Figure 2.A.2: Number of new FUGs by year of FUGs formation
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Figure 2.A.3: Total new area of forest handed over by year of FUGs formation
Figure 2.A.4: Total new number of households in FUGs by year of FUGs formation
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Table 2.A.1: FUG characteristics on observations with missing information on women in
ECs - Census data
Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Eastern region 1577 0.098 0.297 0 1
Central region 1577 0.201 0.401 0 1
Western region 1577 0.238 0.426 0 1
Mid Western region 1577 0.188 0.391 0 1
Far Western region 1577 0.275 0.447 0 1
Mountains 1577 0.101 0.301 0 1
Hills 1577 0.741 0.438 0 1
Tarai 1577 0.159 0.365 0 1
Forest handed over (Ha) 1573 77.868 137.852 0 2591
Number of households in the group 1570 130.662 198.497 0 4334
Number of EC members 1073 11.027 2.949 0 27
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database. Include only observations with miss-
ing information on percentage of women in ECs.
Table 2.A.2: Test on whether the percentage of women is significantly above trend (1)
(1) (2)
Trend 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000)
FUG formed after 2009 0.035***
(0.009)
Obs. 13814 13814
R-squared 0.034 0.035
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.A.3: Test on whether the percentage of women is significantly above trend (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year of formation=1993 -0.110*** -0.128*** -0.095*** -0.117***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Year of formation=1994 -0.067*** -0.085*** -0.052*** -0.074***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Year of formation=1995 -0.080*** -0.098*** -0.065*** -0.087***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Year of formation=1996 -0.068*** -0.086*** -0.053*** -0.076***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Year of formation=1997 -0.062*** -0.080*** -0.047*** -0.069***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Year of formation=1998 -0.044*** -0.062*** -0.029** -0.052***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Year of formation=1999 -0.042*** -0.059*** -0.027** -0.049***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Year of formation=2000 -0.039*** -0.057*** -0.024* -0.046***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Year of formation=2001 0.006 -0.012 0.021 -0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Year of formation=2002 0.006 -0.012 0.021 -0.001
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Year of formation=2003 0.000 -0.018 0.015 -0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Year of formation=2004 0.007 -0.011 0.022 -0.000
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Year of formation=2005 0.012 -0.006 0.027 0.004
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Year of formation=2006 0.007 -0.011 0.022
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Year of formation=2007 -0.015 -0.033** -0.022
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Year of formation=2008 0.018 0.033** 0.011
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Year of formation=2010 0.079*** 0.061*** 0.094*** 0.072***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Year of formation=2011 0.059*** 0.041** 0.074*** 0.052***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Year of formation=2009 -0.018 0.015 -0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Obs. 13814 13814 13814 13814
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database; Reference categories: in column
1 is year formation=2009, in column 2 is year of formation=2008, in column 3 is
year formation=2007, in column 4 is year formation=2006; p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 2.A.5: FUG characteristics - Census data (include only villages sampled in NLSS
surveys)
count mean sd min max
Eastern region 2047 0.166 0.372 0 1
Central region 2047 0.282 0.450 0 1
Western region 2047 0.271 0.444 0 1
Mid Western region 2047 0.189 0.392 0 1
Far Western region 2047 0.093 0.290 0 1
Mountains 2047 0.154 0.361 0 1
Hills 2047 0.846 0.361 0 1
Forest handed over (Ha) 2045 88.439 167.604 0 4500
Number of households in the group 2046 115.600 91.357 0 1209
Number of EC members 2006 11.621 2.601 0 25
% of women in EC 1905 0.326 0.213 0 1
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database. Exclude Tarai belt. Include only
villages sampled in NLSS surveys.
Table 2.A.6: Average percentage of women in ECs of FUGs - Census data (include only
villages sampled in NLSS surveys)
All 1993-2000 2001-2006 2007-2009 2010-2011
% women in ECs=0 0.024 0.032 0.009 0.020 0.010
% women in ECs between 0-25% 0.376 0.468 0.257 0.239 0.163
% women in ECs between 25-33% 0.205 0.187 0.226 0.269 0.184
% women in ECs between 33-50% 0.277 0.221 0.357 0.343 0.429
% women in ECs between 50-99% 0.062 0.049 0.068 0.080 0.143
% women in ECs=100% 0.056 0.044 0.083 0.050 0.071
Observations 1905 1140 456 201 98
Notes: Author’s computations using FUG Database. Exclude Tarai belt. Include only villages sampled in
NLSS surveys
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Table 2.A.7: Comparison of average household and village characteristics between villages
with and without FUGs
2004 2011
With FUGs Without FUGs Diff. With FUGs Without FUGs Diff.
Eastern 0.207 0.200 0.007 0.214 0.111 0.103∗∗
Central 0.306 0.200 0.106 0.260 0.556 -0.295∗∗∗
Western 0.240 0.400 -0.160∗ 0.214 0.222 -0.008
Mid-west 0.165 0.200 -0.035 0.185 0.111 0.074∗
Far-west 0.083 0.000 0.083∗∗∗ 0.127 0.000 0.127∗∗∗
hills 0.760 0.600 0.160∗ 0.844 0.889 -0.045
Quantity firewood collected (Bhari/year) 90.996 95.750 -4.754 84.884 104.263 -19.379∗
Time to collect firewood (Hours/bhari) 3.526 4.104 -0.578∗ 3.889 4.501 -0.612
Use firewood past 12 months 0.974 0.817 0.157∗∗ 0.965 0.611 0.354∗∗∗
Collect firewood past 12 months 0.963 0.980 -0.017 0.954 0.879 0.075
Collect firewood in own land 0.263 0.208 0.055 0.250 0.362 -0.112
Collect firewood in community forest 0.337 0.167 0.170∗∗ 0.475 0.293 0.182∗∗
Collect firewood in government forest 0.357 0.583 -0.226∗∗ 0.235 0.310 -0.075
Collect firewood in other forest 0.043 0.042 0.002 0.040 0.034 0.005
Electric light source 0.242 0.383 -0.142∗ 0.496 0.713 -0.217∗∗∗
Gas,Oil,Kerosene light source 0.652 0.383 0.269∗∗∗ 0.297 0.148 0.149∗∗∗
Use firewood as cooking fuel 0.944 0.817 0.128∗ 0.921 0.556 0.365∗∗∗
Use dung/leaves as cooking fuel 0.008 0.000 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006 0.028 -0.022
Gas,Oil,Kerosene as cooking fuel 0.048 0.183 -0.136∗∗ 0.074 0.417 -0.343∗∗∗
HH size 5.046 4.367 0.679∗∗ 4.761 4.111 0.650∗∗
HH head female 0.223 0.250 -0.027 0.281 0.167 0.114∗∗
HH head married 0.824 0.783 0.041 0.857 0.815 0.043
HH head age 46.663 43.367 3.296 46.824 48.370 -1.546
HH head migrated 0.318 0.500 -0.182∗∗ 0.289 0.343 -0.054
HH head any compl edu 0.647 0.717 -0.070 0.536 0.500 0.036
HH head completed primary education 0.164 0.133 0.031 0.233 0.148 0.085∗
HH head completed secondary/higher education 0.189 0.150 0.039 0.231 0.352 -0.121∗
Own any land 0.941 0.833 0.107∗ 0.948 0.722 0.226∗∗∗
Hectares land owned/cultivated 0.757 0.736 0.021 0.698 0.376 0.322∗∗∗
Land size very small (0-0.2 ha) 0.118 0.267 -0.148∗ 0.126 0.287 -0.161∗∗∗
Land size small (0.2-1 ha) 0.602 0.383 0.219∗∗ 0.630 0.352 0.278∗∗∗
Land size medium (1-2 ha) 0.186 0.100 0.086∗ 0.171 0.111 0.059
Land size large (¿2 ha) 0.059 0.100 -0.041 2076 0.009 0.028∗∗
Own any livestock 0.935 0.767 0.168∗∗ 0.928 0.593 0.336∗∗∗
Number of livestocks owned 11.870 12.467 -0.597 11.789 5.694 6.095∗∗∗
Number of big livestocks owned 6.824 5.783 1.040 6.568 2.750 3.818∗∗∗
Hindu 0.802 0.450 0.352∗∗∗ 0.810 0.750 0.060
Buddhist 0.141 0.450 -0.309∗∗∗ 0.109 0.194 -0.085∗
Paved Road less than 1 hour away from HH 0.145 0.300 -0.155∗ 0.223 0.454 -0.231∗∗∗
Paved Road 1-2 hours away from HH 0.110 0.067 0.043 0.150 0.102 0.048
Paved Road 2-4 hours away from HH 0.160 0.033 0.127∗∗∗ 0.234 0.111 0.123∗∗∗
Paved Road 4-12 hours away from HH 0.233 0.000 0.233∗∗∗ 0.188 0.111 0.077∗
Paved Road more than 12 hours away from HH 0.351 0.600 -0.249∗∗∗ 0.205 0.222 -0.018
% of high caste hh in ward above 50% 0.521 0.400 0.121 0.474 0.778 -0.304∗∗∗
Distance of ward to forest(hours) 1.337 1.350 -0.013 1.192 1.056 0.136
Area Under Forest Decreased past 5 years 0.281 0.200 0.081 0.364 0.111 0.253∗∗∗
Time Taken to collect avg Bhari increased past 5 years 0.397 0.800 -0.403∗∗∗ 0.526 0.444 0.082
Trees planted privately past 5 years 0.231 0.200 0.031 0.092 0.222 -0.130∗∗
Trees planted by community past 5 years 0.496 0.400 0.096 0.266 0.111 0.155∗∗∗
Trees planted by government past 5 years 0.074 0.000 0.074∗∗∗ 0.040 0.222 -0.182∗∗∗
Any user group in ward 0.669 0.400 0.269∗∗∗ 1.000 1.000 0.000
Any development project in ward 0.719 0.800 -0.081 0.954 1.000 -0.046∗∗∗
Any natural disaster past 5 years 0.529 0.400 0.129 0.341 0.222 0.119∗∗
ward population 794.709 760.000 34.709 895.890 1058.667 -162.776
Observations 1452 60 2076 108
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004, 2011 NLSS surveys and FUG Database.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.A.8: Determinants of quantity of firewood collected on a sample that includes
outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2009*Nlss 2011 -23.634* -20.774* -25.282* -25.462** -22.185**
(12.725) (10.690) (13.722) (12.226) (10.752)
Nlss 2011 0.137 -0.697 -73.348*** -74.931*** -82.032***
(4.121) (3.864) (6.098) (5.037) (11.010)
After 2009 6.368 15.410 23.087* 16.214 10.044
(11.253) (11.131) (12.156) (14.236) (13.000)
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE * Nlss 2011 No No Yes Yes Yes
FUG year of formation No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Obs. 3256 3256 3256 3256 3256
R-squared 0.007 0.068 0.128 0.138 0.204
Notes: Author’s computations using 2004, 2011 NLSS surveys and FUG Database. Dependent
variable: quantity of firewood (bhari/year). Results are obtained using difference-in-difference
estimation strategy. All columns show estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered
at the village level. Sample includes 4 outlier observations on dependent variable in 2011 NLSS
survey.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 3
Short- and long-term impact of
violence on education: the case of
Timor Leste
3.1 Introduction
The developmental consequences of violence and conflict are far reaching, affecting mil-
lions of men, women, and children (World Bank, 2011). The objective of this essay is to
examine one important channel linking violent conflict and development outcomes: the
education of children living in contexts of conflict and violence. The chapter focuses on the
case of Timor Leste, particularly the last wave of violence in 1999 during the withdrawal of
Indonesian troops from the territory. We analyse the short-term impact of the 1999 viol-
ence on primary school attendance in 2001 and its longer-term impact on primary school
completion in 2007. In addition, we separately examine the impact of early periods of
high-intensity violence (HVI) during the 25 years of Indonesian occupation and the effects
of the entire conflict on primary school completion in 2007 to compare the average impact
of the overall conflict period with the educational impact of singular peaks of violence.
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This is a unique and important feature of this essay because long conflicts are not char-
acterised by constant levels of violence. Although armed conflict has considerable effects
on people’s lives, there is an important theoretical distinction between the conflict process
and the violence that occurs at different times and in different places (Kalyvas, 2006).
From a theoretical perspective, the long-term developmental effects of violent conflict are
ambiguous. Standard neoclassical growth models predict that the temporary destruc-
tion of capital can be overcome in the long run by higher investments in affected areas.1
However, the long-term destructive effects of violent conflict may remain entrenched in
certain regions and among some population groups even if economic growth converges at
the aggregate level. Recent research on the microlevel effects of violent conflict has shown
that the negative impact of conflict on educational outcomes, labor market participation,
and the health status of individuals and households may be observed decades after the
conflict.2 Children may be particularly affected by conflict because many human cap-
ital investments are age specific. The destruction of human capital during childhood is a
well-documented mechanism explaining long-term trends in household welfare (Alderman
et al., 2006; Case and Paxson, 2008; Maccini and Yang, 2009). The educational effects
of violent conflict are particularly substantial. The existing literature shows that violent
conflict almost always results in reductions in educational access and attainment (Akresh
and de Walque, 2011; Alderman et al., 2006; Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2011; Shemyak-
ina, 2011). Relatively minor shocks to educational access during childhood can lead to
significant and long-lasting detrimental effects on individual human capital accumulation
(Akbulut-Yuksel, 2009; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Leo`n, 2012). We analyse the
short- and long-term impacts of violence on primary school attendance and completion
in Timor Leste using data from two nationally representative household surveys collected
1See the discussion in Blattman and Miguel (2010) and the evidence in Bellows and Miguel (2006),
Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Miguel and Roland (2011).
2See reviews in Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Justino (2009, 2012b).
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in 2001 and in 2007. We focus on primary school outcomes because most individuals in
Timor Leste (approximately 65 percent) have, at most, only primary school education
(TLSS, 2007a). Our identification strategy exploits both individual-level violence meas-
ures and temporal and geographical variation in the incidence of the conflict using data
from the East Timor Human Rights Violations Database (CAVR, 2006). Our results show
mixed evidence for the impact of violent conflict on educational outcomes. Mirroring the
findings of Bellows and Miguel (2006) and others, we find evidence for a rapid recovery in
educational outcomes among girls in Timor Leste. However, we find that the 1999 wave of
violence in Timor Leste, as well as the peaks of violence in the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in
persistent negative effects on primary school attendance and completion among boys. We
present evidence suggesting that boys were less able to benefit from post-conflict recovery
as a result of household trade-offs between education and economic survival that may have
led to the removal of boys from school. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
provides a descriptive background of the conflict in Timor Leste and the country’s edu-
cation sector. In section 3.3, we describe the datasets, discuss our identification strategy,
and present some descriptive results. Section 3.4 discusses our empirical results as well as
a range of robustness checks. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Violent conflict and the education sector in Timor Leste
Timor Leste was under Portuguese colonial rule from 1500 to 1974. After the Portuguese
left, Indonesia forcefully annexed the territory, leading to a guerrilla war spurred by the
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor and its armed wing (the Armed Forces
for the National Liberation of East Timor). Several thousand individuals were forcibly dis-
placed during the Indonesian occupation and forced to live in extreme conditions without
adequate food, shelter, or health facilities (Felgueiras and Martins, 2006; Gusma˜o, 2004).
Approximately 60,000 people lost their lives in the early years of the occupation. The
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number of deaths reached 200,000 by the end of the occupation (UNDP, 2002). The situ-
ation in Timor Leste received little international attention until the Santa Cruz massacre
in November 1991, in which Indonesian forces killed 200 protesters. The massacre was
broadcast by the international media and raised considerable awareness of human rights
violations during the Indonesian occupation. The independence movement received sup-
port from the Portuguese government and international organizations, including the UN.
These events, in addition to the 1997 financial crisis, resulted in Indonesia agreeing to a
referendum on the independence of Timor Leste. On August 30, 1999, 79 percent of the
population of Timor Leste voted in favor of independence. The aftermath of the referen-
dum generated a wave of destruction, violence, and human rights violations by Indonesian
forces and militias (Alonso and Brugha, 2006). The number of killings during this wave of
violence has been estimated at between 1,000 and 2,000 people, approximately 0.2 percent
of the Timorese population (Robinson, 2003; UNDP, 2002). This wave of violence was
characterised by massive displacement and the destruction of private dwellings and public
infrastructure following the ”scorched-earth” tactics employed by the Indonesian troops
and pro-Indonesia militia groups (CAVR, 2006; UNDP, 2002). Approximately 80 per-
cent of the country’s infrastructure and buildings were destroyed during the withdrawal
of Indonesian troops and militias (UNDP, 2002). In October 1999, a United Nations
Transitional Administration was established in Timor Leste.
3.2.1 Variation in the conflict across time and space
The conflict in Timor Leste has evolved in different ways over time and across space. The
Timor Leste Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, established in 2001,
has identified three distinct phases of the conflict during the period between December
1975 and September 1999 (CAVR, 2005). The first phase, from 1975 to 1984, was related
to the initial Indonesian invasion and occupation of Timor Leste. The first few years,
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from 1975 to 1979, were the most intense in terms of killings and destruction. The second
phase, from 1985 to 1998, was characterised by the consolidation and normalisation of
the occupation. Although people were killed in this phase (for instance, during the Santa
Cruz massacre), the violence during this period was of relatively low intensity. The third
phase of the conflict was identified with the 1999 withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the
accompanying wave of violence. The main peaks of violence across these three periods
were 1975-79, 1983, and 1999, coinciding with more intense fighting between the two
factions (CAVR, 2005). There were two main types of victims during this last wave of
violence. The first was urban households, some (but not all) of which were supporters
of the independence movement among or related to the Timorese intelligentsia. Some
of these individuals were targeted and killed, whereas others fled from their areas of
residence, fearing attacks by the Indonesian troops and militias in Dili and other urban
areas (CAVR, 2006; Robinson, 2003). The second set of victims was mostly poor farmers
who fled to safer areas or fell victim to the scorched-earth tactics employed by Indonesian
forces withdrawing from Timor Leste (CAVR, 2006).
The conflict was also characterised by significant variation at the geographical level,
which we exploit in our empirical analysis. The violence was primarily concentrated
in specific areas, and its geographic variation generally followed the movement of the
Indonesian military forces. The occupation was more intense initially in the western
region of Timor Leste because of the proximity to the West Timor border. It then spread
to the central and eastern regions. The last wave of violence in 1999 was particularly
intense in the western region and the urban areas of the central regions (CAVR, 2005).
The concentration of violence in 1999 in the western districts was also due to a long-
established network of pro-Indonesian groups since before 1999. In contrast, the eastern
and central regions were important areas for the resistance forces (Robinson, 2003). We
will explore this variation in violence across time and space in the empirical analysis below.
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The levels of violence experienced in Timor Leste declined considerably after inde-
pendence. In 2006, Timor Leste faced renewed civil strife as a result of fighting between
different factions of the independence movement (Muggah et al., 2010; Scambary, 2009).
Although fighting and violence have become less pronounced, some areas of Timor Leste
continue to face serious challenges in terms of insecurity, youth unemployment, and viol-
ence (Muggah et al., 2010). This essay specifically focuses on the effects of the 1999 wave
of violence and the previous years of the Indonesian occupation, but we also discuss the
potential implications of the 2006 civil strife on our results in section 3.4.4.
3.2.2 The education sector in Timor Leste
Beginning in 1999, substantial funds from bilateral and multilateral donors flowed into
Timor Leste to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. Although
Timor Leste was severely devastated during the 1999 wave of violence, the reconstruction
of state institutions, school systems, infrastructure, and markets was relatively successful
and rapid (World Bank, 2003b). The main development indicators for the country in 2001
were close to the pre-1999 values. However, Timor Leste was (and is) one of the world’s
least developed countries (UNDP, 2002). Under Portuguese colonial rule, the Catholic
Church was the major provider of education, with schooling primarily available for the
elite in urban areas. The literacy rate was approximately 5 percent in 1975, and gender
disparities were large (UNDP, 2002). The Indonesian government expanded educational
access to the entire population of Timor Leste, primarily as a means of controlling the
population (Nicolai, 2004). Enrollment rates increased over those years, and gender gaps
began to close (UNDP, 2002). Despite this progress, educational performance under the
Indonesian occupation was characterised by delayed school entry, high repetition rates, and
high dropout rates owing to the low quality of schools and teaching and high fees. Some
Timorese were also unwilling to send their children to school because this was perceived
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as a sign of participation in the repressive Indonesian system (UNDP, 2002). In 1995, less
than half of individuals aged between 15 and 19 had completed primary school education
(UNDP, 2002).
The school system was almost totally destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the
1999 violence, and schools did not reopen until October 2000. However, children were
still able to attend classes taught in the open air in makeshift camps (Rohland and Cliffe,
2002), and substantial effort was applied to the reconstruction of the education system in
Timor Leste (World Bank, 2003a). In particular, the Trust Fund for East Timor included
substantial funding for the renovation of damaged schools and the construction of new
ones (USD 27.8 million over three years). Within a few months, many schools had been
rebuilt, thousands of books had been replaced, and teachers had been recruited (Rohland
and Cliffe, 2002; World Bank, 2003a).
During this rapid reconstruction process, primary school enrollment rates improved
significantly. This increase was aided by the elimination of school fees and the reintroduc-
tion of Portuguese as the primary language of instruction. As a result, a large number
of over-age students enrolled in primary school for the first time, and net primary school
enrollment in Timor Leste rose from 65 to 74 percent between 1999 and 2001. Gender
differentials decreased significantly as a result of a large increase in female literacy rates
(World Bank, 2003a). However, the reconstruction of the school system in Timor Leste
faced numerous challenges owing to the shortage of teachers and schools (UNDP, 2006).
Makeshift open-air schools were not ideal means of teaching children, and emergency funds
were only available for a limited period of time. In 2007, most of the Timorese population
continued to have little or no education.
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3.3 Data description and identification strategy
Our empirical study is based on two cross-sectional household surveys: the Timor Leste
Living Standard Measurement Surveys (TLSS), which were jointly conducted by the Na-
tional Statistics Directorate in Timor Leste and the World Bank in 2001 and 2007, includ-
ing a broad range of individual- and household-level indicators. The TLSS 2001 surveyed
1,800 households from 100 sucos (villages), covering nearly 1 percent of the population
(TLSS, 2001). The survey included direct questions on the exposure of individuals and
households to the violence in 1999. The TLSS 2007 covered a sample of 4,477 households
from all 498 sucos in Timor Leste (TLSS, 2007b). The TLSS 2007 was conducted over
a period of 12 months between December 2007 and January 2008.3 The TLSS 2007 did
not contain direct information on exposure to violence. To identify individuals and house-
holds affected by violence, we exploit data on the number of killings across time and space
collected in the Human Rights Violations Database to identify districts and years that
experienced HVI at the beginning of and during the occupation and following the with-
drawal of Indonesian troops in 1999. These data were compiled by the Commission for
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation from voluntary statements made by people (victims,
perpetrators, and others) affected by violence.
3.3.1 Identification strategy I: The impact of violence on school attend-
ance in 2001
We first investigate the short-term impact of the 1999 violence on the school attendance
of boys and girls observed in 2001.4 We consider two different channels of exposure
3The survey was launched in March 2006 but had to be suspended due to the outbreak of internal
violence in the country (mostly in Dili). The survey was resumed in January 2007 and conducted over one
year. All households interviewed in 2006 (351 households) were revisited and reinterviewed in 2007. Those
not found at the time of the new interview (34 households) were replaced with new households (TLSS,
2007b).
4We do not analyse primary school completion in 2001 because most children who were of school age
in 1999 were still in school in 2001.
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to violence. The first identifies individuals belonging to households that were displaced
as a result of the 1999 wave of violence (all members displaced). The second identifies
individuals in households that report having their homes completely destroyed by the
violent attacks in 1999.5
The TLSS 2001 contains useful retrospective information on school attendance in three
different school years: 1998/99, 1999/00, and 2000/01. We are interested in the year of
recovery (2000/01). Because the 1999 violence primarily occurred in the summer and fall
of 1999, we can assume with a high degree of confidence that the 1998/99 school year was
not affected by conflict, whereas the 1999/00 school year began during the wave of violence.
Note that many children continued to be able to attend school in 1999. However, these
were generally makeshift open-air schools in internally displaced person camps established
by the international community (Nicolai, 2004; Richter, 2009).
To employ the retrospective information on school attendance provided in the dataset,
we exploit the time variation in school attendance status. We construct a panel dataset in
which each individual is observed over three school years, and attendance status is time
variant. We focus our analysis on individuals who were of primary school age over the
1998-2001 period, ensuring that all children had a minimum age of seven in 1998/99 and
a maximum age of 12 in 2000/01.6 We estimate the following equation using a linear
probability model:
Eit = α+ β1T2 + β2T3 + β3V
k
i T2 + β4V
k
i T3 + αi + it (3.1)
5The 2001 TLSS also contains self-reported information on the number of household members who have
died as a result of violence. In our sample, 148 individuals (living in 27 households) reported the violent
death of a household member. Of these individuals, 88 percent were also affected by displacement and/or
dwelling destruction, and only 13 of those 148 individuals were children between the ages of 7 and 12
during the violence. We have re-estimated our model in table 3.5 excluding these 13 children. The results
remain unchanged. These estimates are not reported but are available upon request.
6We have analysed a larger sample that includes children of primary school age in the year of the
violence (i.e., between 7 and 12 years old in 1999). This includes individuals aged 6 in 1998 and aged 13
in 2000. The inclusion of these individuals may generate ”spurious” results because they are not all of
primary school age. We have estimated the model using both samples. The results (not shown) are very
similar; therefore, we opted to concentrate on the most restrictive sample.
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where Eit is a binary variable for school attendance for individual i at time t. T2 and T3
are year dummies for the 1999 violence and for the first year of the post-violence period
(school year 2000/01), respectively. The reference year is the pre-violence year, 1998/99.
The model includes individual fixed effects, αi. it is the random error term. We estimate
robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity in the error term. In addition,
as we expect observations within each village to be correlated, all standard errors are
clustered at the village level.
Violence-affected individuals are identified using two different measures, V ki , with k =
1, 2 depending on whether displacement or the destruction of a home is included in the
specification. Of the children in the sample, 16 percent and 25 percent live in households
that were displaced or had their homes destroyed, respectively. We allow the violence
measure to interact with both year dummies. The estimation of our specification employs
a difference-in-difference methodology. The first difference compares the school attendance
of individuals affected or not by the violence. The second difference compares the school
attendance of children before and during the violence, and before and after the violence.
Specifically, V ki T2 represents the difference-in-difference term between the pre-war year and
the year of conflict, whereas V ki T3 represents the difference-in-difference term between
the pre-war year and the post-war year. We focus our attention on the coefficient β4
because we are primarily interested in understanding the effects of violence on post-war
outcomes. We also explore both the separate and joint impacts of each channel of violence
by adding a triple interaction between the two violence dummies and the time dummies.
This specification allows us to isolate the impact of only being displaced, only having the
home destroyed and being affected by both shocks. Of the children in our sample, 67.1
percent were not affected by any shock. Moreover, 7.5 percent of all children were only
displaced, and 17.4 percent only had their homes destroyed. Finally, 8 percent of the
sample was affected by both shocks. This specification ensures that the control group
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does not include individuals affected by violence.
In table 3.1, we present average school attendance rates, disaggregated by gender and
age groups, for the same cohort of children aged 7-10 years in 1998, 8-11 years in 1999,
and 9-12 years in 2000. In general, the attendance rates for the whole sample increase
over time and are higher for girls. The differences in means between boys and girls are
statistically significant only for school attendance in the post-war year.
There are, however, considerable differences in attendance rates between children af-
fected by violence and those who do not report victimization. These differences are re-
ported in figure 3.1, where we disaggregate school attendance averages between violence-
affected and unaffected individuals. As expected, we observe a decline in school attendance
in 1999 for children affected by violence.
We present the individual and household characteristics of children affected by the
1999 violence in table 3.2. The table shows that children from displaced households are
better off (i.e., higher education level of the parents, less farmers) overall than those
from households that were not displaced. Many of these were urban households that
fled their areas of residence because they feared being targeted by the Indonesian troops
stationed in Dili and other urban areas in the central regions (CAVR, 2005; Robinson,
2003). Households that report having their homes destroyed by violent attacks or affected
by both shocks are generally poor farmers living in rural areas. These households are likely
to be indiscriminate victims of the scorched-earth tactics employed by the Indonesian
troops withdrawing to West Timor (CAVR, 2005). Interestingly, we find that boys (aged
10-12) affected by displacement work more hours than unaffected individuals, whereas the
opposite is true for girls.
We exploit the panel nature of the data to estimate the causal effects of the 1999
wave of violence on education outcomes. We estimated a fixed effects model,7 which
7The fixed effects model is more appropriate than a random effects model because we would have to
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allows us to eliminate time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics that may be
correlated with the conflict measure and our dependent variable. As shown in equation
(3.1), our specification also includes year dummies that allow us to control for unobserved
time-variant heterogeneity.
To ensure that our key identifying assumption is not violated, we checked whether
trends in education before the 1999 violence were parallel between groups affected by the
violence and those unaffected by the violent events. We examined the average school
grades of affected individuals and unaffected individuals who were not exposed to the
1999 violence during their primary school years and who were old enough in 1999 to
have at least completed primary school.8 The results indicate that it is unlikely that
pre-existing differences in education trends drive our post-conflict outcomes (see figure
3.2). This evidence, combined with the association of the violence with the Indonesian
troop movements described in section 3.2, strongly indicates that the effects of the violence
that occurred in Timor Leste in 1999 on individual educational outcomes are unlikely to
be driven by a systematic correlation between the determinants of individual educational
attainment levels before 1999 and the incidence of the 1999 violence at the individual level.
Despite the evidence discussed above, there is a small possibility that this strategy
may be unable to control for all of the unobservable individual characteristics that may be
correlated with both conflict incidence and educational outcomes. In particular, there are
two common omitted variables in empirical analyses of conflict that may affect our results
(see Kalyvas (2006)). The first variable is a household’s level of support for armed groups.
Supporters of pro-independence groups in Timor Leste were likely to be targets of violent
attacks by Indonesian forces. In that case, the correlation between the conflict variables
assume that the unobserved component of the individual fixed effects and the other covariates specified
in the equation are uncorrelated. This assumption is likely to be violated in our case. This choice is also
supported by Hausman test results.
8We do not include cohorts born after 1985 because the educational attainment of these individuals
might be censored.
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and this potentially omitted variable would be positive. If supporters were also more
educated and hence more likely to send their children to school, our estimated effect would
be biased upward. The use of a fixed effects model controls for these effects as a component
of time-invariant individual heterogeneity. The results of this study may nevertheless
indicate a lower negative impact of the conflict on education than if we were able to
account for this potential unobservable, in the case that levels of support changed during
the conflict. This is unlikely to have been the case in Timor Leste in light of the discussion
in section 3.2. Another common omitted variable is the level of control of different armed
factions. In the case of Timor Leste, the level of control of the Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor and the Indonesian troops is likely to vary with the geographical
characteristics of each area as well as their proximity to West Timor. We control for this
by including individual fixed effects in our specifications.
3.3.2 Identification strategy II: The impact of violence on primary school
completion in 2007
In this section, we investigate the longer-term consequences of the violence experienced in
1999 in Timor Leste on primary school completion in 2007 among the cohorts of children
analysed above. We then compare these results to the educational impact of the peaks of
violence that occurred in earlier years of the conflict. To construct a measure of exposure to
violence, we matched information on the number of killings (provided in the Human Rights
Violations Database dataset)-which varies over time and across districts-to information on
the year and district of birth of each individual (provided in the TLSS 2007 dataset). We
focus on the number of killings as our main conflict variable because we find that it serves
as a good proxy for the intensity of the conflict across time and space. The occurrence
of killings largely tracked the movements of the Indonesian military operations (Silva
and Ball, 2006). The number of killings also proxies for the destruction of homes and
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infrastructure and the displacement of people during the 1999 wave of violence, given the
manner in which it occurred (i.e., the scorched-earth technique employed by Indonesian
troops as they moved toward West Timor). Matching this measure of violence to the year
and district of birth of each individual allows us to identify whether and for how long
each individual was exposed to the conflict during his or her primary school years. Our
violence measure is defined as Vjt =
∑12
a=7 v
j
t+a where each v
j
t+a takes a value of one if
the individual was of primary school age in districts and years affected by the conflict.
Specifically, j is the district of birth, t is the year of birth, and a is the primary school age
(from 7 to 12). This measure ranges from zero to six if, from none to all six of a child’s
primary school years, respectively, were classified as exhibiting HVI. Because we only have
information on the years in which individuals were supposed to have attended primary
school,9 we assume that the district of birth is the district where the child attended school
at the time of the violent events.
We define districts and years of HVI as those in which the number of killings in that
year and district are above a given threshold, defined as the mean of the number of
killings plus one standard deviation. The years in which the conflict was the most intense,
as defined by our threshold, are 1975-1979, 1983, and 1999. This observation coincides
with the history of the conflict discussed in section 3.2 (see CAVR (2005)).10
The definition of HVI districts and years as a binary variable instead of a continuous
one is primarily justified by our interest in capturing the incidence of violent conflict rather
than its scale and magnitude. We have checked the robustness of all results to the use
of a continuous variable and two different thresholds of violence intensity defined as the
9These are not the years in which the individuals actually attended school because we do not have access
to this information. The existence of a delay in school means that the ”supposed” years of attendance
might not coincide with the ”actual” years of school attendance. However, given the way in which we
identify our control and treatment groups, we do not expect this difference to affect our results.
10The districts most affected by violence in the earlier years of the conflict are Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque,
Ainaro, Manufahi, Manatuto, Aileu, Dili, Ermera, and Bobonaro. Those most affected by the 1999 violence
are Dili, Ermera, Bobonaro, Covalima, Liquica, and Oecussi.
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number of killings in each district and year (i) above the mean plus half of a standard
deviation and (ii) above the mean plus two standard deviations. The results obtained are
largely similar to those reported in this chapter.11 In addition, the distribution of killings
is highly right skewed, further justifying the use of a binary variable. A Kernel density
plot of the number of killings (not shown) demonstrates that where and when the conflict
events occurred, we observe a considerably higher number of violent events; otherwise,
we observe a low to negligible number of events. Finally, and more important, the use
of a discrete variable allows us to minimize potential biases deriving from the potential
under-reporting of violent events. The Human Rights Violations Database dataset was
compiled from voluntary statements, which may have resulted in biased reports. For
instance, individuals living in remote areas or sick and disabled people may have not been
able to report abuses, whereas victims of sexual abuse or traumatized people may not have
reported their true levels of exposure to violence. In contrast, socially active individuals
may have been more likely to volunteer information (Silva and Ball, 2006). Under these
circumstances, the use of a continuous measure may lead to biased estimates reflecting
potential self-selection into reporting violence (Leo`n, 2012). The direction of this bias is
impossible to predict a priori and depends on how unobservable characteristics related to
under-reporting may be correlated with conflict exposure and the dependent variable.
To estimate the effect of the 1999 violence on school completion in 2007, we include
individuals born between 1977 and 1992 in our sample. The treatment group includes
individuals who were between 7 and 12 years old in 1999 in HVI districts (born between
1987 and 1992). We do not include individuals born after 1992 because they may have
not completed primary school by 2007. The control group includes individuals who were
not of primary school age in 1999 (born between 1977 and 1986).
11Results not shown and available upon request.
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To analyse the impact of earlier peaks of violence, we focus our analysis on a sample
of individuals born between 1968 and 1984. The treatment group includes individuals
who were of primary school age between 1975 and 1979 and in 1983 (born between 1968
and 1976) in HVI districts. We exclude those born before 1968 because the schooling
system was very different before the Indonesian troops invaded Dili in 1975. We also do
not include individuals born between 1985 and 1986 as they may have been affected by
the 1999 violence although placebo tests presented later indicate that they have not been
affected. One interesting aspect of this analysis is that the treatment term informs us not
only about the effects of exposure to HVI but also about the number of years of primary
school affected by this exposure to violence.
Finally, we analyse the effect of the whole conflict on school attainment in 2007. For
this purpose, we consider the full sample of individuals born between 1968 and 1992, where
the treatment groups are those identified above and the control group includes individuals
born between 1977 and 1986. This allows us to calculate the average educational effect of
exposure to any period of the conflict for boys and girls in different age groups.
To analyse the effect of the conflict on primary school completion in 2007, we estimate
the following equation:
Gihjt = βVjt + αj + αt + αjt+X
′
hγ + ihjt (3.2)
where Gihjt refers to primary school completion for individual i of household h born
in district j in year t, defined as a binary variable equal to one if the individual has
completed at least primary school and zero otherwise. The adoption of a binary variable
as the dependent variable in place of a continuous one is motivated by our interest in
primary school completion rather than school attainment in general. The education sector
in Timor Leste is extremely under-developed, and most of the population is illiterate.
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Primary education is therefore a major concern in the country. We examined whether
our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions of the educational outcome
measure. To investigate the robustness of the results to the use of a continuous rather
than a binary variable, we used a maximum likelihood estimated ordered probit model for
school grade attainment allowing for the censorship of those still in school. This estimation
follows the methods proposed in Glewwe and Jacoby (1994), Holmes (2003), and Zhao and
Glewwe (2010). None of the key findings on the impact of violence intensity on educational
outcomes reported in this study are materially altered under this alternative approach.12
In the regression above, all standard errors are clustered at the year and district of
birth levels. The term Xh is a vector of household characteristics (i.e., education of the
household head and whether the household head is a farmer). The term Vjt is defined as
above and identifies individuals exposed to HVI. β is our parameter of interest, indicating
whether an additional year of primary school exposure to the conflict affects the probability
of primary school completion after the conflict ended compared to an individual who was
not affected by HVI during her primary school years. The two parameters αj and αt are
fixed effects for the districts of birth and the years of birth, respectively, and the term αjt
represents district-specific linear trends.13
In table 3.3, we report the differences in average primary school completion in 2007
between individuals exposed to high- or low-violence intensity in each of the three samples
analysed. These descriptive statistics show that boys exposed to HVI in 1999 (1977-1992
sample) exhibit a lower attainment rate than those who are less exposed to violence. The
opposite is true for girls. Children exposed to earlier peaks of high intensity violence
(1968-1984 sample) exhibit a lower completion rate than those living in districts and years
12The results of these exercises are available on request.
13We re-estimated the equation including a cubic district trend and a square root district trend to
account for possible nonlinear trends across districts. We do not find any difference in the estimates, and
we therefore only show the results that include a linear district trend. Results are available upon request.
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in which the violence was not as intense.
The empirical strategy discussed above assumes that no systematic relationship exists
between the intensity of the violence across districts and pre-conflict education levels at
the district level. The existence of time-varying unobservables that are correlated with
both the outcome and the conflict variables would bias our results. We have discussed this
issue in the section above. We show here that the assumption also holds for the medium-
and long-term analysis. The inclusion of district fixed effects in equation (3.2) allows us
to account for time-invariant differences in education levels across districts. By including
district-specific time trends, we account for any difference in trends across districts and
hence for any time-varying characteristics in a given district. However, this identification
strategy still relies on the assumption that there is no correlation between pre-conflict
trends in education and violence in specific districts. To test for this, we conducted
placebo tests on cohorts that supposedly were not exposed to the conflict during their
primary school years (table 3.4).
Because the geographical variation of the conflict differs between the early years and
1999, we estimate two separate models by defining different violence-affected districts and
placebo cohorts. We construct two violence-affected district dummies equal to one if the
individual’s district of birth is located in one of the HVI districts as defined above, during
the early years of the conflict or during the 1999 violence, and zero otherwise. The first
placebo test concentrates on the early years of the conflict. We are unable to analyse
pre-conflict cohorts because, as explained above, the cohort born before 1968 would have
attended a different school system. Therefore, we define those born between 1977 and 1980
as exposed placebo cohorts and compare them to those born between 1981 and 1984.14
As a further check, we also analyse violence exposure for cohorts born between 1977 and
14The cohorts truly exposed to the early years of the conflict are those born between 1968 and 1976. In
our placebo test, we examine the cohorts immediately following these.
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1981 and compare them to those born between 1982 and 1986. The treatment term is
the interaction between the placebo cohort and the HVI dummies. We expect to find
no effect of ”exposure” for cohorts who were not of primary school age but were born in
districts with HVI. We repeat the analysis with a focus on the 1999 violence. Individuals
born between 1982 and 1986 were not of primary school age in 1999. We define this latter
cohort as the placebo cohort and compare their exposure to that of those born between
1977 and 1981 in high- and low-violence intensity districts. The results in table 3.4 show
that cohorts who were not supposed to be of primary school age during the most violent
years, but who were born in HVI districts, do not show significant differences in primary
school completion rates relative to the same cohorts born in districts of low-intensity
violence. This result supports our identification assumptions.
3.4 Empirical results
In this section, we discuss the results of the short- and long-term analyses.
3.4.1 School attendance in 2001
The results in table 3.5 report the impact of the two channels of exposure to violence in
1999 on school attendance in the 1999/00 and 2000/01 school years. We are primarily
interested in the differential effects of the violence on school attendance in the post-violence
period, T3 (2000/01), relative to the pre-violence year, T1 (1998/99).
The results show a negative and significant impact of displacement on school attend-
ance in 2000/01 for the overall sample. We find that being affected by displacement alone
(panel C, table 3.5) decreases school attendance by 8.5 percentage points on average, with
stronger effects for boys. Individuals affected by both shocks experience a reduction in
school attendance of 13.3 percentage points on average, with girls being more severely af-
fected. We estimated a pooled model with interactions of the violence measures with the
169
female dummy. The results reported in panel C are statistically different between girls and
boys, as in table 3.5. The effects are stronger for younger children. These results suggest
that different violence channels affect school attendance in heterogeneous ways. School
attendance is most severely disrupted for children, particularly girls, who are affected by
both types of violence. Considering the channels separately, we observe that displacement
is the most disruptive channel in terms of consequences on children’s school attendance
because all household assets are likely to have been lost. Iba´n˜ez and Moya (2010) show
similar evidence for Colombia. The destruction of a home affects household wealth, but
perhaps less so if the household was able to retain other assets or to live with friends,
neighbors, or relatives.
3.4.2 School completion in 2007
In table 3.6, panel A, we report the estimates of our analysis of the effect of the 1999
violence on primary school completion in 2007.
The coefficient for the violence measure is negative but not statistically significant.
However, once we split the sample into boys and girls (columns 2 and 3),15 the results
show that boys exposed to violence during their primary school years are 18.3 percentage
points less likely to have completed primary school eight years after the 1999 violence
relative to boys not exposed to violence. This represents a 25 percent decrease in the
probability of primary school completion. In contrast, we observe that girls exposed to
the 1999 violence are 10.4 percentage points more likely to have completed primary school
in 2007. This represents a 14 percent increase in the probability of girls completing primary
school. We do not find any statistically significant differences across age groups.
We now turn to the effect of the peaks of violence in the earlier years of the conflict
15Similar to 2001, we estimated a pooled model for 2007 including an interaction term with the female
dummy. The results show that the effects are statistically different between boys and girls in panels A and
C.
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on primary school completion in 2007. In table 3.6, panel B, we report the results for the
sample of individuals born between 1968 and 1984. We find that an additional year of
exposure decreases school completion in 2007 for all individuals by 2.6 percentage points
and by 3 percentage points for boys. Therefore, the likelihood of primary school completion
for boys was reduced (for an average exposure of one year and 10 months) by 5.6 percentage
points. The effect is particularly strong for boys attending the last three years of primary
school (grades four to six) (column 5). We do not find a significant effect for girls.
The results in table 3.6, panel C, report the effect of the overall conflict on primary
school completion in 2007. The sample includes individuals born between 1968 and 1992.
The results indicate the average effect of exposure to both the first years of the conflict
and the 1999 violence. Because we examine the effects of both periods of high intensity
violence and because only one year of primary school could have been affected during the
1999 violence, we have transformed our treatment term into a binary variable (exposed
or not exposed during primary school) to ensure that we do not confound the results.
These results indicate that boys exposed to the conflict in any period are, on average, 7.4
percentage points less likely to complete primary school in 2007 than those less exposed
to violence. This effect represents a 10 percent decrease in the probability of primary
school completion for boys. This effect is stronger among boys attending the last three
years of primary school. The overall effect on girls is positive (most likely driven by the
1999 effects), corresponding to an 8.5 percent increase in the likelihood of primary school
completion.
3.4.3 Discussion of the results
The results above indicate that violent conflict in Timor Leste had mixed effects on edu-
cation. On average, the wave of violence in 1999 resulted in immediate hardships for the
education of boys and girls. Girls, however, recovered from the negative consequences
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of the 1999 violence in the medium term. When the same cohort was observed in 2007,
girls affected by the conflict had a higher and statistically significant positive chance of
completing primary school than girls who were not exposed to the violence. We find no
effect of the earlier peaks of violence on girls’ primary school completion, but we find a
positive and statistically significant effect (at 10 percent) of the entire conflict on girls’
primary school completion.
In contrast, boys exposed to the wave of violence in 1999 had a much lower probability
of having completed primary school by 2007 relative to boys unaffected by the violent
events. Earlier peaks of violence as well as the entire conflict have similar negative effects
on the education of boys in Timor Leste, particularly among boys attending the last grades
of primary school. The effect of earlier peaks of violence is smaller than the impact of
the 1999 violence, although we observe the persistence of significant negative educational
effects of the earlier years of the conflict in the longer term. The difference in the mag-
nitudes of the impacts of different peaks of violence may be because individuals affected
by the earlier violence may have had the opportunity to complete primary school or may
reflect the particularly violent nature of the 1999 events. In all cases, boys were rather
severely affected by violence over the 25 years of the Timor Leste conflict. The 1999 wave
of violence in Timor Leste was brutal, but the recovery was rapid, as discussed in section
3.2. Although problems remain, violence-affected areas have clearly benefited from this
reconstruction effort. This finding is in line with results reported for other conflict-affected
countries in Bellows and Miguel (2006) and elsewhere. Our results show, however, that
only girls affected by the violence seem to have been able to recover (and even improve)
their educational outcomes.16 The results for boys are persistently negative. An uneven
negative impact of violent conflict on boys’ educational outcomes is also reported in Akresh
16In a recent paper Valente (2013) also finds that conflict casualties increased female educational attain-
ment in Nepal.
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and de Walque (2011) for Rwanda and Verwimp and Bavel (2011) for Burundi.17
Given the discussion in section 3.2, it is unlikely that this result is explained by supply-
side factors, such as the destruction of schools or the absence of teachers. The post-conflict
reconstruction process had clear, positive impacts on the educational outcomes of girls
exposed to violence, possibly because of a strong consideration of gender concerns in the
UN interventions in Timor Leste (Olsson, 2009). However, it is highly unlikely that these
programs would have been biased against educating boys. A more likely explanation is
that the negative impact of the conflict on boys’ education in Timor Leste is related to
the different roles that boys and girls play within the household.
As mentioned in section 3.3, boys who were affected by the violence in 1999, on average,
tended to work more and longer hours in 2001 (table 3.2). We estimated a reduced form
regression of the incidence of conflict on child labor in the aftermath of the 1999 violence.
Specifically we estimate the probability of children aged 10-14 years worked in the week
prior to the 2001 survey. The results in table 3.A.1 in the Appendix indicate a positive
correlation between conflict exposure (displacement) and the probability of boys working:
boys affected by displacement are 11 percentage points more likely to work than boys
unaffected by violence. Affected girls, however, are 3.6 percentage points less likely to
work. Other studies have shown that child labor is a key factor in explaining low school
enrolment rates in Timor Leste, particularly among boys. For instance, as Pedersen and
Arneberg (1999) report, ‘Poverty is the main reason why some 20 percent of children
never get the chance to go to school. (. . . ) Children, especially boys, work when their
parents do not have jobs or their families are headed by single mothers’ (pp. 83). This
argument is in line with findings in the literature regarding household coping strategies
in the face of adverse shocks, which have widely documented the use of children as an
17For a review of the literature on the impact of violent conflict on education, see Justino (2012a).
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economic security mechanism (see Dasgupta (1993); Duryea et al. (2007); Nugent and
Gillaspy (1983)). In areas experiencing violent conflicts, households may decide to replace
dead, injured, absent, or disabled adult workers with children (if they have not also become
fighters). Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) analyse the effect of war on child labor and find
that violent attacks by armed groups in Columbian municipalities significantly increased
the probability of school dropout and the presence of children, particularly boys, in the
labor market.
The above results suggest that household economic needs in Timor Leste may also
have resulted in boys dropping out of school, a mechanism that may, in turn, explain the
negative impact of the conflict on boys’ education. This mechanism is not conclusive, and
it is possible that school dropout may have occurred if boys joined armed groups as fighters
or occupied other supporting roles. Data to test this alternative hypothesis are unavailable,
but there are some indications that children joined both the pro-independence troops and
paramilitary groups and militias. UNICEF (2001) states that ‘[b]oth the pro-independence
and pro-integration forces in East Timor used children as armed combatants during period
of the Indonesian occupation and its violent resolution after the 1999 referendum. On both
sides of the conflict the age of child soldiers ranged from 10 to 18 years old, although most
were between the age of 15 and 18 years old’ (pp. 18). Given this age range, it is unlikely
that our results are strongly driven by increases in the number of child soldiers. However,
we cannot completely exclude this channel given the lack of sufficiently rigorous empirical
evidence.
Taken together, the various pieces of evidence discussed above point to school dropout-
most likely owing to economic necessity, but potentially for other reasons-as an important
channel through which the conflict may have negatively affected educational outcomes
among boys in Timor Leste. These effects may have considerable consequences for the
country’s future economic and political stability given the accumulation of negative edu-
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cation shocks among boys over the 25-year conflict, which may have trapped a significant
number of individuals in cycles of low human capital and low productivity. In particu-
lar, recent studies have reported that large numbers of young men who dropped out of
school during the conflict in Timor Leste are currently members of gangs and martial arts
groups in Dili, which are responsible for increases in insecurity and violence in Timor Leste
(Kostner and Clark, 2007; Muggah et al., 2010; Scambary, 2009).
3.4.4 Robustness checks
We performed several robustness checks to address some important issues that may affect
the results discussed above. In addition to the various validity checks reported in previous
sections, we separately address the possible exposure of the 2007 sample to the civil viol-
ence that erupted in Timor Leste in 2006 and potential biases in the 2001 and 2007 results
due to non-random migration patterns. Supporting tables are presented in the appendix.
As mentioned in section 3.2, in 2006, Timor Leste experienced substantial internal civil
strife owing to fighting between different factions of the independence forces. The violence
in 2006 resulted in 37 killings, 2,000 severely damaged houses, 3,000 completely destroyed
houses, and 150,000 displaced people (Muggah et al., 2010; Scambary, 2009). Most dis-
placed people were located in the vicinity of Dili (where 65 internally displaced person
camps were located) and were still displaced in 2007. Despite the decision to restart the
2007 survey once the violence had subsided (see footnote 3), it is possible that some of
the results discussed in the section above are not due to exposure to the 1999 violence but
due to exposure to the civil upheaval in 2006. To control for this potential exposure to
the violence in 2006, we explore a variable in the 2007 dataset that captures whether an
individual was absent from home in the past 12 months for security reasons (2.7 percent
of the sample). Our calculations show that individuals who were absent from home for
security reasons in 2006 all resided in Dili. Therefore, we believe that this dummy reliably
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captures the level of exposure to the 2006 violence. The results in table 3.A.2 are nearly
identical to those in table 3.6, indicating that our main conclusions are unlikely to be
biased by the effects of the civil violence in 2006.
Another important concern is that some individuals migrated at some point in their
lives.18 The 2001 and 2007 datasets provide information on their places of birth and their
current places of residence. The data do not allow us to establish when this migration
occurred or whether these individuals migrated for conflict-related reasons. Thus, the
migration variable is potentially noisy and prone to misclassification error. The direction
of the endogeneity bias is difficult to predict a priori.19 If, for instance, individuals did not
choose their new place of residence randomly (Kondylis, 2010) and those who migrated
went to areas in which economic conditions are typically better (for instance, urban areas),
our results would likely be under-estimated. Conversely, the effect of the violence would be
over-estimated if migrants relocated to places where they received inferior education. In
addition, individuals who decided to migrate may differ from those who did not migrate.
If this is the case and, for example, only wealthier and more educated households were
able to migrate, then including these individuals in our estimates would underestimate
the overall effect of the violence.
To assess whether the bias deriving from migration is a serious concern in our analysis,
in tables 3.A.3 and 3.A.4, we present estimates from regressions that include a sample
of individuals who never moved from their places of birth. These estimates test whether
18The migration decision should be interpreted as distinct from the occurrence of displacement in 1999
in Timor Leste. Although it is relatively common in the conflict literature to treat displacement as a
migration decision (see, for instance, Chamarbagwala and Mora´n (2011) for Guatemala, Kondylis (2010)
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iban˜ez and Moya (2010) for Colombia), this is not an appropriate means
of addressing displacement in the case of Timor Leste because our displacement variable is based on the
respondents’ reported displacement experience rather than a migration outcome. We have also estimated
the determinants of migration and found that displacement does not play a significant role in migration
decisions.
19It is important to note that issues regarding the potential endogeneity of the migration decision need
to be considered as distinct in this context from potential endogeneity concerns regarding the displacement
measure, which have been discussed in section 3.3.
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the results in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 hold when we restrict the sample to non-migrants.
The results are broadly comparable in terms of magnitude, signs, and significance to those
obtained using the full sample. In addition, the proportions of individuals who migrated
to a different place are 13 percent of the 2001 sample and 19 percent and 24 percent of the
2007 samples (the 1977-92 and 1968-84 cohorts, respectively). This finding suggests that
even in the extreme scenario where the estimated effect was zero for migrants, the overall
estimated effect would only be attenuated by approximately one-quarter of its value. We
are therefore quite confident that our results are not biased as a result of migration choices.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The aim of this essay was to examine the effects of the 25 years of conflict in Timor Leste on
educational outcomes among boys and girls exposed to violence. We began by analysing
the impact of the wave of violence that occurred during the withdrawal of Indonesian
troops in 1999. We first analysed the short-term impact of the 1999 violence on primary
school attendance in 2001 and its longer-term impact on school completion for the same
cohorts of children observed again in 2007. We compared these latter results to the impacts
of the peaks of violence in the 1970s and 1980s on schooling outcomes observed in 2007
(among those who were of primary school age at the time of the various violent events)
and to the overall average educational impact of the conflict. This approach enabled us to
compare the impact of a long-duration conflict on educational outcomes during the overall
conflict and during peaks of violence.
In line with the existing literature on the effects of violent conflict on educational
outcomes, we find that the conflict in Timor Leste led to considerable adverse impacts on
educational outcomes, particularly among boys exposed to the violence. We find, however,
that the impact of the conflict on girls’ education, although negative in the short-term
in terms of school attendance, did not hinder their school attainment in the longer term
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because they were able to benefit from the rapid reconstruction of the education system in
violence-affected areas. In contrast, the 25 years of violent conflict had a clearly negative
impact on the education of boys in Timor Leste that persisted across generations. This
result is consistent for different peaks of violence throughout the conflict in Timor Leste.
Generations of young Timorese boys have experienced considerable reductions in their
accumulation of human capital, which may now be reflected in increases in insecurity,
unemployment, and violence in the country since 2006.
We have discussed evidence suggesting that the negative impact of violence on boys’
education is due to boys dropping out of school. This is likely to be caused by household
investment trade-offs between education and economic survival, where boys would have
been removed from school to participate in household economic activities. It is also possible
that a small number of young boys may have dropped out of school to join armed groups.
These results have important policy implications. One implication is the importance
of educational recovery in areas affected by violent conflict. The Timor Leste case suggests
that early recovery may have positive results for the lives of children (girls, in this case).
Another key implication is that reconstruction policies must pay greater attention to their
redistributive impacts across genders and different population characteristics. Although
girls recovered quickly from the conflict, boys did not, despite the large investment in the
early recovery of the education system in Timor Leste. The evidence for Timor Leste
suggests that boys were very vulnerable to both the direct effects of violence on education
outcomes and indirect effects through household welfare mechanisms. This result implies
that much more attention must be paid to understanding how children are affected by
violent conflict and the different roles girls and boys assume during and after the con-
flict because these are likely to perpetuate the risks associated with renewed conflict and
persistent vulnerabilities across generations.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: School Attendance Rates by Channel of Violence Exposure
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Figure 3.2: Pre-conflict Trends in Education Levels
 
 
 
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
g
r
a
d
e
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
Year of birth
Not affected Affected
Displaced
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
g
r
a
d
e
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
Year of birth
Not affected Affected
House damaged
Notes: The plots are based on the estimation of separate kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions of the last completed grade of schooling against age using an Epanechnikov kernel.
Source: Authors' own computations using TLSS 2001
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Tables
Table 3.1: Attendance rates of children aged 7-12 years between 1998 and 2001
 
 
 
 All: 8–11 years old Younger cohort: 8–9 years old Older cohort: 10–11 years old 
 All Boys Girls t  test All Boys Girls t  test All Boys Girls t  test 
1998/99 0.634 0.611 0.659  0.509 0.498 0.521  0.750 0.720 0.782  
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) n.s. (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) n.s. (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) n.s. 
1999/00 0.676 0.654 0.700  0.622 0.602 0.647  0.726 0.705 0.749  
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) n.s. (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) n.s. (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) n.s. 
2000/01 0.854 0.836 0.874  0.822 0.789 0.860  0.884 0.881 0.887  
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) * (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) ** (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) n.s. 
N 966 512 454  466 251 215  500 261 239  
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  n.s. = not statistically significant.  We consider the same cohort over time: the sample is 
aged 7–10 years in 1998, 8–11 years in 1999, and 9–12 years in 2000. 
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Table 3.2: Individual and household characteristics by channel of violence exposure in 2001
 
 
 All children 7-12 Boys 7-12 Girls 7-12 
 Displaced House damaged Displaced House damaged Displaced House damaged 
 0 1 t  test 0 1 t  test 0 1 t  test 0 1 t  test 0 1 t  test 0 1 t  test
Panel A – All children (7-12 years old) 
Being female 0.472 0.500  0.484 0.454 n.s.              
Speaking Indonesian 0.575 0.720 *** 0.584 0.632 n.s. 0.577 0.701 ** 0.580 0.634 n.s. 0.574 0.738 *** 0.589 0.631  
Speaking Portuguese 0.028 0.033 n.s. 0.030 0.027 n.s. 0.032 0.028 n.s. 0.031 0.035 n.s. 0.024 0.037 n.s. 0.029 0.018  
HH head is a farmer 0.646 0.556 ** 0.623 0.659 n.s. 0.649 0.570 n.s. 0.639 0.634 n.s. 0.642 0.542 * 0.606 0.690 ** 
Education grade of HH head 3.114 3.651 n.s. 3.332 2.783 ** 2.954 3.210 n.s. 3.099 2.685 n.s. 3.293 4.084 n.s. 3.581 2.899 * 
Education grade of the mother 1.870 2.785 *** 2.200 1.435 *** 1.827 2.252 n.s. 2.061 1.406 ** 1.918 3.318 *** 2.348 1.470 *** 
Education grade of the father 2.824 3.495 * 3.037 2.589 ** 2.802 2.869 n.s. 2.944 2.446 n.s. 2.848 4.121 ** 3.136 2.762  
Living in urban areas 0.402 0.533 *** 0.419 0.427 n.s. 0.396 0.551 *** 0.413 0.431 n.s. 0.409 0.514 ** 0.426 0.423  
Per capita monthly HH expenditure 238,963 262,113 n.s. 244,940 234,904 n.s. 250,901 249,806 n.s. 245,971 263,914 n.s. 225,635 274,421 * 243,843 200,024 *** 
N 1236 214  1080 370  652 107  557 202  584 107  523 168  
Panel B – Children aged 10–12 (labor market characteristics) 
Has worked in the past seven days 0.063 0.088 n.s. 0.070 0.056 n.s. 0.054 0.167 ** 0.071 0.063 n.s. 0.073 0.019 ** 0.070 0.048 n.s. 
Working hours 1.468 2.098 n.s. 1.722 1.084 n.s. 1.117 4.292 ** 1.582 1.406 n.s. 1.857 0.148 *** 1.868 0.711 n.s. 
Has performed domestic chores 0.902 0.912 n.s. 0.897 0.922 n.s. 0.889 0.854 n.s. 0.888 0.875 n.s. 0.916 0.963 n.s. 0.907 0.976 n.s. 
N 602 102  525 179  316 48  268 96  286 54  257 83  
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. n.s. = not statistically significant. In the title, 0 refers to not affected individuals while 1 refers to affected individuals.  
HH indicates household. Per capita monthly HH expenditure is expressed in Rupiah in real values using CPI of 2001.  
182
Table 3.3: Average primary school completion in 2007
 
 
 All Boys Girls 
 Low-intensity 
violence  
High- intensity 
violence  
t test Low-intensity 
violence  
High- intensity 
violence  
t test Low-intensity 
violence  
High- intensity 
violence  
t test 
Panel A – All primary school age children 
1977–1992 sample 0.725 0.724 n.s 0.752 0.709 ** 0.698 0.739 ** 
 (0.006) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.020)  (0.008) (0.017)  
1968–1984 sample 0.624 0.572 *** 0.680 0.658 n.s. 0.569 0.472 *** 
 (0.007) (0.023)  (0.010) (0.032)  (0.009) (0.034)  
1968–1992 sample 0.679 0.674 n.s 0.720 0.692 ** 0.636 0.654 n.s. 
 (0.005) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.006) (0.013)  
Panel B – Children of grade 1–3 age 
1977–1992 sample 0.731 0.692 ** 0.751 0.673 *** 0.709 0.711 n.s. 
 (0.005) (0.019)  (0.008) (0.029)  (0.007) (0.025)  
1968–1984 sample 0.623 0.571 *** 0.679 0.659 n.s. 0.567 0.471 *** 
 (0.007) (0.024)  (0.010) (0.032)  (0.010) (0.035)  
1968–1992 sample 0.687 0.637 *** 0.723 0.666 *** 0.650 0.605 ** 
 (0.004) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.016)  (0.006) (0.016)  
Panel C – Children of grade 4–6 age 
1977–1992 sample 0.719 0.759 ** 0.738 0.749 n.s. 0.700 0.769 *** 
 (0.005) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.028)  (0.007) (0.023)  
1968–1984 sample 0.622 0.524 *** 0.680 0.634 n.s. 0.564 0.385 *** 
 (0.007) (0.037)  (0.010) (0.051)  (0.009) (0.054)  
1968–1992 sample 0.675 0.690 n.s. 0.711 0.713 n.s. 0.638 0.664 n.s. 
 (0.004) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.021)  (0.006) (0.019)  
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  n.s. = not statistically significant.   
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Table 3.4: Placebo test for differences in trends in ecucation levels
 
 
 
 1977–1984 sample 1977–1986 sample 1977–1986 sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
HVI district*Cohort 1977–80 0.062 0.070 0.052       
 (0.047) (0.054) (0.061)       
HVI district*Cohort 1977–81    0.021 0.059 −0.018    
    (0.044) (0.048) (0.058)    
HVI district(a) 0.014 0.031 −0.003 0.040 0.014 0.063    
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.043) (0.030) (0.029) (0.043)    
HVI district*Cohort 1982–86       −0.015 0.044 −0.078 
       (0.043) (0.050) (0.054) 
HVI district(b)       −0.051 −0.037 −0.060 
       (0.031) (0.040) (0.038) 
N 2,542 1,255 1,287 3,402 1,699 1,703 3,402 1,699 1,703 
R-squared 0.158 0.156 0.153 0.140 0.131 0.141 0.141 0.130 0.151 
Notes: Authors' computations using TLSS 2007.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the year of birth * district level. 
Regressions include year and district fixed effects and controls (whether the household head is a farmer and the household head’s level of education). HVI district(a) equals one if 
the individual’s district of birth is found to be a conflict-affected district during the early years of conflict (1975–1979 and 1983), as defined by our violence measure. HVI 
district(b) equals one if the individual’s district of birth is found to be a conflict-affected district during the 1999 violence as defined by our violence measure. 
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Table 3.5: Impact of 1999 violence on school attendance in 2001
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All 8–11 Boys 8–11 Girls 8–11 All 8–9 Boys 8–9 Girls 8–9 All 10–11 Boys 10–11 Girls 10–11 
Panel A – Impact of displacement 
D*T2  −0.184*** −0.199*** −0.172*** −0.198*** −0.212*** −0.185** −0.188*** −0.209** −0.170** 
 (0.045) (0.056) (0.060) (0.047) (0.065) (0.074) (0.061) (0.088) (0.077) 
D*T3  −0.127*** −0.111** −0.141*** −0.182*** −0.138* −0.233*** −0.089** −0.106* −0.066 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.077) (0.071) (0.038) (0.055) (0.055) 
N 2,898 1,536 1,362 1,398 753 645 1,500 783 717 
R-squared 0.151 0.155 0.146 0.217 0.199 0.241 0.110 0.130 0.091 
Panel B – Impact of house damage 
H* T2 −0.101** −0.109** −0.091* −0.075 −0.137* −0.012 −0.129*** −0.077 −0.196*** 
 (0.042) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.070) (0.070) (0.048) (0.067) (0.059) 
H* T3 0.027 0.016 0.040 0.046 0.027 0.061 0.004 0.014 −0.016 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.077) (0.078) (0.037) (0.052) (0.056) 
N 2,898 1,536 1,362 1,398 753 645 1,500 783 717 
R-squared 0.147 0.153 0.142 0.209 0.198 0.226 0.110 0.122 0.106 
Panel C: Impact of displacement and house damage
D* T2 −0.060 −0.076 −0.050 −0.070 −0.086 −0.058 −0.079 −0.122 −0.064 
 (0.049) (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.068) (0.087) (0.069) (0.109) (0.085) 
D* T3 −0.085* −0.154*** −0.041 −0.153** −0.248*** −0.098 −0.039 −0.048 −0.020 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.065) (0.064) (0.070) (0.100) (0.055) (0.110) (0.065) 
H* T2 −0.015 −0.030 0.002 0.027 −0.039 0.084 −0.062 −0.011 −0.130** 
 (0.050) (0.068) (0.057) (0.063) (0.091) (0.077) (0.053) (0.076) (0.058) 
H*T3 0.087* 0.045 0.134** 0.114 0.036 0.173** 0.052 0.065 0.028 
 (0.050) (0.064) (0.058) (0.072) (0.096) (0.086) (0.044) (0.063) (0.057) 
D*H* T2 −0.233** −0.174 −0.296** −0.282*** −0.193 −0.364** −0.156 −0.116 −0.158 
 (0.094) (0.114) (0.123) (0.104) (0.136) (0.152) (0.122) (0.171) (0.151) 
D*H* T3 −0.133* 0.037 −0.304*** −0.122 0.166 −0.413*** −0.123 −0.129 −0.119 
 (0.077) (0.103) (0.087) (0.114) (0.158) (0.121) (0.075) (0.128) (0.098) 
N 2,898 1,536 1,362 1,398 753 645 1,500 783 717 
R-squared 0.162 0.164 0.163 0.228 0.217 0.257 0.122 0.134 0.117 
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table reports fixed effect estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
village level. Regressions include time effects (T2 refers to 1999/00; T3 refers to 2000/01). D, H, and D*H are dummies, respectively defined as one if individual was displaced with the 
whole household, whether the house was completely damaged, and whether the individual was affected by both violent shocks. 
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Table 3.6: Impact of conflict on primary school completion in 2007
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
Panel A – Effect of 1999 violence (1977-1992) 
Years of prim. school in HVI  −0.041 −0.183*** 0.104**    
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.047)    
Years of grade 1–3 in HVI     −0.069* −0.210*** 0.080 
    (0.038) (0.056) (0.064) 
Years of grade 4–6 in HVI     −0.040 −0.183*** 0.105** 
    (0.029) (0.044) (0.048) 
N 6,676 3,383 3,293 6,676 3,383 3,293 
R-squared 0.150 0.144 0.180 0.150 0.144 0.180 
Panel B – Effect of early years of conflict (1968-1984) 
Years of prim. school in HVI −0.026** −0.030** −0.021    
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)    
Years of grade 1–3 in HVI     −0.021* −0.022 −0.018 
    (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) 
Years of grade 4–6 in HVI     −0.040** −0.054** −0.031 
    (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) 
N 5,195 2,625 2,570 5,195 2,625 2,570 
R-squared 0.338 0.358 0.318 0.338 0.358 0.318 
Panel C – Effect of entire conflict (1968-1992) 
HVI in primary school −0.012 −0.074*** 0.055*    
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.030)    
HVI in grade 1–3    −0.006 −0.035 0.031 
    (0.019) (0.023) (0.029) 
HVI in grade 4–6    −0.019 −0.075*** 0.044 
    (0.019) (0.027) (0.029) 
N 9,329 4,753 4,576 9,329 4,753 4,576 
R-squared 0.241 0.231 0.266 0.241 0.231 0.266 
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007.  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses clustered at the year of birth * district level. Regressions include year and district fixed effects, district time 
trend (defined as the interaction between the district category and birth year), and controls (whether the household head 
is a farmer and the household head’s level of education). 
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.A.1: Probability of child labour in 2000/01
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Boys Girls 
Displaced  0.021 0.109** -0.036* 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.021) 
House damage -0.017 -0.016 -0.019 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) 
Both shocks -0.008 -0.032 0.015 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.070) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1082 579 503 
Pseudo R-squared 0.080 0.082 0.129 
Notes: Authors' computations using TLSS 2001. We report marginal effects from a probit regression model. The sample 
includes children aged 10-14 in 2000/01. Controls include: household per capita expenditures, whether they speak 
Indonesian, grades completed by the mother and father, the occupation of the head of household, gender of the head of 
household, household size, and region of residence. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.A.2: Robustness check: impact of conflict on primary school completion in 2007, controlling for 2007 civil violence
 
 
 Impact of 1999 violence 
(1977–1992 sample) 
Impact of early years of conflict  
(1968–1984 sample) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
Years of prim. school in HVI −0.042 −0.186*** 0.105** −0.026** −0.032** −0.021 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.047) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) 
Absent home past 12 months 0.083*** 0.066 0.104*** 0.086*** 0.095** 0.079* 
 (0.023) (0.043) (0.032) (0.030) (0.040) (0.045) 
N 6,676 3,383 3,293 5,195 2,625 2,570 
R-squared 0.151 0.144 0.181 0.339 0.359 0.318 
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the year of birth * district level. 
Regressions include year and district fixed effects, district time trend (defined as the interaction between the district category and birth year), and controls (whether the household 
head is a farmer and the household head’s level of education). 
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Table 3.A.3: Robustness check: impact of 1999 violence on school attendance in 2001, non-migrant sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
D*T2 −0.200*** −0.213*** −0.188**    −0.053 −0.071 −0.042 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.072)    (0.058) (0.067) (0.076) 
          
D*T3 −0.144*** −0.130*** −0.157***    −0.082 −0.150** −0.037 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.053)    (0.053) (0.066) (0.074) 
          
H* T2    −0.124*** −0.119* −0.129** −0.027 −0.031 −0.022 
    (0.047) (0.061) (0.062) (0.057) (0.077) (0.067) 
          
H*T3    0.005 0.003 0.007 0.077 0.043 0.118* 
    (0.044) (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.070) (0.065) 
          
D*H*T2       −0.263** −0.206 −0.326** 
       (0.108) (0.129) (0.143) 
          
D*H*T3       −0.167* 0.002 −0.343*** 
       (0.088) (0.113) (0.096) 
N 2,553 1,383 1,170 2,553 1,383 1,170 2,553 1,383 1,170 
R-squared 0.157 0.161 0.154 0.154 0.157 0.150 0.169 0.169 0.173 
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table reports fixed effect estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
the village level. Regressions include time effects (T2 refers to the 1999/00 school year, and T3 refers to the 2000/01 school year); D, H, and D*H are dummies, respectively, 
defined as 1 if the individual was displaced with the whole household, whether the house was completely damaged, and whether the individual was affected by both violent 
shocks. 
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Table 3.A.4: Robustness check: impact of conflict on primary school completion in 2007, non-migrant sample
 
 
 
 Impact of 1999 violence  
(1977–1992 sample) 
Impact of early years of conflict  
(1968–1984 sample) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
Years of prim. school in HVI  −0.033 −0.166*** 0.103* −0.015 −0.018 −0.014 
 (0.036) (0.054) (0.057) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) 
N 5,446 2,803 2,643 3,963 2,041 1,922 
R-squared 0.151 0.150 0.178 0.330 0.374 0.292 
Notes: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the year of birth * district level. 
Regressions include year and district fixed effects, district time trend (defined as the interaction between the district category and birth year), and controls (whether the household 
head is a farmer and the household head’s level of education). 
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Conclusions
This thesis has provided an empirical analysis of child labour and female empowerment in
Nepal, and of conflict in Timor Leste, looking at specific aspects that relate to children,
women and economic development. The three studies offer important contributions on
issues which have received only limited attention to date in the development economics
literature.
The first chapter analysed child labour among farm households of rural Nepal. The
estimates suggested that children’s contribution on the farm is not negligible and might
be necessary for the subsistence of these households. However, reasons other than poverty
appear to explain part of the child labour supply in agricultural households. Imperfections
in the labour market may in part explain the labour supply of children, particularly of
boys, in those households that are not at the top-end of the land distribution.
In the second chapter, we investigated the effects of an increase in female participa-
tion in the Executive Committees of Community Forest User Groups of Nepal on firewood
collection. The results revealed that a higher participation of women reduces firewood col-
lection. This suggests that, given the interests that women have in ensuring the availability
of products essential to their daily lives, once in a decision making position, women favour
decisions towards a sustainable extraction of firewood and ultimately to forest protection.
The last chapter examined the short-term and longer-term impacts of a widely-ignored
but long-lasting conflict - the Timor Leste conflict that endured for 25 years - on the
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educational outcomes of girls and boys. We found that the conflict had considerable
adverse effects particularly on boys which also hindered their school attainment in the
longer term. In contrast, the educational outcomes of girls, despite being negatively
affected in the short-term, did not exhibit these adverse consequences in the longer term.
Girls have been able to benefit from the rapid reconstruction process of the education
system. The findings suggest instead that boys have not equally benefited from this
process, possibly because of household trade-offs between education and economic survival,
whereby many boys may have been removed from school and put to work.
Our analysis provides some novel contributions in understanding how child labour in
agricultural households reacts to changing economic conditions and how children’s edu-
cational outcomes are affected by violent events. In particular, policies focusing on the
removal of constraints to the rural labour markets and on early post-conflict interventions
may eliminate some factors which hinder children’s development and ultimately economic
development. In general, our results suggest that policies need to place particular atten-
tion to how differently boys and girls react to changing economic conditions and to violent
conflicts. Most of the gender differences we identify are driven by the different roles that
boys and girls assume within the household in these contexts. The existence of social and
cultural norms in these countries partly explains these differences.
We also offer a unique analysis of the link between women and economic develop-
ment. The recognition of a greater role for women in forestry seem to be beneficial to the
effectiveness of local collective action institutions. This study offers an important contri-
bution suggesting that policies that place specific provisions on the gender composition
of decision-making bodies of local collective action institutions may ultimately improve
economic development.
Although this thesis explores in depth important relationships among children, women
and economic development, there are some limitations which we need to highlight, and
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offer some suggestions for future research.
In the first chapter, we have not formally established whether the estimated contri-
bution of child labour to the farm is necessary to households to meet their subsistence
needs. Future research may focus on developing the theoretical model by adding a sub-
sistence constraint, hence deriving testable propositions. This development in particular
would enrich our analysis as it would allow us to establish more clearly not only how much
children contribute but also whether this contribution is essential to the family.
Further, our data does not contain information on the specific task in which each type
of labourer is involved on the farm and the use of inputs (including labour) on each single
output and on different types of plots. Progress in the analysis could be made if data
on this is made available. It would allow us to measure the productivity of each type
of worker on a single activity, on each single output and on plots under different modes
of land operation. This would yield additional insights into differences in contribution
between, for instance, child and adult family labour, boys and girls, family and hired
labour.
In addition, due to data limitations, we do not test for the equality between marginal
product of labour (the shadow wage) and market wages. Imperfections in labour markets,
transaction costs and any allocative inefficiency in the use of labour inputs may create
a wedge between these two outcomes. Our results suggest such a difference. However, a
forward step we could make is to provide shadow wage estimates that account for such
allocative inefficiencies. Given the importance of quantifying correctly the contribution
of child labour to the family farms, this would provide more refined estimates of shadow
wages. It would inform better on imperfections in the markets and of any allocative
inefficiencies. This adjusted measure can then be used in the structural labour supply
estimation. One relevant methodology is that developed by Barrett et al. (2008) but
further research can concentrate on exploring other methodologies that require less detailed
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data.
Finally, the estimates from the reduced form model offered results that merit further
investigation. Additional research may concentrate on looking more deeply at the role of
the mode of operation of land in explaining child labour within agricultural households.
In the second chapter, the use of two data sources, specifically the household surveys
and the census of FUGs offers unique information for our analysis. However, future re-
search may concentrate in also looking at the variation in the characteristics of groups in
the same village and in accounting for heterogeneity between households that are mem-
bers of FUGs or not. The availability of more detailed data on FUG membership at the
household level could serve for these purposes and give additional insights on the role of
women within FUGs.
In addition, an interesting development of our analysis would be to look at the dis-
tributional effects of an increased role of women (i.e., equity). Our results do not allow
us to establish whether the reduction in firewood extraction generated by an increase
in female participation, despite favouring the protection of forests, may hurt or benefit
some portions of the population more than others. Data on FUGs’ participation at the
household level may serve to explain further our results looking at heterogeneous effects,
thus shedding light on equity issues. The analysis of the distribution of benefits of FUGs
and whether it is equal across population groups is as important as ensuring that these
groups are effective in protecting the forests. In addition, the way the surplus income
generated within the FUG is spent locally can be affected by the increased role of women
within the FUGs. This is also an interesting aspect that is worth exploring. Women
may invest disproportionately on goods that are related directly to their concerns (e.g.,
children related goods and outcomes) and on the welfare of their households. Additional
outcomes also merit further exploration. For example, increased female participation may
also favourably affect the time women and children spend in collecting firewood and also
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their health. This suggested further research may inform us about the direct effect of
empowering women on children’s outcomes and development.
A recently released nationally representative survey commissioned by the Ministry of
Forest and Soil Conservation (MFSC) jointly with some bilateral donors, which cover 137
FUGs in 47 districts based on 2,069 households, can be exploited for this type of future
research. The data is extremely useful as it includes information at the household level on
a wide range of characteristics of the FUGs, and specifically of the Executive Committees,
including the gender composition.
Finally the role that donors and the conflict played in relationship to the participation
of women in the ECs of FUGs is also worth exploring in future research.
In the third chapter, we offer suggestive explanations for the different effects we find
between boys and girls. Additional data would be helpful in further investigating the
mechanisms we are suggesting and also to exclude others. We explain the reasons why we
exclude supply side mechanisms as potential explanations. However, data on the number
of schools and the number of teachers before and after the conflict would allow us to
empirically test the role of these mechanisms in explaining our results. In addition, we only
offer qualitative evidence regarding the low percentage of boys who join armed groups.
Data on the number of child soldiers would also offer additional insights to reinforce
our arguments. Finally, while our research question focuses on the effects of conflict on
educational outcomes, our findings suggest the need for further research to investigate the
effects on the labour outcomes of those whose education was affected during the conflict.
The analysis of gender differentials may be of particular interest.
In summary, this thesis makes relevant contributions in highlighting specific aspects
that relate children and women to economic development. We provide a useful basis for
investigating further issues that have not been adequately addressed in the literature.
Despite the fact that Nepal and Timor Leste offered two ideal contexts for our analysis,
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our results provide some external validity and suggest that policies and further research
may also be applied in similar context of other developing countries.
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